COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

LIBRARY

Volume X SPRING 1958 Number 2

Chaucer's Good Fair White: Woman and Symbol. By Stephen Manning 97

Dante and Epicurus. By Joseph Anthony Mazzeo 106

Structural Symmetry in the Episodic Narratives of *Don Quijote*, Part One. By Raymond Immerwahr 121

Rilke and his French Contemporaries. By Renée Lang 136

Ernst Jünger's Concern with E. A. Poe. By H. F. Peters 144

Scriptor Classicus. By Georg Luck 150

Book Reviews 159

The Victorian Poets: A Guide to Research, ed. by Frederic E. Faverty (William E. Buckler). *A Dictionary of Spanish Literature*, by Maxim Newmark (P. J. Powers). *Indiana University Conference on Oriental-Western Literary Relations*, ed. by Horst Frenz and G. L. Anderson (Hans H. Frankel). *Joyce et Mallarmé*, by David Hayman (William Y. Tindall). *Strindbergs Erövring av Paris / Strindberg och Frankike 1884-1895*, by Stellan Ahlström (Harry Bergholz). *La Musique instrumentale de la Renaissance* (Nan Cooke Carpenter). *La primera versión castellana de Atala*, by Pedro Grases (Hugh H. Chapman, Jr.) *Rainer Maria Rilke: Creative Anguish of a Modern Poet*, by W. L. Graff (Wolfgang Leppmann.) *Racine and English Classicism*, by Katherine E. Wheatley (Irving Massey). *De Sanctis on Dante*, trans. by Joseph Rossi and Alfred Galpin (G. N. G. Orsini). *The Radical Novel in the United States, 1900-1950*, by Walter B. Rideout (James B. Hall). *The Figure of the Musician in German Literature*, by George C. Schoolfield (Bayard Quincy Morgan), *El barroco o el descubrimiento del drama*, by Alejandro Cioranescu (H.H.). *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri*, trans. by Glen Levin Swiggert (H.H.). *The First English Translation of the Decameron*, by H. G. Wright (S. B. Liljegren). *Platonism in French Renaissance Poetry*, by Robert Valentine Merrill with Robert J. Clements (Robert M. Burgess).

Varia 188

Fernand Baldensperger (1871-1958), by Hélène Harvitt. Announcements. Books Received.

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, EUGENE, OREGON

With the Cooperation of the Comparative Literature Section of the Modern Language Association of America

Issued quarterly. Entered as second-class matter, April 5, 1949, at the post office at Eugene, Oregon, under act of August 24, 1912.

Comparative Literature

Editor
CHANDLER B. BEALL
University of Oregon
Eugene, Ore.

Associate Editor
WERNER P. FRIEDERICH
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N.C.

Assistant Editor
PERRY J. POWERS
University of Oregon
Eugene, Ore.

Editorial Board

FRANCIS FERGUSSON
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, N.J.

VICTOR LANGE
Princeton University
Princeton, N.J.

HELMUT HATZFELD
Catholic University
Washington, D.C.

HARRY LEVIN
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

RENÉ WELLEK
Yale University
New Haven, Conn.

FOUNDED at a time when the strengthening of good international relations is of paramount importance, *Comparative Literature* provides a forum for those scholars and critics who are engaged in the study of literature from an international point of view. Its editors define comparative literature in the broadest possible manner, and accept articles dealing with the manifold interrelations of literatures, with the theory of literature, movements, genres, periods, and authors—from the earliest times to the present. They particularly welcome longer studies on comparative topics and on problems of criticism.

Manuscripts, editorial communications, and books for review should be addressed to: Comparative Literature, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.

The subscription rate is $3.50 a year. The price of single copies is $1.00. Complete back sets are available for sale or exchange. Correspondence concerning subscriptions should be addressed to: University of Oregon Publications, Eugene, Oregon. Correspondence concerning exchanges should be addressed to: University of Oregon Library, Eugene, Oregon.

Indexed in International Index to Periodicals.

Autres livres à télécharger sur le site
https://abbassa.wordpress.com

LIBRARY

COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

VOLUME X SPRING 1958 NUMBER 2

CHAUCER'S GOOD FAIR WHITE: WOMAN AND SYMBOL

STEPHEN MANNING

IN THE *Book of the Duchess* Chaucer eulogizes Blanche of Lancaster through the Man in Black's lament of her allegorical counterpart, good fair White. Before the eulogy, however, Chaucer prepares his audience by emphasizing, through a series of three stories, the sorrowfulness of the situation in which the Man in Black finds himself. The first tells the sorrow the narrator feels because for eight years he has been unsuccessful in love. The second tells how Alcyone died from grief over the death of Ceys, her husband, and announces the theme of the third: "To lytel while our blysse lasteth!" (line 211).[1] The third tells of the Man in Black, who, unlike Alcyone, is spared by death and lives only to grieve the death of good fair White:

> The pure deth ys so ful my foo
> That I wolde deye, hyt wolde not soo;
> For whan I folwe hyt, hit wol flee;
> I wolde have hym, hyt nyl nat me.
> This ys my peyne wythoute red,
> Alway deynge and be not ded.
> (Lines 583-88)

In two of Chaucer's sources, Guillaume de Machaut had presented a pair of sorrowful situations and asked which was the more sorrowful. The King of Bohemia decided in favor of the knight who had been betrayed and deserted by his lady, but the King of Navarre reversed the decision, favoring the lady whose lover had died. Taking his clue from Machaut, Chaucer in his poem seems to be asking whose sorrow is the greatest—that of the Dreamer, of Alcyone, of the Man in Black—

[1] All Chaucer quotations are from *Works*, ed. F. N. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1957).

but the poet leaves no doubt as to the only possible decision. The Dreamer, however, with his customary stupidity, is griefstricken by Alcyone's sorrow, so much so, in fact,

> That trewly I, which made this book,
> Had such pittee and such rowthe
> To rede hir sorwe, that, by my trowthe,
> I ferde the worse al the morwe
> Aftir, to thenken on hir sorwe.
> (Lines 96-100)

But Chaucer has indicated his reason for this grief of the Dreamer's by the line, "I, which made this book." *This book* is contrasted to the book the Dreamer read before falling asleep, in which

> were written fables
> That clerkes had in olde tyme,
> And other poets, put in rime
> To rede, and for to be in minde
> While men loved the lawe of kinde.[2]
> (Lines 52-56)

The Dreamer, though deficient in his five senses, feels through some sort of sixth sense that his is so wonderful a dream, he had better record it. If Alcyone's grief for Ceys was worth recording, Chaucer seems to be saying, how much more is the grief of the Man in Black for good fair White!

Chaucer, then, is presenting the sorrowful situation par excellence. The Dreamer's sorrow and Alcyone's sorrow are intended to contrast with the sorrow of the Man in Black, and to underscore the overwhelming sorrow that is his. The Man in Black, indeed, tells us, "y am sorwe, and sorwe ys y" (line 597). He is, then, the very personification of sorrow. And, in order to emphasize this sorrow still more, Chaucer begins his dream with a markedly contrasting typical May morning.[3]

Having thus emphasized the Man in Black's (i.e., John of Gaunt's) sorrow, Chaucer comes to the eulogy proper. His method is to idealize Blanche; such extravagant praise has, of course, a rhetorical foundation. It fits the epideictic or demonstrative type of discourse, which praises or blames. It also has an affective value. Since he has portrayed John's grief with such emphasis, Chaucer must make Blanche worthy of so much sorrow in order to make this grief understandable. He

---

[2] This contrast may be seen also at the end of the poem, lines 1326-34.

[3] The suggestion for this contrast may have come from Machaut's *Jugement du Roy de Navarre*; but the contrast here is reversed. For some new points on the French influence on Chaucer's poem, see John Lawlor, "The Pattern of Consolation in *The Book of the Duchess*," *Speculum*, XXXI (1956), 636-646. For the French influence on Chaucer generally, see Charles Muscatine, *Chaucer and the French Tradition: A Study in Style and Meaning* (Berkeley, 1957).

idealizes her; he does not individualize her. This is typically mediaeval; for, as J. Huizinga has pointed out:

> Whatever the faculty of seeing specific traits may have been in the Middle Ages, it must be noted that men disregarded the individual qualities and fine distinctions of things, deliberately and of set purpose, in order always to bring them under some general principle. This mental tendency is a result of their profound idealism. People feel an imperious need of always and especially seeing the general sense, the connection with the absolute, the moral ideality, the ultimate significance of a thing. What is important is the impersonal. The mind is not in search of individual realities, but of models, examples, norms.[4]

Chaucer had at his disposal a ready means for idealizing Blanche—the traditions of courtly love. We observe that he does not present the Man in Black and good fair White as husband and wife (as John and Blanche were), but as ideal courtly lovers. Courtly lovers, not husbands and wives, were of course the personae of Chaucer's sources, but Chaucer is no slave to a source. We should remember, however, that the story of Ceys and Alcyone is a story of husband and wife. If he had cared to, Chaucer could have given us a second such story. But by means of the courtly love background the poet can idealize Blanche; indeed, I suggest that he makes good fair White a personification, just as he had made the Man in Black a personification of sorrow.

What does Blanche personify? Beauty, goodness, joy, *cortezia, jovens*—in short, all those virtues which courtly love prized. The loss, then, becomes not merely John of Gaunt's, but the world's; for with the death of Blanche beauty, goodness, joy, *cortezia, jovens* have departed from the world. I would apply to good fair White much of what Chaucer does with Alcestis in the *Legend of Good Women;* as John Speirs has commented:

> The lady in green is the daisy—or the daisy is she—and she is Alcestis; and she, who is both the daisy and Alcestis and perhaps the Queen of England, is herself a symbol; a symbol of the courtly ideal of womanhood, the most exalted earthly (as distinguished from heavenly) ideal—devotion to which made life courteous, gracious, and serene.[5]

Chaucer's two principal methods of giving good fair White a symbolic value are the use of the nonpareil and the multiple connotations of the color white. Consciously or not, he followed the rhetoricians' suggestion that something good or evil may be deduced from a person's name;[6] the Man in Black tells us:

---

[4] *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (New York, 1954), pp. 215-216. Thus, the question of whether Blanche really looked as Chaucer describes her is irrelevant.

[5] *Chaucer the Maker* (London, 1951), p. 86. Cf. Chaucer's use of personification in "A Complaint to His Lady," lines 24-28.

[6] Matthew of Vendôme, *Ars Versificatoria*, ed. Edmond Faral, *Les Arts poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1924), p. 136; John of Garland treats the matter very briefly in his *Poetria*, ed. Giovanni Mari, *Romanische Forschungen*, XIII (1902), 939.

> And goode faire White she het;
> That was my lady name ryght.
> She was bothe fair and bryght;
> She hadde not hir name wrong.
> (Lines 948-51)

Chaucer also followed the further advice of the rhetoricians—a poet should single out a person's most characteristic quality,[7] and Chaucer singled out whiteness.

His use of this characteristic quality, however, transcends the advice of the rhetoricians. The mediaeval lady in both love song and romance is, of course, always white; white was a stock epithet in describing a woman's beauty. But good fair White is the most beautiful woman who ever lived; the Man in Black saw the fairest company of ladies that ever men had seen together in one place, and good fair White outshone the others as the bright summer sun eclipses the other planets (lines 805-24). She is the chief "ensample" and "moustre" of nature's work (lines 911-12). The Dreamer is inclined to attribute such extravagance to the fact that the Man in Black was blinded by love, but the knight assures him that this opinion was shared by everyone:

> "trewely
> Yow thoghte that she was the beste,
> And to beholde the alderfayreste,
> Whoso had lokid hir with your eyen."
> "With myn? nay, alle that hir seyen
> Seyde and sworen hyt was soo."
> (Lines 1048-53)

Good fair White is thus raised to the nonpareil of beauty, so that she must be Beauty itself. And her name reminds us of this.

But physical beauty is not the only beauty White possesses; Chaucer was undoubtedly aware of the rhetoricians' commonplace that the description of a person is twofold: one, superficial, the other, intrinsic; i.e., the exterior man and the interior man (viz., the qualities of the soul).[8] The name White sums up also her moral beauty, for Chaucer has called her *good* fair White. White is both good and fair; she is both Goodness and Beauty. In his complaint to Death, the Man in Black speaks of his lady as being "So good, that men may wel se / Of al goodnesse she had no mete!" (lines 485-86). Later, he boasts:

> To speke of godnesse, trewly she
> Had as moche debonairte
> As ever had Hester in the Bible,
> And more, yif more were possyble.
> (Lines 985-88)

---

[7] "Debet autem quaelibet persona ab illo intitulari epitheto quod in ea prae ceteris dominatur et a quo majorem famae sortitur evidentiam," Matthew of Vendôme, p. 120.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

Both the beauty and goodness of White are described in the same terms—of "mesure." Mesure was not only an aesthetic ideal (in the rhetoricians, for example, especially Geoffrey of Vinsauf)[9] but also an ethical ideal. Matthew of Vendôme's source is Horace (p. 179); Chaucer's in the *Legend of Good Women* is simply "Etik": "for vertu is the mene, / As Etik seith" (Prol. F, lines 165-66). The whole physical description of White is based on this principle. For instance, her eyes were "Debonaire, goode, glade, and sadde, / Symple, of good mochel, noght to wyde" (lines 860-61), and Dame Nature "Had mad hem opene by mesure, / And close" (lines 872-73). Her throat was "a round tour of yvoyre, / Of good gretnesse, and noght to gret" (lines 946-47). Her arms were "Fattyssh, flesshy, not gret therwith" (line 954). Her mesure is to be seen also in her being neither too sober nor too glad (line 880), in her speech (lines 919-38), and in her general conduct, especially toward would-be lovers (lines 1015-33). In fact, the Man in Black tells us: "In alle thynges more mesure / Had never, I trowe, creatures" (lines 881-82). Good fair White, then, is the nonpareil of goodness as well as beauty.

The peculiar relationship of the courtly lover to his lady also gives an ambivalence to the color white. White contrasts immediately with black, the color in which the knight is attired. Black, of course, signifies sorrow, and white, joy, as in Machaut's *Remede de Fortune* (lines 1907-09).[10] We overhear the Man in Black lament that, because his lady is dead, "joye gete I never non" (line 476). This lament for the loss of joy is reinforced by the catalogue of opposites in lines 599-615 and in lines 685-86, where the knight also tells us explicitly he has lost his bliss. The word *joy* has a special connotation within the courtly love tradition; joy is not mere delight but involves a certain moral worth. Love is, of course, the source of joy,[11] and joy in turn is itself the source of virtue. Alfred Jeanroy has noted that

> l'amour fait naître dans une âme bien née une exaltation qui l'élève au-dessus des sentiments vulgaires et la livre en proie à toutes les inspirations généreuses. C'est cet état d'esprit que les troubadours qualifient de joie et dont ils décrivent les merveilleux effets en d'interminables litanies.[12]

---

[9] Edgar de Bruyne, *Études d'esthétique médiévale* (Bruges, 1946), II, 182.

[10] This is an old meaning of white; André G. Ott, *Étude sur les couleurs en vieux français* (Paris, 1899), p. 10, comments: "En latin déjà, blanc est la couleur de bon augure, indiquant le *bonheur, la joie, la bonté*, tout ce qui peut nous être *propice* et *favorable*."

[11] E.g., Bernart de Ventadorn finds joy from the blossoms and the nightingale and himself, but a greater joy he has from his mistress, for this is the joy that conquers all other joys ("mas sel es jois que totz autres jois vens"): "Can l'erba fresch," No. XXXIX, lines 5-8 in Carl Appel, ed., *Bernart von Ventadorn, Seine Lieder* (Halle, 1915), p. 220; Pons de Capdeuil says that, if he loves his lady faithfully, joy ought to come to him ("doncs s'ien am finamen / Mi dons cui sui, be m degra joys venir)—"Aissi m'es pres," in C. A. F. Mahn, *Die Werke des Troubadours* (Berlin, 1846), I, 338.

[12] *La Poésie lyrique des troubadours* (Toulouse, 1934), II, 100.

Arnaut de Mareuil described the man who has been accorded joy, whence arise all good qualities that make a man of worth:

> A gran honor viu cui jois es cobitz,
> que d'aqui mou cortesi' e solatz,
> enseignamenz e franques' e mesura,
> e cors d'amar et esfortz de servir,
> e chausimenz, saber e conoisensa,
> e gens parlars et avinens respos,
> e tuich bon aips, per qu' om es gais et pros.
> (Lines 1-7)[13]

When the Man in Black laments the loss of joy, then, he laments also the passing of moral worth. His lady most appropriately is named good fair White.

Another connotation of the color white is brightness; whiteness and brightness are synonymous. The Man in Black himself seems to equate the two terms in commenting on his lady's name:

> And goode faire White she het;
> That was my lady name ryght.
> She was bothe fair and bryght;
> She hadde not hir name wrong.
> (Lines 948-51)

Both white and bright are generally used to describe a lady's great beauty, but bright has a special value, related to the connotations of joy, within the courtly love tradition. Andreas Capellanus has this to say about ladies' brightness:

> For if their brightness were not to give light to anyone, it would be like a candle hidden under a bushel, whose beam is not able to drive away darkness or shine to anyone's profit. Therefore it is clear that every man should strive with all his might to be of service to ladies that he may shine by their grace.[14]

All this emphasis upon moral worth is part of the troubadour tradition. In fact, *cortezia* itself, as Father Denomy has defined it, is a virtue concerned primarily with the moral aspect of behavior.[15] A related virtue is *jovens*, a spiritual quality which may be partially equated with purity in love,[16] or simply love in its purest form.[17] Andreas Capellanus

[13] *Les Poésies lyriques*, ed. R. C. Johnston (Paris, 1935), p. 121, cited by Alexander J. Denomy, "Courtly Love and Courtliness," *Speculum*, XXVIII (1953), 52. I am indebted to this article for several examples from the troubadours.

[14] *The Art of Courtly Love*, trans. John Jay Parry (New York, 1941), p. 108.

[15] "Courtly Love and Courtliness," p. 63.

[16] Alexander J. Denomy, "Jovens: The Notion of Youth among the Troubadours, Its Meaning and Source," *Med. Stud.*, II (1949), 1-22. I think this article sheds light on Chaucer's making the Man in Black 24 years of age (line 455) rather than 29, Gaunt's actual age. The Man in Black is, after all, an ideal courtly lover, and thus allegorically attributing to John of Gaunt a bit of moral perfection does not seem inappropriate.

[17] Denomy, "Courtly Love and Courtliness," p. 46.

derives all excellence of character from pure love and recommends it to those who are intent upon love,[18] and the tradition of pure love appears in the French lyricists of Chaucer's own day. Chaucer's White, then, would seem to have another connotation to her name—purity, specifically purity in love. Pure love is clearly the type of love represented by White and her lover; the emphasis the Man in Black gives his lady's moral goodness is one indication. Moreover, his description of the real beginning of their love underscores its nature (lines 1261-71). The fact that Chaucer, following a convention, includes the rules of love within his narrative, through the specific examples of the Man in Black and his lady, also suggests that everything about this pair is ideal, including the type of love they have for one another.[19]

Chaucer, then, is working within a definite tradition when he personifies Blanche. The typical lady of the troubadour love songs is such an idealization. But Blanche is dead, and along with her death beauty and goodness and joy and *cortezia* and *jovens* have departed from the world. Is this also traditional? Are we justified in making this interpretation? I would find precedent in three related traditions. First of all, the troubadours lamented the passing of those virtues which they associated with love. For example, Giraut de Bornelh finds the world changed from courtliness into baseness and corruption; thievery is more praised than largess.[20] In another poem he points out that courtliness, once joyfully received, is now little valued. Marcabru is horrified by the meanness and deceit which flourish and is unable to find courtliness, good behavior, fame, worth, merriment.[21] Related to this is a second, larger tradition, lamenting the passing of virtue from the world. Chaucer himself looked upon his age as one of

> covetyse,
> Doublenesse, and tresoun, and envye,
> Poyson, manslauhtre, and mordre in sondry wyse.[22]

Deschamps is above all the poet of such pessimism; his "Tristesse du temps present" offers an interesting parallel to *The Book of the*

---

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

[19] Ernest Hoepffner, *Œuvres de Guillaume de Machaut* (Paris, 1911), II, xvi, lxvi, believes that Machaut wrote three "arts d'amour": *Dit dou Vergier, Remede de Fortune, Dit d'Alerion.* Cf. *Roman de la Rose,* lines 37-38: "Ce est li Romanz de la Rose, / Ou l'Art d'Amors est toute enclose."

[20] "No.s pot sofrir ma lenga," No. LXIX, lines 9-12, in *Sämtliche Lieder,* ed. Adolf Kalsen (Halle, 1910), I, 436. The second reference is to "Tot suavet e de pas," No. XXVIII, lines 73-74, p. 160.

[21] No. XXXIV, lines 8-14, *Poésies complètes,* ed J. M. L. Dejeanne (Toulouse, 1909), p. 165. For other examples, see Denomy, "Courtly Love and Courtliness," pp. 54-55, and "Jovens: The Notion of Youth," pp. 2-13, *passim.* In a slightly different vein is the lyric in the *Carmina Burana* lamenting the perversion of the art of loving as handed down by Ovid; printed in F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1934), II, 276.

[22] "The Former Age," lines 61-63; cf. "Lak of Stedfastnesse," *passim.*

Duchess; the speaker laments the passing of courtly love and sees that all good qualities have disappeared with it:

> Puisque je voy Amours des cuers partir
> Et que Joie est du monde departie,
> Il me convient d'avec eulz departir
> Et dire adieu a l'amoureuse vie.
> Je voy regner trahison et envie,
> Mesdit, despit, deshonneur a toute heure;
> Noblesce fault, il n'est nul qui bien die;
> Adieu, bon temps, drois est que je te pleure!
> (Lines 1-8)

In Chaucer, of course, the emphasis is upon the personal loss of the Man in Black; but, since White is the embodiment of all that is excellent in courtly love, the loss by extension becomes the world's, which now lacks these excellences.

This technique of Chaucer's is related most closely to a third tradition, found in the *planhs*. This tradition is related to the second, in that the *planh* often contains a denunciation of the evils of the present (Jeanroy finds this denunciation a characteristic which distinguishes the *planh* from the *planctus*.)[23] Two conventions of the *planh* apply to the *Book of the Duchess*. First, the deceased is spoken of as the embodiment of virtue, and sometimes with his parting specific virtues are said to disappear from the world. Second, the loss of the deceased is not just a personal loss, but a loss to the world.

Examples are the lament of Cercamon for Guillaume X (with the passing of the duke *jovens* is abased while wickedness is exalted and joy descends—since worth and largess fail, the poet grieves that he is left behind);[24] Lafranc Cigala for Berlenda (without peer in worth and merit, courtliness, grace, honor, and the top and root, the flower and fruit and seed of all virtue);[25] Bertran de Born for Henry II (worth and *jovens* are left behind and grieve, the world is darkened, without all joy, and full of sorrow and anguish);[26] Aimeric de Peguilhan for the Marquis of Este (in his death worth and song died) and for Beatrix of Este (buried with her are *jovens* and joy);[27] and, finally, the most elaborate eulogy in this vein, "Totas honors," an anonymous

[23] *La Poésie lyrique des troubadours*, II, 238.

[24] "Lo plaing comenz iradamen," lines 4-6, 15-16, in *Les Poésies de Cercamon*, ed. Alfred Jeanroy (Paris, 1922), pp. 19-20. This is the oldest *planh* preserved (Jeanroy, *La Poésie lyrique*, II, 238).

[25] "Eu non chant ges," No. XLI, lines 9-16, in Giulio Bertoni, *I trovatori d'Italia* (Modena, 1915), p. 347.

[26] "Si tuch li dol," No. XLI, lines 6-8, in *Bertran de Born, sein Leben und seine Werke*, ed. Albert Stimmung (Halle, 1879), p. 212. I have not seen the second edition (1913).

[27] "S'ieu hanc chantiei," No. XLVIII, line 9, *Poems*, ed. William P. Shepard and Frank M. Chambers (Evanston, 1950), p. 226; "De tot en tot," No. XXII, lines 33-34, p. 129.

LIBRARY JU 12 1958 MANHATTAN

planh for King Manfred (on the day that this most pleasing man ever born of mother died, all honor and every noble deed also died; honor weeps for him and is forced from the land by dishonor; largess also departs; courtesy and valor have gone, and there is no one to support the virtues of which Manfred was emperor; right and truth and modesty have all departed, only deceit and wrong remain, and so on).[28] Petrarch follows this same tradition in grieving for Laura; he addresses death: "Or hai spogliata nostra vita, e scossa, / D' ogni ornamento, e del sovran suo honore" (CCCXXVI, 5-6); "Nel tuo partir," he says to Laura, "partí del mondo Amore / E Cortesia" (CCCLII, 12-13); and especially in CCCXXXVIII he develops the theme of the impact of Laura's death on the world as well as himself.

Chaucer, it seems to me, follows these three traditions. He is not only eulogizing Blanche by presenting her as a symbol of the ideals of courtly love, but is also lamenting the departure of such ideals—with the result that not only love is debased but the virtues consequent to the concept of love as an ennobling power are no longer practiced. Chaucer laments the death of Blanche and of those things of which she herself is the embodiment. This is why the Man in Black's sorrow is so great that he can claim he is Sorrow; this is why the dream was worth recording and "for to be in minde / While men loved the lawe of kinde" (lines 55-56).

University of Colorado

[28] Printed in Giulio Bertoni, "Il 'Pianto' in Morte di Re Manfredi," *Romania*, XLIII (1914), 169-170.

DANTE AND EPICURUS

JOSEPH ANTHONY MAZZEO

IN VIEW of Dante's continual reconsideration of many artistic and intellectual questions, it is odd that G. Busnelli and G. Vandelli, the latest editors and most exhaustive commentators on the *Convivio*, should interpret Dante's references in that work to Epicurus and Epicureanism in the light of the ninth and tenth cantos of the *Inferno*. In both the commentary on the apposite passages and in an appendix on Dante's presumed doctrinal tolerance, they assume that the poet held the same view of Epicureanism throughout his life, and that the Epicureans of the *Convivio* are the archheretics of the *Inferno* "who make the soul die with the body."[1]

I hope to demonstrate that they read back into the *Convivio* what Dante clearly must have considered a correction of an early error. I shall consider Dante's various references to Epicurus and Epicureanism in the light of the sources and definitions available to him, and relate as precisely as possible his changing views to his use of different sources at different times. We shall then discover that Dante knew two entirely different concepts of Epicurus and Epicureanism, one of which we find in the *Convivio* and the other in the *Inferno*. The former is Ciceronian and classical while the latter is based on the mediaeval Christian tradition, best exemplified by Isidore of Seville.

In the *Inferno* Epicurus is the great symbol of the archheretic, and Dante's treatment of heresy in this work has been one of the classic problems of Dante scholarship. Some scholars have compounded the problem by detecting heretical tendencies in some of his minor works, especially the *Convivio*. However, the researches of two generations of scholars would seem to show that Dante had little precise knowledge of heresy and great independence of mind coupled with equally great reverence for the Catholic faith, and that he was not very consistent on the question. Whatever the heretical implications of his thought in the *Convivio* may be—and it may well have such implications—few doubt that Dante's sense of his own position was that it was orthodox, and still fewer doubt that the *Comedy*, both in its thought and in the implications of its thought, is sufficiently orthodox.[2] Let us now turn

[1] *Il convivio*, ed. Busnelli and Vandelli, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Florence, 1953-54), Appendix VI, I, 466 ff., "Sopra la tolleranza dottrinale di Dante"; *Inf.*, X, 14-16, "Suo cimitero da questa parte hanno / con Epicuro tutt' i suoi seguaci, / che l'anima col corpo morto fanno." All citations from the *Comedy* are from the text of the Società Dantesca Italiana, *Le opere di Dante Alighieri* (Florence, 1921).

[2] See G. Fraccaroli, *Il cerchio degli eresiarchi* (Modena, 1891); Felice Tocco, *Quel che non c' è nella Divina Commedia o Dante e l'eresia* (Bologna, 1899); E. Moore, *Studies in Dante*, 2nd series (Oxford, 1899); G. Volpe, *Movimenti*

to those passages in the *Convivio* in which Dante discusses Epicureanism.

In Chapter xiv of Book III, Dante tells us how and why love may be said to be the very soul and form of philosophy. Divine, immaterial light, as that form of intellectual light by which we know whatever we know, descends immediately and directly upon the intelligences or angels and, through their mediation, to the rest of creation. Men also receive this light directly from its divine source, and it functions in them as a divine power which conforms human love to its own likeness, gives it eternal wisdom, the Word Himself, for its object, thus eliciting that love of supreme wisdom which is philosophy (*Conv.*, III, xiv, 1-7).[3] As this love grows, all other lesser loves or desires are quenched (*ibid.*, 7-8). It was this love of wisdom which led the great pagan philosophers such as Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle to condemn temporal goods and personal advantage, and led others such as Zeno, Socrates, and Seneca to despise their very lives (*ibid.*, 8-9). This divine power descends upon men as it does upon the angels, Dante tells us again, and it is significant that he should repeat this idea immediately after the parade of examples drawn from the great thinkers of classical antiquity (*ibid.*, 9). For they received that "celestial thought" which is philosophy from Heaven itself, and participated in an activity which is more than human (*ibid.*, 11-12), displaying that particular kind of love which philosophy kindles wherever she exists (*ibid.*, 13).

We possess the power to look upon philosophy in high degree not only that we may behold what she reveals, but also that we may desire those things which she keeps hidden:

> Whence even as by her name much is perceived in its reason and in its sequence which without her appears a marvel, so by her means it becomes credible that every miracle may have its reason for a loftier intellect, and consequently may take place. Whence our excellent faith hath its origin, from which cometh the hope of that for which we long and which we foresee, and from this is born the activity of charity; by which three virtues we rise to philosophize in that celestial Athens where Stoics and Peripatetics, and Epicureans by the art of the eternal truth, harmoniously unite in one will.[4]

---

religiosi e sette ereticali nella società medievale italiana (Florence, 1926). A more recent work which briefly summarizes the literature on this question is A. De Salvio, *Dante and Heresy* (Boston, 1936).

[3] On the role of light in Dante's thought, see my "Dante, the Poet of Love: Dante and the Phaedrus Tradition or Poetic Inspiration," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, XCIX, No. 3, June 1955.

[4] *Conv.*, III, xiv, 14-15: "Onde, sì come per lei molto di quello si vede per ragione, e per consequente essere per ragione, che sanza lei pare maraviglia, così per lei si crede [che] ogni miracolo in più alto intelletto puote avere ragione, e per consequente può essere. Onde la nostra buona fede ha sua origine; da la quale viene la speranza, de lo proveduto disiderare; e per quella nasce l'operazione de la caritade. Per le quali tre virtudi si sale a filosofare a quelle Atene celestiali, dove gli Stoici e Peripatetici e Epicurii, per la l[u]ce de la veritade etterna, in uno volere concordevolemente concorrono." All references to the *Convivio* are to

According to Busnelli and Vandelli in their commentary on this passage, all that Dante means is that the three sects unite in seeking the *summum bonum*, not in finding it. Yet Dante says quite unmistakeably that it is the "art" or power of the eternal truth which unifies the wills of all three philosophical schools. "To philosophize in that celestial Athens" can mean nothing else than the loving contemplation of wisdom, the beatific vision, in whose sight all the mundane differences of intellectual opinion and ethical ideals which separate lovers of truth disappear. The three schools which Dante mentions were the three great ethical schools of antiquity primarily concerned with the active life, the life of volition. They not only differed on the nature of the *summum bonum*, but did not realize that the highest mode of life was contemplative, not active. Once they have risen, however, to that "celestial Athens" and philosophize as the blessed do in the beatific vision, by loving and knowing the eternal truth, their intellectual differences are reconciled and their conflicting wills are harmonized. They know clearly what the *summum bonum* is, and unite in having it as the single object of their love.

It seems to me that Dante does actually say that Stoics, Peripatetics, and Epicureans find the *summum bonum*; for the *summum bonum* is nothing other than eternal truth as the object of love or desire, and it is by the art of this eternal truth that the various sects unite in one will. Before they could so unite it was necessary that they know the eternal truth, and they would seem to have achieved such knowledge after death. What is even more striking is that Dante identifies that wisdom which has always been the goal of philosophy with Christ by citing the opening of St. John's Gospel (*Conv.*, III, xiv, 7), thus suggesting that the object of the philosophical love of the pagan philosophers was really Christ as the Logos, even though they were not aware that this was the goal of their striving. Furthermore, they unconsciously sought wisdom or Christ, and moved toward Him, because of the divine power and light which descended to them from that source (*ibid.*, 4-5, 7-8).

So interpreted, this passage would mean that the pagan philosophers not only sought the Word, but were able to rise to some kind of knowledge of supernatural truth in this life, and to a complete knowledge in the afterlife where their seeking was fulfilled and their differences reconciled.[5] Indeed, the three theological virtues are conceived as growing out of the intense prosecution of philosophical activity. Such activity, love of wisdom, quenches all the lesser loves and so develops the moral virtues, as it obviously did in the pagan philosophers. Continued further, however, philosophy leads by way of belief in the ultimate com-

the Busnelli-Vandelli edition. Translations in the text are from Philip H. Wicksteed, *The Convivio of Dante Alighieri*, Temple Classics (London, 1903).

[5] Busnelli and Vandelli *op. cit.*, I, 430-431; cf. Lenkeith, *Dante and the Legend of Rome* (London, 1952), pp. 143 ff.

prehensibility of miracles, to faith, from which issue hope and charity. The distinctions between theology and philosophy seem blurred, and the realm of nature seems to lead rather easily into the realm of grace. Even pagans seem to be capable of acquiring a sufficient degree of theological insight and virtue in this life so that their knowledge can be completed in the celestial city of philosophy.[6]

Dante again refers to Epicureanism in Book IV of the *Convivio*, where he discusses the final good posited by the Stoics and Epicureans. His argument here is drawn entirely from the *De finibus* of Cicero, and he seems to evaluate these pagans as generously and tolerantly as his source.

> There were then certain very ancient philosophers, of whom the first and chief was Zeno, whose view and belief was that the goal of this human life is solely rigid integrity; that is to say rigidly to pursue truth and justice, without respect to aught; to show no grief, to show gladness at nothing, to have no sense of any emotion. And this is how they defined this integrity, 'That which, apart from utility and apart from result, is, for its own sake to be praised by reason.' And they and their sect were called Stoics, and of them was that glorious Cato of whom I dared not to speak above. There were other philosophers whose view and belief was different from theirs; and of these the first and chief was a philosopher who was called Epicurus; who, seeing that every animal as soon as it is born, and as though directed by nature to the due goal, shuns pain and seeks pleasure, said that this our goal was voluptuary (I do not say 'voluntary' but write it with a *p*), that is to say, delight without pain. And moreover, between delight and pain he placed no middle term, saying that 'voluptuous' was no other than 'without pain'; as Tully seems to recount in the first of the *Goal of Good*. And of these who are called Epicureans after Epicurus, was Torquatus, the noble Roman, descended from the blood of the glorious Torquatus of whom I made mention above.[7]

The final reference to Epicurus in the *Convivio* occurs in Chapter xxii of Book IV. Dante begins to discuss the goal of human life and the progress the souls make in reaching it. He chooses the opinion of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, leaving those of Zeno and Epicurus:

> Letting be, then, the opinion on this matter which the philosopher Epicurus had, and that which Zeno had, I purpose to come at once to the true opinion of Aristotle and of the other Peripatetics. As said above, from the divine excellence sown

[6] In the *Convivio*, Dante both distinguished and identified philosophy and theology. The wisdom which loved Solomon also loved the true philosopher (III, xiv, 12). God sees this most noble of all things, philosophy, both here below and in Himself who has it perfectly (III, xii, esp. 11 ff.). The various heavens, however, correspond to the various sciences, e.g., the starry sphere to both physics and metaphysics, the Primum Mobile to ethics, and the Empyrean to theology (*Conv.*, II, xiii-xiv); philosophy fixes her vision most firmly on metaphysics or the "starry sphere" (III, xi, 10). See Nardi, *Dante e la cultura medievale*, 2nd ed. (Bari, 1949), pp. 204 ff., and Lenkeith, *op. cit.*, pp. 148 ff., where she argues that Dante maintains that divine grace is innate in human nature, a product of natural conditions, and that eternal beatitude is simply the culmination of earthly happiness.

[7] *Conv.*, IV, vi, 9-13.

and infused into us from the beginning of our generation there springs a shoot which the Greeks call *hormen*, that is, natural appetite of the mind.[8]

This is the principle of self-love which grows and differentiates itself by distinguishing between higher and lower objects of its appetite, and finally comes to rest in the love of the exercise of the highest part of the self, the mind, including both the will and the intellect. Dante departs here from his source, *De finibus*, and, in harmony with contemporary Peripateticism and, indeed, Boethius, places the contemplative over the active life.[9] However, though the latter is superior, the operation of both the practical and speculative intellects is equally the fruit of the seed of divine excellence naturally implanted in us in the process of generation. But, before we continue, let us consider exactly what Dante means by the seed of divine excellence.

God gives most men a kernel or seed of grace which is the principle of the natural growth of virtue. This seed of blessedness is nobility, a strictly personal quality which cannot be obtained through inheritance. It is the indispensable prerequisite of virtue, and virtue necessarily grows out of it. God gives it to a soul which has a body perfectly disposed in every part so that it may in turn dispose the soul to receive the seed of grace which is nobleness (*Conv.*, IV, xx, especially 7-9). Now, the manner in which nobility descends on man may be explained in two ways, first, by natural science and, second, by theology. If we consider the process of conception from the point of view of purely natural science, we learn that the physical conditions which determine the process are not always the same. The impregnating seed may vary in its elemental composition. Also, the degree of generative power it received from its Creator and the celestial influences are not always the same. All of these differences in turn determine the way in which the receptive, passive "matter" of the female is physically prepared to submit to the action of the male generative power, the way in which the generative power acts in forming the foetus, and the way in which the potential life-giving principle of the seed is actualized by the celestial power transmitted through the light of the stars (IV, xxi, 1-4). When the foetus is sufficiently grown to receive it, the intellectual principle is divinely superinduced in it and the human being is complete (*ibid.*, 4-5).

To the extent that all of these conditions are closer to perfection, to that degree are divine excellences multiplied in the soul (*ibid.*, 7-9). Dante then adds that it is theological science which permits us to say that these excellences are the gifts of the Holy Spirit and to enumerate them (*ibid.*, 11-12). However, if all the natural conditions are actually

[8] *Ibid.*, IV, xxii, 4-5; cf. *De finibus* V, vi, 17.

[9] Dante was thoroughly acquainted with Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* at the time of writing the *Convivio*, but he does not seem to have shared Boethius' contempt for the Stoic and Epicurean herd (*Cons.*, I, pr. 3).

perfect, then "so much of the Deity would descend thereon that it [the person] would be almost another incarnate God; and this is almost all that can be said by way of natural science" (*ibid.*, 10).

Dante then adds "by way of theological science" that, when God sees a creature so prepared by natural process to receive His benefactions, He commits to it as much as it can take of them (*ibid.*, 11). These are the gifts of the Holy Spirit and are committed to a creature who is perfectly created by natural processes. They are wit, wisdom, understanding, counsel, strength, knowledge, piety, and the fear of God (*ibid.*, 12). All these, which in strict orthodoxy are gifts of grace which God confers in those secret counsels by which he decides who shall receive them, are here treated as virtually natural endowments.

Dante concludes his analysis of what the seed of nobleness is by saying that its most fitting offshoot is that mental appetite which the Greeks call *hormen*. This along with other offshoots of the seed must be cultivated and nurtured; otherwise it would have been better not to have had any seed at all. Evil is thus implicitly presented as a kind of deviation from natural growth. Hence Dante emphasizes the need for training and education of the person in well-doing and restraint in order to correct any propensity toward evil, and cites both Aristotle and St. Augustine (of all people!) for authority in this matter (*ibid.*, 14). But what of that person in whose begetting the various natural factors failed to operate as they should, so that he has some defect, or lacks the seed of nobleness altogether? Dante answers that "by much correction and cultivation some portion of the outgrowth of this seed may be so led to a place where it did not originally fall as to come to fruit. And this is, as it were, a kind of engrafting of another nature on a diverse root. And so there is none who can be excused; for if man has not this seed from his natural root, he may at least have it by way of engrafting."[10] Thus, where the divine seed of grace does not exist, it may be engrafted by education through a virtuous agent, the outgrowth of this seed.

After *hormen* has finally unfolded itself and become the love of the mind, the operation of the practical and the speculative intellect, the choice then becomes which of these two activities to follow. The highest is, as we have seen, contemplation, and this is what the three ancient sects of the active life did not achieve. In a striking interpretation of the story of the three Marys at the tomb, Dante equates the three ladies with the Stoics, Peripatetics, and Epicureans:

> But in truth the one of these exercises is more full of blessedness than the other, to wit, the speculative, which, without any admixture, is the exercise of our most noble part, which, by reason of that fundamental love which has been spoken of, is chiefly to be loved, to wit the intellect. And this part cannot in this life have

[10] *Conv.*, IV, xxii, 12.

its perfect exercise, which is to see God (who is the supreme object of the intellect), save in so far as the intellect considers him and contemplates him through his effects. And that we should supremely demand this blessedness and not the other (to wit that of the active life), the Gospel of Mark instructs us, if we would rightly consider it. Mark says that Mary Magdalene and James' Mary and Mary Salome went to find the Saviour at the tomb, and found him not, but found a man dressed in white, who said to them: 'Ye seek the Saviour, and I say unto you that he is not here. Nevertheless, fear ye not, but go and say to his disciples, and to Peter, that he will go before them in Galilee, and there ye shall see him as he said unto you.' By these three ladies may be understood the three schools of the active life, to wit, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics, who go to the tomb, that is, to the present world, which is the receptacle of corruptible things, and demand the Saviour, that is, blessedness, and find it not; but they find a man in white garments, who, according to the testimony of Matthew, and also of the others, was an angel of God. And therefore Matthew said: 'The angel of God descended from heaven and came and rolled away the stone and sat upon it; and his aspect was as lightning and his garments were as snow.'[11]

This angel is nothing less than our nobleness which descends from God and which tells our reason that beatitude cannot be found in the active life but in speculation. He informs both those who are seeking beatitude and those who are gone astray where it lies. Thus all the pagan sects erred in not knowing where to find beatitude, having evidently not listened sufficiently to the voice of our naturally implanted indwelling nobleness. Even though Dante uses a Scriptural story to get his argument across, he is not discussing Christianity or theology, for this allegory simply concludes the argument of "Aristotle and of the other Peripatetics." Notice the apparent inconsistency in Dante's references to Peripatetics; for he first implies that they are "contemplatives," and later cites them as "actives." As we shall see, the second definition is Ciceronian. Dante has either not noticed his own inconsistency or he assumes that the reader will make the necessary distinction between "the true opinion of Aristotle and of the other Peripatetics" and what Cicero says that they taught. In any case the Schoolmen and Dante's contemporaries knew that Aristotle gave the palm to the contemplative life, and Dante seems to use both conceptions of Aristotle even though they are contradictory.

Whatever Dante's inconsistency, it is manifestly clear that he is passionately enthusiastic about philosophy, and the *Convivio* is filled with her praises. Indeed, his love of wisdom is so great that it makes him claim that virtually perfect happiness can be achieved on earth through philosophy alone (III, viii, 5 ff.). It is, after all, a divine virtue which descends on man in an angelic fashion. Dante's own love of philosophy extinguished every other thought from his mind, even Beatrice (II, xii, 7-8), as, let us recall, the love of wisdom which fired the pagan philosophers quenched all their lesser loves. The love of wis-

[11] *Ibid.*, IV, xxii, 13-17.

dom has this effect precisely because the happiness it gives transcends all other kinds. Indeed, philosophy functions like grace in that its beauty can make a new nature in those who gaze on her, a miraculous thing which aids our faith (II, viii, 20).

The idea of precedent merit, the ability of man to ennoble himself, the obscuring of the sharp distinctions between philosophy and theology, the intense rationalism which simultaneously culminates in mysticism—all of these are certainly not Thomistic ideas even if they are not as heterodox as some interpreters would make them (cf. *Conv.*, II, xiv; III, xi, especially 12 ff.; III, xii, especially 11 ff.). One thing, however, is clear. In every reference Dante makes to Epicurus or the Epicureans, his tone and attitude give no indication whatsoever that he then thought that they denied the immortality of the soul.

In Book II of the *Convivio* he denounces such people in no uncertain terms: "I say that of all the stupidities that is the most foolish, the basest, and the most pernicious, which believes that after this life there is no other."[12] Dante claims for his authority for this statement not only the Scriptures, but all the philosophers and sages, specifically referring to the Stoics, Aristotle's *De anima*, Cicero's *De senectute*, and the pagan poets, and all nations, even Jews, Saracens, and Tartars. While he does not mention the Epicureans here, their omission signifies nothing. If the immortality of the soul was such a crucial question for him and he at this time knew that Epicurus held this doctrine, he surely would have given some indication and would not have spoken of the followers of Epicurus as if they were as good as the Stoics and Peripatetics. As we shall see, his knowledge of Epicureanism at this point was based entirely on Cicero's *De finibus*. He was as yet unaware of what Epicureanism had come to mean in the Christian tradition and was not acquainted with the *Tusculan Disputations*, from which he might have learned what he could not from *De finibus*, that the Stoics held a doctrine of limited immortality while the Epicureans did not believe in it at all.[13]

Let us now turn to Dante's source, Cicero's *De finibus*, and try to specify his use of it. We will then see that he not only adopted a number of its philosophical ideas and arguments, but that he also assumed Cicero's evaluation of Epicurus and Epicureanism. Indeed, he follows Cicero so closely that, as we have seen, he includes the Peripatetics among the teachers of the supremacy of the active life, at the same time that he argues from "the true opinion of Aristotle" that the contemplative life is supreme.[14]

---

[12] *Ibid.*, II, viii, 8.

[13] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, ed. and trans. J. E. King (London, 1927), I, xxxi, 77.

[14] Cicero's opinion that the Peripatetics taught that moral virtue is superior to intellectual excellence and that virtue is the perfection of reason—the exact oppo-

Dante also drew on *De finibus* in his discussion of the principle of universal self-love which culminates in the highest good,[15] and in adopting, in agreement with the Peripatetics, as the end of goods, living "in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible."[16] There are other important borrowings from *De finibus*. The argument that Epicurus finds the chief good in pleasure and the evidence in nature for this view are simple recapitulations of Book I, ix, 29-30. Similarly the view that there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling between pleasure and pain is drawn from Book I, xi, 38. Dante stresses his use of the word "voluptate" to prevent the reader from confusing it with "voluntate" or will. Cicero discusses at length the rendering of the Greek *hedone* by the Latin *voluptas*.

Over and above the borrowings of doctrine, there is the assimilation of an attitude. Of course, Cicero's work is a set of dialogues in which various people attack and defend various positions. Yet no one says a harsh word about Epicurus. In Book II (xxix-xxx, 95-96) there is a long discussion of the nobility of his death. He died with a display of fortitude in enduring pain which would seem to be in contradiction to his principle that pain must be disregarded. He was a good, kind, humane man, with many friends. It is his intellect and not his character that is ever called into question. Only frivolous Greeks attack a man's ideas through his character.[17]

In reference to Epicurus's fondness for making classifications of desires, Cicero calls him a great and famous philosopher who has a right to maintain his dogmas boldly.[18] He corrected the error of reprobating pleasure and extolling pain and was a great explorer of human truth and the master builder of human happiness.[19] At no point in *De finibus* is Epicurus impugned. Only Zeno, of the three great teachers of the active life, gets any personal criticism and that happens only once when he is called a crafty Phoenician (IV, xx, 56). Otherwise, even Zeno gets his share of respect.

But more important than Cicero's attitude toward Epicurus is the fact that at no point in *De finibus* is there any clear statement that Epicurus taught that the soul dies with the body. The closest Cicero comes to this is in a passage where he says that Epicurus taught that

site of what Aristotle said—was imposed on the Peripatetics of his time by Antiochus under Stoic influence. See *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, ed. and trans. H. Rackham (London, 1914), V, xiii, 38; cf. V, xiv, 38.

[15] *De finibus*, V, ix, 24 ff. Cicero tends in his discussion of the chief good to equate the Academic and Peripatetic views and even to argue that the Stoics really agree with both of these schools (*De finibus*, V, viii, 21 ff.).

[16] *Ibid.*, V, ix, 24.

[17] *Ibid.*, II, xxv, 80-81.

[18] *Ibid.*, II, ix, 28.

[19] *Ibid.*, II, X, 32.

sensation ceases after death so that there is no need to fear it. "For he repeatedly argued at length, and also stated briefly and plainly in the book I have just mentioned, that 'death does not affect us at all; for a thing that has experienced dissolution must be devoid of sensation; and that which is devoid of sensation cannot affect us in any degree whatsoever.' "[20]

With our knowledge of Epicurean doctrine we would read this passage as denying the immortality of the soul. In the system of Epicurean materialism, as Cicero well knew, the loss of the body would of course mean the loss of consciousness. Yet what he says is that *sensation* ceases after death, a statement which need not disturb a Christian conscience. Cicero was aware that, for Epicurus, absence of sensation would mean the absence of consciousness, but Dante need not have drawn this conclusion. Sensation is a corporeal function and, with the dissolution of the body and the organs of sense, the faculty of sensation would naturally cease. However, in Dante's thought and that of the Schoolmen, the loss of sensation in death did not interfere with the survival of consciousness and memory. In fact, it was this loss which was so often used to argue for the necessity of the resurrection of the body. The human being would not be complete without the sensory functions, and for those he needs a body. I would suggest that Dante read this passage to mean that dying would not be painful because it is simply the loss of the vegetative and sensitive souls. It therefore could not be experienced as pain or pleasure.

It is clear that, at the time of writing the *Convivio,* Dante did not know what Epicureanism really meant and that he was able to accord it the respect he apparently felt for it precisely because he did not know what it meant. This conclusion follows with particular force when we realize that the source for his knowledge of Epicureanism was *De finibus* and that he everywhere shows his dependence on it—both on what it includes and on what it omits. Dante shared the respectful attitude of his source toward Epicurus as well as toward the other great thinkers of antiquity. He saw no inconsistency in his own reverent attitude toward Epicurus and his condemnation of those who deny the immortality of the soul.

If we accept a Neopelagian interpretation of the *Convivio*, that Dante there gave to pagan thinkers a knowledge of saving truth, then his later changes in attitude toward ancient thought was very marked indeed; for in the *Comedy* all pagan thinkers spend eternity deprived of the beatific vision. But, even if we do not accept this view, we are still faced with an interesting question. Why is Epicurus the only great thinker of antiquity deprived of the companionship of his peers in Limbo when he stands together with them in the *Convivio*? Before

[20] *Ibid.*, II, xxxi, 100.

we can answer this question we must consider briefly the fortunes of Epicurus' reputation.

In the early Christian period Epicurean arguments against the pagan religion were widely used by Christian polemicists. Later on, however, he was also employed against Christianity, so that St. Jerome and St. Ambrose both consider Epicureanism a menace, although St. Augustine treats it as pretty well dead. By the time of Isidore and Rabanus Maurus he is "Epicurus de grege porcus," morally corrupt, even though St. Jerome praised his life at the same time that he condemned his doctrine (*Adversus Jovinianum*, II, 11).[21]

By the tenth century the term Epicurean had lost any really specific reference to the actual teachings of the classical followers of Epicurus and had become a general term for "materialist." Thus, Alvarus of Cordova designated the Epicureans as the most dangerous fomenters of heresies, and by heresies he meant determinism, the idea that the soul is corporeal (although immortal), denial of the immortality of the soul, and opposition to both marriage and continence. So vague had the meaning of "Epicurean" become that the Cathari and other mediaeval heretical sects were called by that name, and even the great Italian Ghibelline opponents of the Papacy were accused of "Epicureanism," although precisely what this may have meant in their case is not clear. It is in the tenth century also that atomism and determinism are seen to have an intrinsic connection with one another and that atomism comes to be condemned as heretical after having been considered an innocent doctrine in the Carolingian period.[22]

St. Thomas believed that the Epicureans were astrological determinists who thought that all was caused by the celestial bodies which they called gods (*De veritate*, q. VI, a. 6, n. 5; Vives ed., XIV, 462). This view of the essence of Epicureanism was quite old, and was held by Nemesius (*De natura hominis*, XLIV; *P. G.*, XL, col. 795) and Gregory of Nyssa (*De dietate Filii et Spiritus Sancti; P. G.*, XLVI, col. 559).

It is this general attitude toward Epicureanism which we find in the *Inferno*, an attitude which Dante may have obtained from a number of sources. But the most probable mediaeval source was the *Etymologies* of Isidore of Seville or the *De universo* of Rabanus Maurus, a pretty faithful copy of the *Etymologies*. That Dante had read these two authors is close to certain, since he glorifies them in the *Paradiso*—Isidore in Canto X, 131 and Rabanus in Canto XII, 139.

---

[21] J. Philippe, "Lucrèce dans la théologie chrétienne du III^e^ au XIII^e^ siècle et spécialement dans les écoles carolingiennes," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, XXXII (1895), 284-302; XXXIII (1896), 19-36, 125-162.

[22] Philippe, *loc. cit.*, XXXIII, 154 ff. Among those "who make the soul die with the body" Dante places the Ghibellines Farinata, Frederick II, and Cardinal Ottaviano degli Ubaldini, and also the Guelf, Cavalcante (*Inf.*, X).

LIBRARY

Let us now turn to Isidore and see what he has to tell us about the pagan philosophers and especially the Epicureans. We shall then, I think, be able to specify the exact nature of the shift in Dante's evaluation of the Epicureans. Isidore entitles one section of his encyclopaedia "De philosophis gentium" and begins by classifying them according to their "sects" ("haeresis"). Some, such as the Platonists and Epicureans, take their names from their founders. Others, such as the Peripatetics and Stoics, from their meeting places. The Platonists, named after Plato, believe that, although God creates souls, the angels create bodies, and they also believe in reincarnation.[23] Zeno was the founder of the Stoics, who believe that no one can be blessed without virtue. There are no degrees of sin according to the Stoics, so that the man who steals chaff is as guilty as the man who steals gold, and the man who kills a gull is as guilty as the man who kills a horse. The crime is measured by the state of the soul and not by the animal killed. They believe that the soul perishes with the body, that continence is not a virtue, and strive after eternal glory although they say they are not eternal.[24]

Isidore reports that both the Stoics and the Epicureans deny the immortality of the soul. However, there is a great difference between his ethical and moral evaluation of these two "sects." Epicurus was not a true lover of wisdom but a lover of vanity. He wallowed in carnal filth and placed the highest good in bodily pleasure, so that the philosophers themselves called him a pig. He denied divine Providence and maintained that the origin of things lay in the fortuitous concourse of atoms. His followers denied that God does anything and claimed that everything was corporeal, including the soul. Epicurus said, "I will not be once I am dead."[25]

Although both the Stoics and the Epicureans denied the immortality of the soul, the former were virtuous and had a strenuous morality, while the latter were hopelessly corrupt. They were equally erroneous about the nature of God, the Stoics confusing Him with the world and the Epicureans placing Him beyond all concern for the world. All of the pagan thinkers, saying they were wise, were made fools.[26]

The ancient philosophers held varying erroneous opinions concerning the nature of the world. The Platonists thought it was incorporeal, the Stoics corporeal. Epicurus thought it made of atoms, Pythagoras out of numbers, and Heraclitus and Varro of fire. The latter held the foolish opinion that death was the result of the loss of this fire, and that the

[23] Isidori Hispalensis episcopi, *Etymologiarum sive originum*, ed. W. M. Lindsay, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1911), VIII, vi, "De philosophis gentium," 6-8.

[24] *Ibid.*, VIII, vi, 8-11.

[25] *Ibid.*, VIII, vi, 15-17. The Peripatetics believed in the immortality of part of the soul, although most of it, in their view, perished (*ibid.*, 13).

[26] *Ibid.*, VIII, vi, 18, 19-20.

world died when it lost fire through lightning. These errors of the philosophers brought many heresies into the Church, including Arianism, the heresies of Valentinus and Marcion (the latter deriving from the Stoics), the denial of the immortality of the soul which is the work of Epicurus, and the denial of the resurrection of the body, a teaching of "the vain school of all the philosophers." Where God is identified with matter, we detect Zeno and where with fire, Heraclitus. It was such ideas which circulated among the heretics and the philosophers and which are to be rejected.[27]

However little merit Isidore's garbled account of classical philosophy, Gnosticism, and Arianism may have as history, it is clear that philosophy and heresy are for him virtually synonymous and that Christian heresies derive from the errors of pagan philosophers. Indeed, Isidore classifies Christian heretics and pagan philosophers under the genus of those who choose to believe whatever seems better to them, ignoring the truth promulgated to the world by the Apostles who received it from Christ. It is the Apostles of God who are the auctores.[28]

It should now be clear that Dante had two entirely different conceptions of Epicurus and Epicureanism when he wrote the *Convivio* and when he wrote the *Inferno*. His later view gives us the Epicurus of mediaeval tradition, the pagan philosopher who above all was the breeder of heretical errors. I would suggest that the mediaeval conception of Epicurus as morally corrupt may have helped prompt Dante to single him out as the symbol of heresy. The Stoics too, as he could have learned from Isidore, denied the immortality of the soul. But this denial was pre-eminently an Epicurean position, and, in addition, the Epicureans were immoral and materialistic in the broad sense of the term. The Stoic hero appealed so to Dante that he found room for Cato in Purgatory; whatever their intellectual errors, the Stoics' moral virtues were undeniable.

Oddly enough, Dante, in his changing views on Epicureanism, went counter to what was to be the trend of the future. He departed from the better understanding of Epicureanism available in Cicero's *De finibus* to embrace the characteristic mediaeval view, which was less accurate, to say the least. The diffusion of *De finibus* gradually led to a rehabilitation of Epicureanism, until in Valla's *De voluptate* we find an attempt at reconciling important Epicurean tenets with Christianity. Dante, however, came to accept the authority of Isidore and Rabanus rather than that of Cicero, modifying his earlier "humanism" in the light of the Christian mediaeval tradition.

---

[27] *Ibid.*, VIII, vi, 20-23.

[28] *Ibid.*, VIII, iii, 1-3. The same arguments are repeated in Rabanus Maurus, *De universo*, XV, i, "De philosophis"; *P. L.*, III, cols. 415 ff.

Dante in the *Comedy* saves only Ripheus and Trajan, those pagans who received a special grace and knew of the redemption which was to come or which had come. Cato, as we find him in the *Purgatorio,* is not saved in the sense that he shares in the beatific vision, although he will apparently share in it at the general resurrection. He is certainly saved from the boredom of Limbo, evidently because his singular virtues make him a suitable agent for helping to operate the machinery of the Other World. The virtuous pagans, all the rest—Aristotle, Plato, and Democritus "who ascribed the world to chance"—are in Limbo. Averroes, a Moslem who might have been placed with Mohammed and Ali among the fomenters of discord, is also there. They are in Limbo, according to Dante, because they were virtuous pagans—not because they held particular intellectual positions, even those which might have approximated orthodoxy, or because they knew a great deal, but because they were able to use what truth they had to lead moral lives. Epicurus, treated as the peer of other great pagan thinkers in the *Convivio,* was later discovered to be, as mediaeval tradition held, "de grege porcus." He was not a virtuous pagan, and so Dante could use him as the symbol of heresy he represented for so many mediaeval theologians.

That Dante omits mentioning Cathari, Patarini, and other contemporary heretics with which some scholars have identified his Epicureans has been a problem.[29] It is clear, however, when we consider Isidore's definition of heresy and its presumed source in pagan thought, especially that of Epicurus, that Dante is using a traditional typological figure of the heretic to symbolize them all, and that he singles out one heresy—denial of the immortality of the soul—as a type of all the rest. That he should have thought this the most serious of all heresies should not surprise us when we reflect on his passionate belief in justice and on his extraordinarily subtle differentiations and gradations of rewards and punishments in the *Divine Comedy.* If the soul does not survive death, then the good may receive no reward and the evil may escape all punishment. This is a heresy which destroys the very foundations of the moral life, its sanctions and its fulfillment, and which denies the existence of universal order and justice in its most important area.

Whatever revaluation Dante may have made of pagan thought, however, he never shared remotely in Isidore's ignorant contempt and fear of it. He knew too much and admired the great men of antiquity too much for that. He seems to have learned from Isidore what the eternal destiny of virtuous pagans could not be, rather than what it had to be. He had to deprive his ancient sages of the beatific vision, but he could save them from actual torment because of their nobility of

[29] De Salvio, *op. cit.,* pp. 3 ff., reviews the literature on the question.

character, which Isidore would not have been willing to do. The exception, of course, is Epicurus; when Dante learned what he thought was the truth about him, he had no choice but to condemn him to torment.

Cornell University

STRUCTURAL SYMMETRY IN THE EPISODIC NARRATIVES OF *DON QUIJOTE*, PART ONE

RAYMOND IMMERWAHR

REVIEWING Ludwig Tieck's translation of *Don Quijote* in 1799, Friedrich Schlegel asserted that the time had come to consider Cervantes "one of the most purposeful artists"; for, "as far as hidden purpose is concerned," he could be "just as sly and cunning" as Shakespeare.[1] In the contemporaneous "Rede über die Mythologie," Schlegel found common to Shakespeare and Cervantes, as well as to mythology, "that wit on a grand scale [jener große Witz] of romantic poetry, which consists not in individual conceits but in the construction of the whole... Yes, this artfully ordered confusion, this fascinating symmetry of antitheses, this marvellous everlasting alternation of enthusiasm and irony, animating even the smallest members of the whole, seem to me themselves an indirect mythology."[2]

The term "wit" in a structural sense, as an architectonic symmetry of parallels and contrasts, occurs frequently in Friedrich Schlegel's aphorisms. In the 383rd *Athenäum-Fragment*, for example, it is combined with an anticipation of our present-day critical concept of the

[1] Friedrich Schlegel, *Seine prosaischen Jugendschriften*, ed. J. Minor (Vienna, 1882), II, 314. (All translations from the German in this essay are my own.) It should be emphasized at the outset that neither Schlegel nor the present critic would presume to infer the terms in which Cervantes' artistic purpose presented itself to his own consciousness. There is just one substantial passage in which Cervantes himself discusses the function of the narratives intercalated in Part One. Here the author protests against the constraint of confining himself to "a story so dry and limited in scope as is this one of Don Quijote .... without being able to indulge in digressions of a more serious and entertaining nature. He [Cide Hamete] remarked that to go on like this, pen in hand, with his mind fixed upon a single subject and having to speak through the mouths of a few persons only, was for him an intolerable and unprofitable drudgery." To escape this predicament, the author introduced stories like the "Curioso" and the Captive's Tale, "que están como separadas de la historia," the others being inseparably involved in Quijote's own adventures. The omission of separate and extensive interwoven narratives in Part Two is explained by the danger of the readers' skipping over them in their absorption in the main action, "thereby failing to note the fine craftsmanship [la gala y artificio] they exhibited." The hope is expressed that the author's work in Part Two will be appreciated and his restraint praised. Such questions as the artistic relevance of the stories to the main action of Part One or the relative artistic merits of the methods followed respectively in the two parts are not discussed. Part Two, beginning of Chap. XLIV; *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, ed. Rodríguez Marín (Madrid, 1947-48), VI, 267 f. (this edition of the Spanish text is cited throughout this article). The translated quotations above are from the version of Samuel Putnam, *The Portable Cervantes*, New York (1951), p. 593; elsewhere I quote the most literal translation at hand or provide my own literal translation.

[2] *Jugendschriften*, II, 361 f.

baroque: "There is a kind of wit that for its genuineness, comprehensiveness, and symmetry might be called architectonic... It must be really systematic, and yet again not so; for all its completeness, something must seem to be lacking, broken off, as it were. It may really be this baroque quality that produces the grand style in wit."[3]

In their insistence upon the artistic purposiveness of *Don Quijote,* the German romanticists stressed especially the narratives interwoven with the exploits of the titular hero,[4] particularly that story whose relevance had been most strongly attacked by critics of Cervantes' own time, "El Curioso impertinente."[5] The general principle of Cervantes' deliberate artistry has become increasingly accepted during the more than 150 years since it was first proclaimed by German romanticism; and, as far as the main action of *Don Quijote* is concerned, it has reached full fruition in the Cervantes scholarship of the past generation. However, the view that the intercalated narratives serve no more serious artistic purpose than that of diversion or suspense still finds adherents;[6] as recently as 1949 the author of a book on Cervantes could declare: "It is altogether amiss to declare these digressions or interpolations integral, indispensable, and organic components of a planfully constructed artistic totality. They are to be judged like the interpolations in Dickens' *Pickwick Papers.*"[7] Even where principles of symmetry and paradox are applied to the structural analysis of the main action, as in the investigations of Joaquín Casalduero and Knud Togeby, these stories are assigned only a subordinate structural role.[8] Though Améri-

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 271. See also the references to symmetrical parallels, antitheses, structural "rhyme," and a "baroque exterior" in *Lyceum-Fragment* 124, *Athenäum-Fragment* 162, 253, and 394; *ibid.,* pp. 201, 228, 245, 274.

[4] Friedrich Schlegel, *Jugendschriften,* II, 412; August Wilhelm Schlegel, *Werke,* ed. Böcking (Leipzig, 1846-47), XI, 409 ff.; Ludwig Tieck, *Kritische Schriften* (Leipzig, 1848-52), II, 69, 74 ff. It is, however, not true that they neglected the main action or "relegated [it] to a minor position," as maintained by Lienhard Bergel in his "Cervantes in Germany," in *Cervantes Across the Centuries,* ed. Angel Flores and M. J. Benardete (New York, 1947), pp. 323 ff. By admitting only the most extreme interpretation of Friedrich Schlegel's all too flexible terminology, Bergel makes his view of *Quijote* appear antithetical to that of Tieck, which it actually inspired. The discussion of Cervantes' novel in Tieck's *Sommerreise* is not "anti-romantic" (p. 326) in terms of early German romanticism. See also J.-J. A. Bertrand, *Cervantès et le romantisme allemand* (Paris, 1914), pp. 106 ff., 125 ff., 170 ff., 546 ff.

[5] See the opinions cited by Sansón Carrasco, Part Two, Chap. III.

[6] See Enrique Moreno Baez, "Arquitectura del 'Quijote,'" *RFE,* XXII (1948), 271 ff.; Salvador de Madariaga, *Don Quixote* (Oxford, 1935), p. 55; August Rüegg, *M. de Cervantes und sein Don Quijote* (Bern, 1949), pp. 44 f. The desire indicated in Cide Hamete's statement cited above in note 1 was for diversion of the author, not the readers.

[7] Rüegg, *op. cit.,* p. 88.

[8] Joaquín Casalduero, *Sentido y forma del Quijote* (Madrid, 1949), and "The Composition of 'Don Quixote,'" in *Cervantes Across the Centuries,* pp. 56-93; Knud Togeby, *La Composition du roman "Don Quijote,"* Supp. 1 of *Orbis Litterarum* (Copenhagen, 1957). Togeby sees Rocinante as a symbol of the circuitous

co Castro notes a symmetrically "rhyming" plan in some of them,[9] he fails to examine the possibility of symmetry in the whole series.

The German romanticists are disappointing when it comes to the detailed, specific application of their critical insight.[10] They do, however, point out an underlying analogy between the behavior of *Don Quijote* and that of the "impertinently curious" Anselmo; and this analogy suggests an application of Schlegel's concept of structural "wit" to the narratives in Part One. That the criticism of one age can stimulate new criticism in a later age, and thus contribute to a progressively heightened insight into the artistry of a great literary masterpiece, is a proposition in which Schlegel most certainly would have concurred.

Nor is it entirely fortuitous if Friedrich Schlegel's critical principles are relevant to the work of Cervantes. Schlegel's ideal of romantic literary creation was itself derived in large part from *Don Quijote,* from the other writings of Cervantes,[11] from the earlier Italian and Spanish Renaissance literature upon which Cervantes had been nourished, and from the works of Cervantes' Spanish contemporaries. Schlegel's term *Roman* means first of all romance, in the late mediaeval, Renaissance, and baroque senses of the word, but he expands it into the ideal of an all-embracing poetic synthesis. The *Roman,* or the work that is *romantisch,*[12] is a boundlessly rich poetic creation, encompassing a seemingly chaotic profusion of varieties of human experience and of artistic forms, opening endless perspectives to the imagination.

---

route of Quijote's mad imagination and of the vicissitudes of fortune; he is therefore the central organizing principle of Part One. Like Casalduero, Togeby stresses the rhythmic recurrence of the principal themes common to the main action and the episodic narratives: chivalry, literature, and love (or arms, letters, and beauty). But the "idée capitale du roman" is that man is the author of his own destiny, and this is central to the "Curioso" and to the story of analogous content and position in Part Two, that of Claudia Jerónima. Togeby also suggests a parallel between the captivity of the captain and the subsequent captivity of Quijote (pp. 26 ff.). His table illustrating the parallel sequence of episodes in Parts One and Two (p. 45) is particularly significant in view of his stress on the radically different structure of the two parts.

[9] *El pensamiento de Cervantes* (Madrid, 1925), p. 124.

[10] Among some of Friedrich Schlegel's notebook jottings just published for the first time there is one that calls *Don Quijote* "mehr eine Kette als ein System von Novellen," whereas two others emphasize the systematic character of the work. Friedrich Schlegel, *Literary Notebooks, 1797-1801,* ed. Hans Eichner, (Toronto, 1957), Nos. 860, 1014, 1023; pp. 97, 110.

[11] See *Jugendschriften,* II, 314, 350, 411 f.; *Friedrich Schlegels Briefe an seinen Bruder August Wilhelm,* ed. Walzel (Berlin, 1890), p. 318; *Caroline: Briefe aus der Frühromantik,* ed. G. Waitz and E. Schmidt (Leipzig, 1913), I, 524.

[12] See Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Meaning of 'Romantic' in Early German Romanticism," *Essays in the History of Ideas* (Baltimore, 1948), pp. 190-206; Hans Eichner, "F. Schlegel's Theory of Romantic Poetry," *PMLA,* LXXI (1956), 1022 ff., and the Introduction to the edition of the *Literary Notebooks* cited above, note 10. See also my article, "F. Schlegel's Essay 'On Goethe's *Meister,'*" *Monatshefte,* XLIX (1957), 6 ff., 16 ff.

Nevertheless, this seeming chaos is in reality an organic unity, in which each element has a life and meaning of its own and is yet purposively integrated in the whole. Such a work ironically reflects the paradox inherent in the universe as it is experienced by man, along with the artist's awareness of the inevitable limitations and contradictions inherent in his medium. The combination of dialectical antithesis, symmetry, and organic unity in the structure of the romantic literary work Schlegel calls "wit," as we have seen. But such a work is also "Poesie der Poesie," for in it literature itself becomes a subject matter of literature; the inspired poet is at the same time a conscious critic. The romantic creation must also portray a "sentimental subject matter in fantastic form,"[13] coupling unlimited imaginative appeal with warmth of emotion and, above all, with a sense for the force of love that mystically pervades the whole universe.[14] Finally, the romantic creation is "progressive." Just as its author had advanced to successively higher levels of artistic attainment in the course of his career, so the individual work and its characters, and with them the reader, rise to successively higher levels of spiritual and artistic development and of insight.[15]

The most important applications of these romantic principles to the work of Cervantes include Friedrich Schlegel's concept of structural wit as it was developed and applied to *Don Quijote* by the younger romantic philosopher, K. W. F. Solger,[16] the analogy between the madness of Cardenio in the Sierra Morena and that of Quijote,[17] which has since become a commonplace of literary criticism, and the analogy we are now about to examine between the "Curioso impertinente" and the chivalrous endeavors of Quijote. Although first suggested by August Wilhelm Schlegel in 1799,[18] this analogy was explicitly drawn at a much later date by Tieck, when his writing had come under the influence of his younger friend, Solger.

Solger's philosophy was derived from Friedrich Schlegel's concept of irony[19] and from Neoplatonic mysticism. Its central principle is that primal reality, the Idea, must undergo a kind of annihilation, become

[13] "Brief über den Roman," *Jugendschriften*, II, 370.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 371 f.

[15] See the "Versuch über den verschiedenen Stil in Goethes früheren und späteren Werken," *Jugendschriften*, II, 376 ff., and the essay, "Über Goethes *Meister*," *ibid.*, pp. 165 ff.

[16] *Erwin* (Berlin, 1815), II, 254 ff., and *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik* (Leipzig, 1829), pp. 223 ff. Solger does not apply the concept specifically to the intercalated narratives, but says that these are essential and have "an allegorical reference to the main idea of the whole work" (p. 296).

[17] See *F. Schlegels Briefe an seinen Bruder*, p. 427; and A. W. Schlegel, *Werke*, XI, 409.

[18] A. W. Schlegel, *Werke*, XI, pp. 410 f.

[19] See Paul Kluckhohn, *Das Ideengut der deutschen Romanik*, 3rd ed. (Tübingen, 1953), p. 21.

"real nothingness" (reales Nichts) in its descent to the level of earthly experience. In a dialogue between some characters in Tieck's narrative, *Eine Sommerreise* (1834), this principle is applied to the delusion of Quijote, to the tragic experiment of Anselmo, and to a religious and cultural tendency of the early nineteenth century.[20] Quijote's undertaking, to realize in action the ideal of chivalry, is something beyond his own or, indeed, anyone's powers. "Even a Hercules or an Amadis . . . would necessarily fail in such an insane mission. Only here and there, in different times and countries, did something, more or less, of this poetic world of chivalry display itself in actual history." In seeking to experience his poetic inspiration in personal action, "he tried to grasp with his bodily hands" what was in reality "an invisible miracle." The "Curioso" presents a "profound antitype [Gegenbild], which clarifies the folly of the Manchegan from another side. Anselmo too wants to hold visibly, bodily in his hands the invisible, which we possess only in noble faith. He wants earthly nothingness to represent something heavenly and to be a pledge of constancy and love. Through false wisdom, *impertinente curiosidad,* . . . he destroys the chastity and nobility of his wife . . . " One of Tieck's characters narrates a parable to show that the same error is committed by young moderns who attempt to realize through formal conversion the poetic fascination they have found in the legends of mediaeval saints.

The parallel between Quijote and Anselmo was also drawn—independently, or at all events without acknowledgment to Tieck—by the nineteenth-century Spanish critic, Nicolas Díaz de Benjumea,[21] and is occasionally mentioned by twentieth-century scholars as well.[22] Yet neither the romantics nor the later critics seem to have realized the full import of this analogy for the entire series of intercalated narratives centering in "El Curioso impertinente" or for *Don Quijote*, Part One, as an artistic whole.

Noting first of all that the "Curioso" is the one narrative which is read from manuscript and thus presented solely as fictitious literature, let us observe how it is introduced. In Chapter XXXII the priest remarks to other persons at the inn that Quijote's reason has been unhinged by books of chivalry. The innkeeper comes to the defense of these books and mentions that he has a few of them on hand, together with some "other papers" (namely the "Curioso" and another story, which Cervantes was to publish later in his *Novelas ejemplares*).[23]

[20] Ludwig Tieck, *Schriften* (Berlin, 1853), XXIII, 46 ff.

[21] *La verdad sobre el Quijote* (Madrid, 1878), pp. 247 ff.

[22] J. D. M. Ford, "Plot, Tale, and Episode in *Don Quixote*," *Mélanges de linguistique et de littérature offerts à M. Alfred Jeanroy* (Paris, 1928), p. 316, note 2; Marcel Bataillon, "Cervantès et le 'mariage chrétien,'" *Bulletin Hispanique*, XLIX (1947), 130; Américo Castro, *El pensamiento de Cervantes*, pp. 121 ff.

[23] "Otros papeles," *Quijote*, III, 9 f. As we learn in Chap. XLVII (III, 337),

There follows a heated debate on the merits of romances of chivalry, reminding us of the famous scrutiny in Chapter VI, before the start of Quijote's present sally, and foreshadowing the discussion between Quijote and the canon of Toledo, near its end, in Chapters XLIX and L. The crux of the debate between the priest and the innkeeper is the magnitude of the exploits performed in chivalrous romance. The innkeeper prefers a Félixmarte de Hircania to the more plausible heroes of historical tradition precisely because he can slice five giants in half at a single stroke and rout singlehanded an army of 1,600,000 fully armed men. The innkeeper's tirade elicits the comment by Dorotea that he is "capable of making a second part to Don Quijote."[24] She thereby reminds us of Quijote's dual identity as a person and a literary creation and draws our attention to the affinity between Quijote's demented view of life and the unbalanced literary judgment of the innkeeper. We become aware that Quijote and the innkeeper are two manifestations of abnormal credulity brought about by the reading of books of chivalry. A moment later, when the priest looks at the manuscript of the "Novela del Curioso impertinente" and remarks that "the title promises something," our attention is drawn toward the contrast between the curiosity alluded to in this title and the credulity of Quijote and the innkeeper. A further link between this manuscript story and the books of chivalry is provided within the story itself when one of its characters, Lotario, calls Camila an enemy "who could conquer a squadron of armed knights with her beauty alone."[25]

The reading of this one literary fiction is preceded by three narratives of actual happenings told to Quijote and his friends by participants, and is followed by three more such narratives. But the reading of the "Curioso" is central in respect to the main action, for it takes place at precisely the moment when Don Quijote accomplishes his greatest chivalrous exploit, the slaying of the giant who has driven Princess Micomicona from her realm. The reading is interrupted by Sancho's entry into the room to report this great victory of his master. We thus learn that Quijote has destroyed Micomicona's giant of sensuality[26] just after the priest had read about the destruction of Camila's and Lotario's moral integrity. Quijote's insane credulity reaches its apex in his confusion of waking reality with the dream just before we learn the price that Anselmo must pay for the *hybris* of his curiosity.

---

this is *Rinconete y Cortadillo*, a *novela* in the picaresque genre, which is also concerned in part with the problem of confidence between lovers.

[24] "Poco le falta a nuestro huésped para hacer la segunda parte de don Quijote" (III, 15). This and the following translation quoted are from Ozell's revision of the translation by Peter Motteux in the Modern Library edition, pp. 267 f.

[25] "... que pudiera vencer con sola su hermosura a un escuadrón de caballeros armados" (III, 52); my own translation.

[26] See Casalduero, *Sentido y Forma*, pp. 142, 150, 153 ff. The "monkey," who provides the princess and her realm with their names, connotes sexual license.

The position of the "Curioso impertinente" in *Don Quijote,* Part One, midway in the intercalated narratives and interlocking with the climax of Quijote's imaginary career, seems nearly always overlooked by literary critics; a happy exception is Harry Levin, who mentions it briefly but explicitly in a recent essay.[27] The intensive structural analysis of Joaquín Casalduero treats the coincidence of the slaying of the giant and the reading of the "Curioso" as only the second member of a pair, the first being Quijote's dream after the earlier scrutiny, in Chapter VII.[28] But the adventure of this first dream, a defeat rather than a victory, is not comparable to the slaying of the giant, and there is yet a third literary scrutiny in Chapters XLIX and L. The reading of the "Curioso" is a unique event in the novel. It is the center around which the other stories are paired, and it can itself be paired only with the career of Quijote.

Casalduero locates the center of the novel in Chapters XVIII to XXVII, before the narration of the third of the seven stories.[29] This is indeed valid, as far as the actual career of the deluded hidalgo Alonso Quijada or Quesada is concerned, for it is in this part of the novel that he writes the love letter which makes his return home inevitable. But the climax of the no less important imaginary career of the valiant caballero Don Quijote de la Mancha is the slaying of the giant in the enchanted castle.[30] The imaginary career is a delusion resulting from literature, from those grotesquely exaggerated romances of chivalry which were so popular with impoverished hidalgos, with innkeepers and their families, and with a legion of other undiscriminating readers around the end of the sixteenth century. It is therefore not merely fortuitous that the climax of *Don Quijote,* Part One, as a romance of chivalry coincides with the center of seven narratives which make us aware of some alternative types of literature available to readers at this period: the psychological study of the perils of matrimony, the stylized pastoral idyll, and the romance of action and adventure.[31]

The first and last of these seven narratives, which present in retrospect the unhappy loves of Grisóstomo for Marcela and of Eugenio and a rival for Leandra, are pastorals narrated by goatherds. The heroine and her admirers in the first story and the disillusioned lovers in the last are well-to-do sophisticated persons who consciously assume the

[27] "The Example of Cervantes," in *Contexts of Criticism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 91.

[28] *Sentido y Forma,* p. 150.

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 20; more precisely, he finds two centers or axes, the first material, the second spiritual, within these chapters.

[30] Beginning in Chap. XXXVII, Quijote becomes somewhat shaken in the conviction that he has performed this feat, but he attributes his uncertainty to the "enchantment" characteristic of this "castle."

[31] See Leo Spitzer, *Linguistics and Literary History* (Princeton, 1948), pp. 62 f.

roles of the stylized characters of the Renaissance pastoral.[32] It is only this conscious affectation which makes possible the enactment, in a kind of pseudo reality, of a literary category which is almost as fanciful and remote from real experience as the chivalrous romance itself. In the manner of their presentation as well, with all but an epilogue narrated in retrospect, these two pastorals are the most remote of the six stories which are supposed to report actual events.

Between the first goatherd's tale and the wholly fictitious "Curioso" come the two stories of Cardenio and Luscinda and of Fernando and Dorotea. Most of the action of these two stories has been completed before the reading of the *novela* at the inn to a company which includes Cardenio and Dorotea. But they have a common happy dénouement immediately after the reading of the "Curioso," upon the arrival of Fernando and Luscinda, the missing members of the two betrothed couples. These two stories are, in a sense, one; but except for their common dénouement they are narrated as separate histories by Cardenio and Dorotea, and are concerned with the loves of two couples. We are therefore justified in speaking of a total of seven narratives and of seven loves intercalated in the main action of *Don Quijote*, Part One. The deferred common dénouement of the second and third narratives illustrates the difference between a static, geometrical symmetry and the dynamic symmetry compatible with narrative suspense. The deferred dénouement not only ties this pair of stories together but places their conclusion immediately before the fifth and sixth stories, which follow the "Curioso" and precede the final goatherd's tale—the stories of the captive and Zoraida and of the mule boy and Doña Clara. As in the Cardenio-Luscinda and Fernando-Dorotea stories, there are also links which tie these two stories together. Clara's father, the judge, is a brother of the captain. The baptism and marriage of Zoraida under fitting social and material auspices[33] are made possible by the unexpected arrival of the judge and Clara, reuniting two brothers who had dedicated themselves to arms and to letters, respectively.

In the first and last of the seven narratives, the pastorals, the actual world is transformed into an abstract literary realm through the deliberate pretense of the characters. In the "Curioso" the very real problem of matrimonial confidence in a familiar domestic milieu is presented as pure fiction. In these different ways the central psychological story and the pastorals at either end embody that antithesis between literature and actuality animating the main action, which is at once a picaresque novel and a romance of chivalry. But the two pairs of narratives situated

[32] Another fictive Arcadia, but without a love story, is encountered by Don Quijote on his way to Barcelona in Part Two, Chap. LVIII.

[33] The need of such auspices is poignantly expressed by the captain at the end of Chap. XLI, just before his brother comes.

STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LIBRARY
JU 11 1938
MANHATTAN - KANSAS

midway on either flank represent still another literary category typical of the Renaissance from the *Decameron* to the *Novelas Ejemplares*—the story of true love surmounting obstacles under unusual circumstances, a category replete with romantic adventure and coincidence, abductions, disguises, and surprising reunions, exotically beautiful heroines and resolute, daring, or maddened heroes. In the four romances of this type in *Don Quijote*, Part One, "everything is strange and full of incidents arousing wonder and suspense";[34] yet major parts of the action unfold before our eyes. A highly imaginative literary world becomes a credible actuality; romance and reality are synthesized.

The seven intercalated narratives are thus like a series of mirrors,[35] symmetrically placed at different angles around the main action, so as to reflect from different facets the general relation of literature to life. But the symmetry also extends into the individual motives, acts, and destinies of the characters, making them *Gegenbilder* to their mirror-counterparts and to Quijote at the center. The "shepherds," Grisóstomo and Eugenio, have sought personal happiness in reciprocated love; but the one has found only tragic frustration, the other, cynical disillusionment. Both contrast with Quijote, who loves Dulcinea disinterestedly, without need of requital or even recognition. Cardenio, maddened by the complexities of society, contrasts with Quijote, maddened by the extravagancies of literature; and Cardenio's involuntary seizures in the Sierra contrast with Quijote's studied antics in the same mountains. The very conflict of love and society which disorganizes the thought of Cardenio into mad ravings integrates the thought of his mirror-counterpart Luis into the tender lyrics which he sings to Clara at night outside the inn; these in turn contrast with the declarations of love for Dulcinea delivered by Quijote that same night, outside the same inn, in bombastic prose.[36] Fernando, in the third story, is a licentious lover who betrays both friends and betrothed. The captain, in the fifth, is continent in love and steadfast in his loyalty to Zoraida, to his fellow captives, to Spain, and to Christendom. The contrite sensuality and delightfully urbane worldliness of Dorotea contrast with the devout spirituality and reckless unworldliness of Zoraida, whose human love is subservient to that love of the Virgin for which she sacrifices material possessions, national and cultural identity, and filial loyalty.[37] Con-

[34] "Todo es peregrino, y raro, y lleno de accidentes, que maravillan y suspenden a quien los oye." Fernando says this of the captive's tale at the beginning of Chap. XLII (III, 245; my own translation).

[35] Cf. the metaphor of the "endless series of mirrors" applied to romantic poetry in the famous 116th *Athenäum-Fragment* of Friedrich Schlegel (*Jugendschriften*, II, 220 f.).

[36] Chap. XLIII.

[37] The implicit association of Dorotea with the Magdalen mentioned by Casalduero (*Sentido y forma*, p. 133) has its counterpart in the explicit association of Zoraida with the Virgin.

trasting with Fernando on the one hand, Quijote is unshakably steadfast in a love devoid of carnal temptations and in an ethical code inapplicable to the real world. On the other hand, Quijote's abstract chivalrous valor, derived from fantastically distorted literary vestiges of a remote past, contrasts with the captain's authentic soldierly courage, tested in battle at Lepanto and in captivity in Algiers under historical Moorish governors.[38] The spotless but cold chastity of Dulcinea contrasts with the fallible but warm humanity of Dorotea, just as Dulcinea's purely abstract virtues contrast with the passionate Christian dedication of Zoraida.

To sum up, we can say that, just as Quijote contrasts with Anselmo of "El Curioso impertinente" in one dimension, so he or Dulcinea contrasts with at least one major character of each of the six symmetrically paired stories in a second dimension, and each such character contrasts with his mirror-counterpart in a third dimension. The mirror-correspondence is, of course, far from being complete or exact; but it is present in a sufficient degree to suggest that the potentialities for symmetry in the stories—each, no doubt, independently conceived with its own unique literary personality—influenced their selection, arrangement, development, and connection by Cervantes. The symmetry relates primarily to love and to the relation of narrative literature to life, although other artistic, ethical, and social problems are also involved. Some problems of central significance for the main action, such as the criteria of justice, truth, and metaphysical reality, only touch the periphery of the intercalated narratives. And it is understandable that Sancho, who does not love and cannot narrate a story, has contact with these tales and their characters only to the extent that his own interests and prospects are affected by them.

If we now briefly survey the course of love in these seven stories, together with the love of Quijote and Dulcinea on the imaginary level of the main action, a further symmetry becomes evident. At either end, in the pastorals, love is left unfulfilled. In the center of the intercalated narratives a love already fulfilled in happy marriage is destroyed. At the same moment, on the imaginary level of the main action, a love which needs no fulfillment proves its merit. In the two stories on either side of this center, love triumphs over a variety of obstacles to achieve complete fulfillment: in physical consummation, in the sacrament of Christian marriage, in a well-provided household with a secure and respected place in society, and in the lovers' attainment or demonstration of their moral fitness for marriage.

When we compare each of these four loves with its counterpart on the other side of the central axis, a further, dynamically "progressive" sym-

[38] See Jaime Oliver Asín, "La hija de Agi Morato en la obra de Cervantes," *Boletín de la Real Academia Española*, XXVII (1947-48), 245-339.

metry emerges. The obstacles in the two outer stories, confronting the loves of Cardenio and of the mule boy Luis, are of a parental, social, and circumstantial nature: Cardenio's father defers the marriage in favor of an opportunity for his son's social advancement; Luscinda's parents are attracted by the social advantages of a match with Fernando. The love of Luis and Clara is opposed by their youth, by the social aspirations of Luis' father,[39] and by the impending departure of the judge and Clara for the West Indies. In neither story are the obstacles intrinsically formidable; the difference lies in the resources with which they are met by the two couples. The timidity of Luscinda, the bewilderment and irresolution of Cardenio, repeatedly magnify and complicate the obstacles to their marriage. Unfortunate separations and the treachery of Fernando deprive these fainthearted lovers[40] of their happiness until some fortuitous encounters and the assistance of Dorotea win it back for them. Loyal to each other from the start, they are too deficient in will and judgment to establish their marriage by their own initiative. How different are the confident young love of Luis, soaring boldly and resolutely over all impediments to a speedy resolution, and the sure response of Clara, unshaken even by filial obedience!

In the two inner stories flanking the "Curioso" the obstacles to love are deep and fundamental. Fernando and Dorotea must not merely bridge the social gulf between the son of a duke and the daughter of his peasant retainer; Fernando's character must itself be redeemed from its initial licentiousness and inconstancy so that his spirited and inherently generous temperament may be positively developed. This is accomplished through the contrition, fortitude, and resoluteness of Dorotea. The captain is worthy of Zoraida from the start, but his human virtues cannot bridge the still greater gulf separating their religious, cultural, and linguistic[41] worlds without the aid of the divine inspiration guiding Zoraida. In one story we observe the transformation of sensual passion into complete human love;[42] in the other, complete human love is inspired and brought to fruition by the divine love of the Virgin.

There is also a kind of thematic progress from the three stories preceding the "Curioso" to the three stories following it, in the direction of greater social and historic relevance to the Spain of Cervantes' lifetime. The first three stories present their themes in a generalized Renaissance milieu, while life in sixteenth-century Spain displays itself to us through the exploits of Quijote, who himself sees it fantastically

[39] See Chap. XLIV.

[40] See Salvador de Madariaga, *op. cit.*, pp. 72 ff.

[41] See Leo Spitzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 62 ff.

[42] Fernando and Dorotea remain warmly sensual, as we note in Chap. XLVI, where their sensuality is no longer in conflict with their positive moral qualities—only with the ambitions of Sancho!

transformed into the idealized world of chivalrous romance. The last three stories are narrated while Quijote is relatively inactive or a passive victim, at the inn and during his return home in the cage; and nearly all their male protagonists are soldiers or men of letters participating actively in Spain's wars in the Mediterranean and in her colonization of the New World. This applies in a very special sense to the captive's tale, as will be seen below; but in the following story as well, the judge, the captain's brother, is a man of letters on his way to a post in the West Indies, and the mule boy is a man of letters of a different sort, a creative poet. Vicente de la Roca, in the last story, is a sham military hero, but he has seen service in Italy. The structural significance of Quijote's two discourses, on the Golden Age and on arms and letters,[43] lies, I believe, in their introducing two distinct portions of the novel: one in which Quijote intervenes actively in society while the stories present their themes rather abstractly, and one in which Quijote is relatively passive while the society of sixteenth-century Spain is concretely portrayed in the stories through the socially crucial perspectives of arms and letters.

The advances to higher moral and spiritual levels from the love of Cardenio and Luscinda to that of Luis and Clara and from the love of Fernando and Dorotea to that of the captain and Zoraida, together with the increased historicity of the second pair of romances and the pastoral following them, sacrifice static symmetry to dynamic progress. And in the third and fifth stories there is still another kind of departure from symmetry. In the third story this lies in the unique twofold relationship of Dorotea to the career and love of Don Quijote. She plays a part, not merely in his actual history, by facilitating his return home, but also in his imagined exploits, as the princess whom he saves from the giant. The contrast between the charmingly sophisticated daughter of a prosperous peasant and the coarse village wench Aldonza Lorenzo is no less marked than that between the warmly kissing princess of Chapter XLVI and the coldly chaste Dulcinea. Thus Dorotea-Micomicona participates—along with Fernando and the giant—on both the real and the imaginary planes in the stories of Quijada-Quijote and Aldonza-Dulcinea.[44]

The story of the captain also moves on two levels: it is both a series of events presented as realities in a literary sense within a work of imaginative fiction, *Don Quijote*, Part One, and the actual events,

[43] This is stressed by both Casalduero (*Sentido y forma*, pp. 74 ff., and "The Composition of 'Don Quixote,'" pp. 76 ff.) and Togeby (pp. 30 ff.). Togeby also suggests a progressive or "spiral" development of Part One in so far as its treatment of the themes of literature, love, and chivalry is concerned (p. 21).

[44] I wish to thank Professor Harry Levin for reminding me, in a conversation at the time this paper was being prepared, of the importance of Dorotea's twofold function in the novel.

scenes, and personalities which belonged to the life of Cervantes and the history of sixteenth-century Spain and North Africa. The captain's experiences are at once a literary creation of the author Cervantes and an autobiographical reminiscence of "un soldado español llamado tal de Saavedra."[45]

However different the captain may be from Dorotea, we observe that the unique asymmetrical characteristic of each is a projection away from the plane of the other characters in the dimension of historic actuality and poetic imagination. The captain penetrates downward beneath the level of mere literary reality to merge into the actual life and age of Cervantes. Dorotea moves upward from the normal literary reality of the four happily resolved love stories to become Princess Micomicona in the fanciful literary realm of Quijote's chivalrous exploits.

In their progress toward higher levels of love, the four stories paired around "El Curioso impertinente" exemplify not only the romantic concepts of Friedrich Schlegel but also some Renaissance ideas on love and matrimony which have been studied in detail by Américo Castro[46] and Marcel Bataillon.[47] The contrast of these happily fulfilled loves with the tragedy of the "Curioso" at their center reminds us that the ideal toward which they ascend is a humanly fragile one that must be carefully nurtured. Its complete fulfillment, surmounting human weaknesses and bridging cultural and religious chasms, belongs to that realm of poetic romance, the synthesis of imagination and life, the ideal and the real, lying midway between the fanciful "pure poetry"[48] of Quijote and Dulcinea and sober reality. In the aesthetically perfect world of Quijote an ideal love subsists complete in itself without relation to human desires and potentialities. Anselmo and Camila, whom Quijote encounters only as literature, live in the realm of prosaic reality. Even though their story is implausible[49] and lacks the outward trappings of modern "realism," they are real human beings in a familiar domestic milieu; their matrimonial union is not a distant goal but a starting point, with

[45] Chap. XL (II, 190 f.). The captain himself need not, and strictly speaking cannot, be identified with Cervantes—Oliver Asín even tentatively associates him with another contemporary personality (*op. cit.*, pp. 297 ff.)—but his adventures are in large measure autobiographical.

[46] *El pensamiento de Cervantes*, pp. 145 ff.

[47] "Cervantès et le 'mariage chrétien,'" *Bulletin Hispanique*, XLIX, 129-144; "Cervantès penseur d'après le livre d'Américo Castro," *RLC*, VIII (1928), 326 ff.

[48] This concept is developed at great length in application to Quijote, to Sancho, and to the episodic narratives as well by Mario Casella, *Cervantes, Il Chisciotte* (Florence, 1938) and "Critical Realism," *Cervantes across the Centuries*, pp. 195-214.

[49] It is implausible because it is a hypothetical test of an extreme case, but, once we accept the obsession of Anselmo, everything else follows with relentless logic. Paradoxically, the source was the fancifully supernatural tale interpolated by Ariosto in the *Orlando Furioso*, Canto 43.

all the weakness and imperfection of reality seen close at hand. It is Anselmo's obsession to seek theoretical perfection in a real human being, and from the Renaissance point of view he is all the more obsessed to seek such perfection in a woman. This quest for a metaphysical absolute—as different from the poetically idealized humanity of the four romances as it is from the purely aesthetic poetic ideal of Quijote—leads to the progressive destruction of his wife's faithfulness and his own happiness. More than that, it destroys the moral integrity needed to cement social relations generally—between husband and wife, between friends, between masters and servants. Anselmo's *hybris* sets off a relentless chain reaction disintegrating the moral fiber of three other characters, all sound and loyal at the outset, who would have remained so had they not been subjected to an inhuman probing into their potential weaknesses.

The negative direction and conclusion of the most real of the eight loves portrayed in *Don Quijote*, Part One, exemplifies a tendency of Cervantes to set matrimony in the perspective of an ideal goal in imaginative romance but to portray it, once achieved, with prosaic sobriety, as endangered by human frailty and error.[50] One of the greatest perils to love generally in the work of Cervantes is jealousy, of which we find conspicuous examples in *Persiles* and in the story of Claudia Jerónima in *Don Quijote*, Part Two. Anselmo's obsession is a metaphysical variant of jealousy, a jealousy motivated neither by reality nor by delusion, but by abstract speculation. This metaphysical jealousy is an antithesis of Quijote's aesthetically absolute faith in Dulcinea and of the poetically human hopes and faiths of Cardenio and Luscinda, Fernando and Dorotea, the captain and Zoraida, Luis and Clara.

The pastorals at either end of the series of narratives are both unhappy in outcome, and as a literary pair manifest retrogression rather than progress. Marcela's refusal to love is unnatural, but we respect her right to assert her innate temperament and her freedom of will. The "fickle Leandra"[51] is no more capable of distinguishing the true love of Eugenio and his rival Anselmo from the mercenary enticements of Vicente de la Roca than of discerning the difference between his cheap tinsel and real finery. Eugenio's denunciation of the female gender in his nanny goat is no less a burlesque descent from the posthumous love poems of Grisóstomo than his brawl with Quijote is a descent from Grisóstomo's dignified funeral. If the second pastoral thus appears to be a parody of the first, it may be that Cervantes is pointing to the inadequacy of this vehicle, with its endless stylized

[50] Examples are the *Celoso extremeño* and the illicit quasi matrimony depicted on the picaresque plane in *Rinconete y Cortadillo*. See especially Bataillon's article in *Bull. Hisp.*, XLIX, already cited.

[51] "Antojadiza Leandra," Chap. LI (III, 403; translation by J. M. Cohen in the Penguin Classics ed., p. 448).

laments of unrequited love, for the portrayal of a vital human love capable and worthy of fulfillment.

The tragic outcome of the central narrative and the somewhat cynical tone of the final one are overshadowed by the ascending nobility of the loves in the pairs of stories grouped around the "Curioso," so that we cannot say that the overall impression left by the portrayal of love in *Don Quijote*, Part One, is pessimistic. A tendency toward pessimism is, however, suggested in the love stories of Part Two. Because it utilizes other means of fusing literature and life, Part Two assigns only a minor role to episodic narratives, but it does not eliminate them. Its three serious love stories retain something of the pattern of the tragic "Curioso" with happily resolved tales on either side. In the "Bodas de Camacho" true love triumphs over mercenary interest, but only by resorting to a crude fraud. In the third story, the Christianized Spanish mooress Ana Félix and the Christian Spaniard Gregorio can surmount the barrier imposed between them by the expulsion of the Moriscos, but their union cannot be realized in Spain. In the central story Claudia Jerónima kills her fiance in a fit of blind jealousy. The overall shading of these three stories is darker than that of the narratives in Part One; for, with the enchantment of Dulcinea, the ideal of a perfect love becomes more remote on both the imaginary and the real levels of the novel.

The relevance of the "Curioso impertinente" to the main action of *Don Quijote*, Part One, its central position, and the unique manner of its presentation within the intercalated narratives have suggested that these stories may form a meaningful artistic whole, a "symmetry of antitheses," illuminating each other and the work of which they are a part. Our pursuit of clues from German romanticism has led us to infer, not only that the narratives of Part One are an example of "wit in the grand style," but that they contribute purposively and systematically to its artistic mission as "Poesie der Poesie." In addition, we have found evidence of an implicit endorsement by Cervantes in this work of the romantic tale of love and adventure[52] in a contemporary setting as a literary synthesis of imagination and observation, of the ideal and actual, which are presented antithetically in the adventures of Don Quijote.[53]

Washington University

[52] It is these stories that fulfill the qualifications demanded of imaginative literature by the canon of Toledo: "Hanse de casar las fabulas mentirosas con el entendimiento de los que las leyeren, escribiendose de suerte, que, facilitando los imposibles, allanando las grandezas, suspendiendo los animos, admiren, suspenden, alborecen y entretengan de modo, que anden a un mismo paso la admiracion y la alegria juntas." Chap. XLVII (III, 349).

[53] This essay represents part of the work made possible by a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and sabbatical leave from Washington University. I wish to thank my colleagues at Washington University, particularly Liselotte Dieckmann and Alejandro Ramírez, for encouragement, help, and stimulating criticism during the preparation of this article.

RILKE AND HIS FRENCH CONTEMPORARIES

RENÉE LANG

IT IS NO longer necessary to stress the fact that France was the capital influence on Rilke's artistic evolution. More than Goethe, Heine, Schopenhauer, and even Nietzsche, Rilke saw in French culture "die höhere Art," the "higher kind." His admiration for the language with its rigorous and elegant precision, for the writers who handle this tool with an ever-controlled mastery, his love for the country and especially "l'irremplaçable, l'inépuisable Paris"—all this we find expressed again and again in his voluminous correspondence. It is less well known, however, that Rilke was possessed in his last years by an insatiable "avidité livresque," almost exclusively directed towards French literature. Throughout most of his life he had not been a passionate reader; even in his apprentice years in Paris, before the war, he limited his reading mainly to Maeterlinck, Baudelaire, Verlaine, Jammes, Maurice de Guérin, Anna de Noailles, and his personal friends, Verhaeren, Gide, and Vildrac.

With the exception of a few months of military service in Austria, Rilke spent the war years in Germany, mostly at Munich. In these years he spoke consistently of a spiritual "drought," comparing himself to a clock whose movement had stopped. This creative sterility (which he undoubtedly exaggerated) he attributed in great measure to his remoteness from France.

He dreamed of returning to Paris as soon as the frontiers reopened, but the sequestration of his Parisian home and the extremely low value of the mark prevented his going there. He had to be content with the hospitality of Switzerland and a very brief stay in Paris in October 1920, eight days of complete rapture which restored his faith in his poetic genius. It is not surprising that, after trying several Swiss localities, Rilke settled on a place in the French-speaking part of the country, Muzot sur Sierre, where he could drink "à grands traits l'ineffable satisfaction d'être une fois encore en pays français."[1] The sky of the Valais, he said, reminded him of Provence; here he at once indulged in orgies of reading.

Who was his counselor and guide in these orgies? Some hundred unpublished letters which Rilke wrote between September 1921 and September 1926 to Monsieur and Madame Paul Morisse, owners of the French bookstore in Zürich, supply the answer, and reveal the choices,

[1] Letter to Merline (Baladine Klossowska), May 19, 1921, in *R. M. Rilke et Merline: Correspondance* (Zürich, 1954).

the judgments, the enthusiasms of the poet.[2] In a *plaquette* which has become almost unobtainable, M. Morisse, who had been one of the directors of the *Mercure de France*, tells us of his relationship with his famous customer:

> De toutes les joies certaines dont Zurich m'a jusqu'ici gratifié, il en est une que le souvenir me rendra toujours plus précieuse, celle d'y avoir fait la connaissance de l'homme exceptionnel que fut le poète Rainer Maria Rilke.
>
> Déjà client de la librairie Crès, il se présenta à moi dès les premiers jours de mon arrivée sur les bords de la Limmat, et, quasi comme à la pression d'un contact électrique, s'établit entre nous un courant de sympathie, qui nous demeura fidèle. La conversation s'engagea sans plus tarder sur des gens que tous deux nous connaissions et, surtout, sur de communes admirations. Puis, du jour où il alla prendre résidence à Muzot, de nombreuses lettres de lui se succédèrent, dont le prétexte était sa faim de lectures, mais aux lignes desquelles se greffaient des aperçus si personnels sur tels auteurs qui l'enchantaient ou l'avaient déçu. Mais quel enthousiasme chez cet être aux vocables si mesurés, chez cet être dont le cœur n'eût pu, semblait-il, laisser échapper nulle violence, et dont toute manifestation était comme placée sous le signe d'une politesse innée et d'un style venu de la race!
>
> C'étaient de délicieux instants que ceux qu'à ma femme et à moi, il voulait bien nous accorder lorsque—profitant de ses visites à Meilen et au Greifensee, où l'appelaient de sûrs amis—il poussait jusqu'à la Rämistrasse. Il s'amenait parfois avec, entre autres fleurs, ses essais (suivis de réussite) de translation poétique des vers de Valéry, ou bien des pages manuscrites de ses *Vergers* valaisans. J'avoue mon sentiment de satisfaction un peu orgueilleuse, lorsque je me rappelle que c'est par moi qu'il entra en relations avec le poète du *Cimetière marin*.[3]

Soon after the beginning of the correspondence, Rilke's book orders became warm personal messages to which he entrusted his *états d'âme*, the progress of his work, his victories, and his doubts, the social events of Muzot, and the discomforts of declining health. Moreover, he often appealed to M. and Mme Morisse as literary advisers. "Ne croyez-vous pas," he asks, for example, "que je devrais acquérir l'Histoire de la littérature française contemporaine de Lalou, en tant que 'manuel'?"[4] And on another occasion, upon the publication of some new works by Carco and Albert Erlande, he writes: "Envoyez ou non, selon ce que vous pensez."[5]

He begs the Morisses to be judges and even revisers of his first writings in French. When at the end of the summer of 1921 his first French work is published—the introduction to *Mitsou*, the 40 drawings of little Baltusz—he at once sends a copy to M. Morisse with the following lines:

---

[2] Rilke's letters to M. and Mme Morisse have been acquired by the Rilke Archives of the Swiss National Library in Bern.

[3] *In Memoriam Rainer Maria Rilke* (Privatdruck der *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung*, 1927), pp. 46-47.

[4] Letter of Nov. 20, 1923.

[5] Letter of Nov. 27, 1925.

Certes, c'est à votre indulgence surtout que je la recommande, mais j'avoue que j'aime ces quelques pages, pour les avoir *pensées* en français. Ce petit essai, à peine avouable, a suffi à me faire participer un instant (de bien loin, cela se conçoit) à la précision exquise qui est le bon droit de tous ceux qui vivent dans l'intimité de cette langue accomplie.[6]

Two years later Mme Morisse found, on her return from Paris, a small notebook filled with French verse, and a letter asking her to read in a severe critical spirit these "dictées" which had come to him almost against his will. "Quand vous me rendrez mon bouquin vous me direz tout vertement, n'est-ce pas, si c'est absolument interdit de continuer jamais cet entraînement puéril."[7] M. Morisse not only spoke his mind about these poems, but also suggested a few slight changes and a few corrections of Rilke's French, as Vildrac had done for the introduction to *Mitsou*. Nevertheless, whenever Rilke presented these French pieces to one of his French friends, he humbly excused himself for his "audacity." One of the first to be introduced to this new phase of his creation was Paul Valéry, on the occasion of his meeting Rilke at Muzot in 1924. Valéry knew no German, and Rilke's eagerness to establish a more complete communion impelled him to overcome his timidity. Of this encounter we have a brief but enthusiastic account in a letter to Mme Morisse:

Il faut que, vite, vous partagiez avec moi une très grande joie: Paul Valéry m'a fait l'honneur de s'arrêter ici, pour moi, en venant de Genève sur la route d'Italie; c'était un dimanche de fête que celui d'hier: nous l'avons passé vivement, délicieusement dans d'inépuisables conversations. Valéry est reparti ce matin, en me laissant des souvenirs les plus réconfortants et toute cette conscience heureuse de le connaître.[8]

In the meantime, his book orders follow each other at a pace which becomes, especially towards the end of his life, breathtaking. Novels, poetry, biographies, memoirs, diaries and correspondences, histories of literature and of art, anthologies, monographs on cities, travel reports—everything seems to be of interest to him. His curiosity is tremendously awake; a couple of lines suffice to spur it on. Thus we read in a letter of February 1924: "J'ai lu dans le 'Crapouillot' quelques vers délicieux que Supervielle avait signés, ce qui m'a donné envie de ses poésies."[9] This is the starting point of a very deep, reciprocal admiration. Often a little note or article by one of the critics—in particular Edmond Jaloux, Charles Du Bos, Philippe Soupault, or Benjamin Crémieux—arouses his inquisitiveness. Sometimes it is only the title of a book.

Once he has adopted a writer, he is not content with reading and

[6] Letter of Sept. 26, 1921.
[7] Letter of Feb. 18, 1924.
[8] Letter of Apr. 7, 1924.
[9] Letter of Feb. 2, 1924.

rereading him; he must at once spread his fame. He reorders over and over again, e.g., *Charmes* and Valéry's dialogues, Maurois' *Ariel*, Princess Bibesco's *Isvor*, and certain books by Giraudoux, Sindral, Pesquidoux, and Pierre-Jean Jouve. He not only gives these books to friends; he wants his admiration to be shared by unknown readers as well. In January 1926, while under severe medical treatment, he writes to Mme Morisse:

J'avais le temps... de découvrir un chef-d'œuvre: *le Navire aveugle* de Jean Barreyre! Ce livre qui était sur ma dernière liste, j'avais la chance de le trouver ici dans une mercerie de Glion, je l'ai pris, et il m'a causé une admiration mêlée d'étonnement... Lisez, chère Madame, et mettez ce livre d'autorité entre les mains de vos clients sérieux. Je l'ai signalé à Edmond Jaloux, pour qu'il en parle bientôt. Ce nom de Jean Barreyre ne me disait rien; est-il tout aussi neuf et inconnu pour tout le monde? Je suis bien aise de recevoir par vous cet autre exemplaire demandé, car j'ai donné le mien à mon médecin.[10]

A few weeks later the *Navire aveugle* obtained the Prix des Amis des Lettres Françaises. Although some of Rilke's literary enthusiasms may surprise us, most of them bear witness to an extraordinary critical sureness. He recognized immediately the stature of such writers as Gide, Proust, Valéry, Roger Martin du Gard, and Montherlant—often even before the French critics had noted their exceptional qualities.

As soon as *Du côté de chez Swann* appeared, he recommended it to all his friends and urged his publisher, Anton Kippenberg, to acquire the rights of translation for this "remarkable" and "singular" unknown author. His veneration for Proust continued to grow after the war and he read each new volume with the most devout attention. In 1924 he writes Mme Morisse about *La Prisonnière*:

Chère Madame, c'est le Proust, vous le pensez bien, qui m'a empêché de vous remercier plus vite de votre bonne lettre du 27 février: la densité de ces volumes m'a laissé un peu engourdi, et même après avoir fini la première lecture, je suis resté tout absorbé par ces présences latentes de la vie que Proust nous montre en activité. Si on ose détacher quelque chose, c'est "la mort de Bergotte" qui restera un morceau unique peut-être dans toutes les littératures du monde, et, en se rapprochant de ce même thème (l'immortalité de l'âme personnelle, prouvée par l'art), la plupart des passages qui se rapportent à la musique de Vinteuil, où toute une suite de lentes découvertes se trouve exprimée avec une audace et une précision inouïes...

Ce qui fatigue un peu, c'est cette longue jalousie, portée—dirait-on—par personne: car celui qui raconte, comme déjà dans les autres volumes, n'est en somme qu'une voix, une voix parfois couchée, parfois debout, mais de moins en moins un être vivant; c'est une voix et une conscience. Mais quel avantage en résulte de cette abolition du personnage principal en faveur des événements dont il reste la boussole![11]

In 1923, having finished the first volume of *Les Thibault*, which had

[10] Letter of Jan. 27, 1926.
[11] Letter of Mar. 8, 1924.

just been published, Rilke declares that the name of Roger Martin du Gard will remain in the limelight. "Certaines scènes (avec Rachel) sont d'une pénétration inouïe—et la situation intérieure de Jacques, dans son amour naissant . . . se trouve précisée avec un art capable de la dernière exactitude."[12] At the beginning of 1924, his list of desiderata includes *Le Songe* by Montherlant: "Je [le] connais, mais je voudrais [le] posséder, m'intéressant de plus en plus à ses idées, exprimées parfois avec une rare et noble vigueur."[13] On a first hurried contact with *Bella*, so disconcerting for many foreign readers, he is certain that the author is an unequalled artist: "Cette admirable '*Bella*' de Giraudoux qui me semble la plus belle chose qu'il ait jamais faite! il faut une incomparable maîtrise pour suspendre dans l'air léger et pur de l'imagination une œuvre pourtant inspirée par des actualités palpables."[14]

Occasionally Rilke opposes his judgment to the judgment of the press or academic opinion. Thus he writes Mme Morisse concerning *Rabevel*, by Lucien Fahre (winner of the Prix Goncourt in 1923), which had a flashy but ephemeral success:

Rabevel, imaginez-vous que, pour moi, les défauts l'emportent; c'est fait un peu au hasard, comme en gageure; certainement certaines de ces figures, tout intérieures, se sont imposées à l'auteur irrésistiblement—, mais il ne les impose à nous que par la rapidité, voire la violence de son allure. Et le troisième volume est tellement faible qu'il démasque un peu le procédé autoritaire et insuffisant . . . Me tromperais-je? Ce qui en reste pour moi, c'est le paysage du Rouergue, admirablement décrit. C'est aussi dans ces parties seulement que la langue me semble soignée, mesurée, parfaite.[15]

In the same letter, he seems to forecast the Nobel Prize for 1937: "Je ne conçois pas que le jury du prix Goncourt n'ait plutôt voulu se réunir autour des *Thibault*, tellement plus important!" As for Carco's novel, *Perversité*, which was stirring up a violent controversy—some critics acclaiming it as a tour de force and others declaring it a tactless, disgraceful narrative—this is Rilke's unprejudiced and wise judgment:

C'est un roman ni si terrible ni si fort qu'on l'a par-ci et par-là annoncé dans la critique, mais estimable et bien conduit d'une conséquence à l'autre; un de ces romans assez curieux dont le héros est un être effacé et nul qui par sa nullité même attire les conflits avides de remplir ce 'vide.'[16]

In addition to prose writers already mentioned, the following appear more than once in Rilke's order lists: Balzac, Barbey d'Aurevilly, Barrès, Lacretelle, Colette, Mauriac, Cocteau, Rivière, Betz, Hamp, Schlumberger, Morand, Péguy, Jouhandeau, Pourtalès, Drieu de la

[12] Letter of Dec. 10, 1923.
[13] Letter of Jan. 30, 1924.
[14] Letter of Jan. 18, 1926. See also Rilke's admirable letter of July 31, 1926 to the Princess von Thurn und Taxis.
[15] Letter of Dec. 18, 1923.
[16] Letter of Dec. 21, 1923.

Rochelle, Valery Larbaud, Jules Romains, Alain-Fournier, Marie Lenéru.

As for poetry, Paul Valéry is the absolute master. From the time Rilke discovered "Le Cimetière marin" in February 1921 and promptly translated it, his thought and his pen were constantly occupied by the author of *Charmes*, whom he believed the greatest, the first, the most important of poets. This rapture, which Rilke associated with a new faith in his own creative power, we may follow step by step through his letters to the Morisses. Every line from Valéry's pen, every line about him, any writing prefaced or mentioned by him, is awaited with a feverish impatience.

On annonce un nouvel ouvrage de Paul Valéry: *Le Serpent.* Est-ce qu'il s'agirait d'une reproduction *identique* du magnifique Poème, paru dans la N.R.F. (en juillet 1921)? Ces vers admirables qu'on a pu y lire portaient comme titre: *"Ebauche* d'un Serpent." C'est cette circonstance qui me fait croire que l'édition annoncée en donne peut-être une version différente ou plus complète; *dans ce cas* je voudrais absolument l'avoir![17]

But when M. Morisse sends him the *plaquette* for examination and it proves to be but a luxury edition of the poem published in the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, Rilke cannot reconcile himself to part with it. When the publication of *Charmes* is announced, he writes immediately to his booksellers: "Ai-je besoin de vous dire que je le réclame ardemment, aussitôt qu'il sera installé, étalé sur vos tables généreuses. 'Plus de vingt-cinq poèmes, étant inédits': pensez!"[18] Since M. Morisse had become the middleman between the two poets (as had also Gide), Rilke keeps him regularly informed of his Valéry translations, of his ecstasies, and of his hopes:

Vos lignes... m'ont trouvé tout occupé... de Lui, de Valéry, de son Œuvre, aussi activement que possible. Je viens de traduire cette incomparable "Dormeuse" qui m'éblouit comme une constellation établie à tout jamais au ciel de la langue.[19]

Following these lines Rilke gives a precise account of the translations he has made and begs M. Morisse to sound out ("sonder") Valéry on whether he would authorize these versions, into which Rilke has thrown himself "sans demander beaucoup... suivant la pente de [son] admiration et celle de [sa] nature."

Henceforth other poets who have reigned over Rilke's Olympus are

[17] Letter of Mar. 4, 1922.

[18] Letter of June 29, 1922. It is important to realize that all these letters of Rilke about Valéry belong to the period in which he had reached the climax of his own creation with the *Duino Elegies* and the *Sonnets to Orpheus.*

[19] Letter of Dec. 7, 1922. Such a passage is more than a simple statement on Rilke's literary activity. It bears witness to the fact that he was attracted to Valéry not only by his ideas but also by the faultless *métier*, the unerring craft of Valéry's language.

pushed into the background. Only those who, like Rimbaud, Mallarmé, and Moréas, have some connection with his idol gain in prestige. Nonetheless, Rilke's curiosity never dries up, and his book lists include numerous anthologies of contemporary poetry and collections of Supervielle, Pierre-Jean Jouve, Valery Larbaud, André Breton, Henri Franck, Cocteau, Tristan l'Hermite, Marie Noël, Fernand Mazade, St. John Perse, etc. But these are simply to read—with Valéry there is a fervent and total communion. Rilke declined to translate *Les Nourritures terrestres*, despite Gide's almost insistent entreaty,[20] and abandoned the unfinished translations of Michelangelo's poems; henceforth his entire power of re-creation belongs to Valéry:

> L'entraînement était si fort que j'ai abandonné Michel-Ange et toutes mes autres occupations de traducteur, pour me vouer entièrement à celle-ci qui porte en elle-même une récompense infiniment douce et durable.[21]

"Des tentations, des tentations . . . cela n'en finit pas," he writes to his bookseller while studying catalogues and periodicals. When in August 1925 he came home from a seven months' stay in Paris, he brought back two huge cases filled with books. But this did not prevent him from resuming at once his endless orders. "Si la présence parlante de Paris m'a fait négliger les lectures accoutumées," he explains, "combien, dans ma solitude de Muzot, j'aurai de nouveau besoin de les poursuivre!"[22] He renews all his subscriptions—*Nouvelle Revue Française, Revue Hebdomadaire, Art Vivant, Nouvelles Littéraires*, etc., together with a generous selection of the latest books.

The *latest books*—with hardly an exception, Rilke ordered only contemporary works. He seemed to feel no need to fill in the numerous gaps in his classical background or to know the writings that had an important influence on his own masters (Descartes, for instance, on Valéry and Gide, the Greeks and Latins, or the French classics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). What is the reason of his "modernism"? The answer, in my opinion, is clear. His nostalgia, his incurable and grievous nostalgia for France, which no munificence in Switzerland could ever appease, demanded contact with those who, more fortunate than he, lived in the country of his heart and whose works effused the spiritual climate without which Rilke could not live.

In one of his last letters to Mme Morisse he writes, "Je ne peux pas cesser d'augmenter ces provisions de vie comprimée . . ."[23] At the point

[20] Rilke-Gide, *Correspondance*, Introduction et commentaires par Renée Lang (Paris, 1952), letters 65 and 67. And yet, *Les Nourritures terrestres* seems to have been Rilke's favorite work among the books of Gide, according to a letter to Duchess Gallarati-Scotti of Jan. 23, 1923. See *Lettres milanaises*, Introduction et textes de liaison par Renée Lang (Paris, 1956).

[21] Letter of Feb. 10, 1923.

[22] Letter of Sept. 18, 1925.

[23] Letter of Oct. 27, 1925.

of death, "miserably and humbly ill," he begs his devoted friend Mrs. Wunderly-Volkart to read to him in French. Perhaps behind his closed eyelids he dreams he is once more and forever in the country of those he most loved—Rodin and Valéry.

Tulane University

ERNST JÜNGER'S CONCERN WITH E. A. POE

H. F. Peters

FREQUENT references to E. A. Poe in the works of Ernst Jünger, particularly in those written during and after World War II, raise two questions: First, what is it that attracts Jünger and Poe? And second, has Jünger's interest in Poe influenced his own writings? This paper addresses itself to the first question. Concerning the second, let me simply say that I do not think it is possible to trace any direct influences of Poe on Jünger. Undoubtedly Jünger sees in Poe more than the expert craftsman of grotesque tales and romantic fantasies, although the role of the romantic element in Jünger's work should not be underestimated. The relationship of the two authors is one of affinity rather than dependency, an affinity rooted in their common concern with one major literary theme—the theme of terror.

Terror, as a literary theme, is as old as literature itself. The Greeks considered it an essential element of tragedy. In German literature the romantic poets, notably E. T. A. Hoffmann, were past masters at it—so much so that, when the theme began to appear in Poe's writings, he was accused of plagiarizing the Germans. He defended himself against this charge by protesting that, "if in many of my productions terror has been the thesis, I maintain that terror is not of Germany but of the soul."[1]

It is surely no accident that Poe's terrors of the soul find an echo among contemporary writers. The ever-increasing complexities of our technological civilization, the threat of total destruction which hangs over us in the shape of mushroom clouds, give rise to deep-seated fears. We may dismiss such fears and refuse to talk about them; they are present nevertheless. For, as Jünger says:

> . . . was uns im Innersten beschäftigt, entzieht sich der Mitteilung, ja fast der eigenen Wahrnehmung. Da gibt es Themen, die sich geheimnisvoll durch die Jahre hindurch fortspinnen, wie etwa das der Auswegslosigkeit, die unsere Zeit erfüllt. Sie erinnert an das großartige Bild der Lebenswoge der asiatischen Malerei, auch an den Malstrom von E. A. Poe.[2]

This entry in Jünger's war diary, *Strahlungen*, is dated Paris, November 18, 1941. The reference to Poe's "A Descent into the Maelström" is instructive. To understand its significance the reader must recall the events of the war winter of 1941. These were the months when Hitler's armies suffered their first serious reverses in Russia. Under

[1] *The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe*, ed. J. Harrison (New York, 1902), I, 150-151.

[2] Ernst Jünger, *Strahlungen* (Tübingen, 1949), pp. 65 f.

the impact of an unusually severe winter, they reeled back before Moscow. To Jünger, the author of the subtly anti-Nazi novel, *Auf den Marmorklippen*, it meant that the end was in sight, the revolution of nihilism drawing to a close. "Wir haben in diesen Wochen den Nullpunkt passiert," he noted in his diary. "Dennoch ist es merkmürdig, daß mich im tiefsten Grunde Zuversicht belebt."[3]

The narrator in Poe's story also passes through the "zero point" and is saved. Salvation from the jaws of death is one aspect of the terror theme. Jünger's image of the wave of life which carries man beyond destruction is exemplified by the manner in which Poe's hero is carried through the maelström and cast back into life. His brother is drowned because he lacks faith in the uplifting power of the waves. Paralyzed by terror, he clings to the ring bolt and is sucked down into the abyss.

The moral of Poe's story is that it is fatal to panic in the face of death. Terror is a test of character. If you succumb to it you are lost. It is a lesson that Jünger learned in two world wars. He feels it has a special meaning in our age. Are we not all standing at the brink of a maelström that may destroy us if we lose heart? That is why he says in a letter to me, dated January 9, 1957: "Der Malstrom erschien und erscheint mir noch als eine besonders gelungene Diagnose und Prognose unserer Zeit. Ihre Tendenz ist auf die knappste Formel gebracht."

An entry in an earlier diary, *Gärten und Straßen*, August 19, 1939, gives a clue to the nature of Poe's diagnosis as Jünger interprets it: "Die beste Schilderung des voll automatisierten Zustandes enthält die Erzählung 'Hinab in den Maelstrom' von E. A. Poe."[4] Man's fate in a world of vast and terrifying mechanical forces that seem to be beyond human control is one of Jünger's major concerns. He thinks that Poe anticipated such a state and therefore deserves the epithet, "der erste Autor des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts,"[5] which the Goncourts bestowed upon him. Poe's image of the maelström is to Jünger a symbol of our age.

He gives a similar symbolic interpretation of Poe's story, "The Pit and the Pendulum."

> Die Wassergrube gibt uns das Bild des Kessels, der immer dichteren Umkreisung, der Raum wird enger und drängt auf die Ratten zu. Das Pendel ist das Sinnbild der toten, meßbaren Zeit. Es ist die scharfe Sichel des Chronos, die an ihm schwingt und den Gefesselten bedroht, doch ihn zugleich befreit, wenn er sich ihrer zu bedienen weiß.[6]

"Kessel" refers here to the great battles of encirclement, the *Kesselschlachten* of the war in Russia, the classic example of which is Stalin-

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[4] Ernst Jünger, *Gärten und Straßen* (Berlin, 1942), p. 48.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[6] Ernst Jünger, *Der Waldgang* (Frankfurt, 1950), p. 43.

grad. Jünger, the author of *In Stahlgewittern,* continues to think in military images. But there is this difference—while Jünger in his earlier books glorified war, his concern in his later books is with the isolated individual threatened with destruction by impersonal technical forces.

Die immer künstlicheren Städte, die automatischen Bezüge, die Kriege und Bürgerkriege, die Maschinenhöllen, die grauen Despotien, Gefängnisse und raffinierten Nachstellungen—das alles sind Dinge, die Namen bekommen haben und die den Menschen Tag und Nacht beschäftigen.[7]

These themes also occupied Poe. He anticipated many of the mechanical horrors that have become reality in our time. But the real significance of Poe's nightmarish visions is that he analyzed them and uncovered the strange ambivalence of the soul, which can be fascinated by what terrifies it. In "The Imp of the Perverse" he lays bare that streak in man which makes him seek out the very dangers that threaten to destroy him. "There is no passion so demonically impatient, as that of him, who shuddering upon the edge of a precipice, thus meditates a plunge."[8] Modern psychologists call this fascination with terror the death wish of the soul. It is a theme that often occurs in Jünger. "Der Schwindel vor dem kosmischen Abgrund ist ein nihilistischer Aspekt,"[9] he writes with reference to Poe's essay "Eureka," and asks: "soll man, und sei es auch nur geistig, die äußersten Gewässer aufsuchen, die Katarakte, den Malstromwirbel, die großen Abgründe?"[10] He answers yes. "In unserer Lage sind wir verpflichtet, mit der Katastrophe zu rechnen und mit ihr schlafen zu gehen, damit sie uns nicht zur Nacht überrascht."[11] Like Hölderlin ("wo aber die Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch")[12] Jünger believes that the greater the dangers the better the chances of salvation. "Bei großen Gefahren wird das Rettende tiefer gesucht werden, and zwar bei den Müttern, und in dieser Berührung wird Urkraft befreit. Ihr können die reinen Zeitmächte nicht standhalten."[13]

The difference between Jünger and Poe lies in their attitude towards "das Rettende," which may perhaps be interpreted as Providence. In Poe's stories salvation is usually the result of a rational act on the part of the threatened. Lashing himself to the water cask was such a rational act which saved the narrator of "A Descent into the Maelström." Jünger too believes in the saving power of courageous action, but courage alone is not enough. Something else is necessary, the support of a

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[8] *The Best Tales of E. A. Poe,* Mod. Libr. ed., p. 111.
[9] Ernst Jünger, *Über die Linie* (Frankfurt, 1950), p. 23.
[10] *Der Waldgang,* p. 67.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[12] Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke* (Stuttgart, 1951), II[1], 165.
[13] *Der Waldgang,* p. 55.

transcendental force, a wholly irrational power of salvation. While Poe is fundamentally a rationalist who knows the irrational yearnings of the soul, Jünger has been tending more and more towards mysticism. Rationalism, he thinks, leads to mechanism and mechanism to torture.

> Zahllose leben heute, welche die Zentren des nihilistischen Vorganges, die Tiefpunkte des Malstromes passiert haben. Sie wissen, daß dort die Mechanik sich immer drohender enthüllt; der Mensch befindet sich im Inneren einer großen Maschine, die zu seiner Vernichtung ersonnen ist. Sie mußten auch erfahren, daß jeder Rationalismus zum Mechanismus, und jeder Mechanismus zur Folter führt, als seiner logischen Konsequenz. Das hat man im 19. Jahrhundert noch nicht gesehen.[14]

Nor, we might add, did Jünger see it in his earlier writings. This difference in attitude towards salvation in Poe and Jünger accounts for the different emphasis in their treatment of terror. For Poe it is the fascination with terror that leads him back to the same theme time and again. Jünger's emphasis is on salvation from terror. While in Poe's stories unrelieved terror often prevails, producing a melodramatic effect, Jünger imparts to his readers a sense of man's ultimate conquest of the powers of darkness. In a rather mystifying entry in *Strahlungen,* dated Paris, January 15, 1942, Jünger draws this distinction between himself and Poe. He quotes a letter he received from a friend concerning his "schwarze Fürstin": "Ich meine, daß Ihre Fürstin etwas vom 'Untergang des Hauses Usher' beeinflußt ist. Doch wird hier der Weg zur Heilung gezeigt. Das ist gut. Poe zeigte nur den Untergang."[15]

In a letter to me, January 9, 1957, Jünger explains that this entry refers to his story "Der Hippopotamus," published in *Das abenteuerliche Herz* (2nd ed., 1938). The heroine of his capriccio, as he calls it, is that unhappy Brunswick princess who was queen of England at the time of Napoleon. She was a victim of severe mental depressions, and the story deals with a method of treatment. As in Poe's "The Fall of the House of Usher," the narrator in Jünger's story faces a strange and threatening situation. He finds himself in the presence and at the mercy of a person who is obviously going mad. But, while in Poe's story madness finally overwhelms everything, with the narrator fleeing aghast from a scene of horror he has been unable to alleviate, Jünger presents a cure. It combines scientific and magical elements. Scientific are the prescriptions of sleeping drugs, magical the incantations the princess is to use when she feels the approach of her illness. This combination of scientific and magical elements is a distinguishing feature of Jünger's prose. It has given rise to the expression "magischer Realismus."

Scientific and magical elements also intermingle in Poe's work. But

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 121 f.
[15] *Strahlungen*, p. 82.

Poe saw in magic mainly a destructive force, a dark demonic power that both terrifies and fascinates the soul. To Jünger the magical forces in life are those that uplift man, carrying him beyond destruction. The mediaeval distinction between black and white magic might perhaps be applied to Poe and Jünger. The latter's concern is with man's ascent from the dark realm of demons. To his wife, who was living amidst the terrors of aerial bombardment, he wrote in June 1943: "Was Dich betrifft, so fühle ich mit Gewißheit, daß Du unbeschadet dem großen Malstrom entrinnen wirst; verliere das Vertrauen zu Deiner eigentlichen Bestimmung nicht."[16] Poe did not have such faith to counterbalance the terrors of his soul.

Jünger is interested in Poe's world because it gives him insights into the "dark mathematics" of fate.

> Im Malstrom Edgar Allan Poes besitzen wir eine der großen Visionen, die unsere Katastrophe vorausschauten, und von allen die bildhafteste. Wir sind nun in jenen Teil des Wirbels abgesunken, in dem die Verhältnisse in ihrer dunklen Mathematik, zugleich einfacher und faszinierender, sichtbar werden.[17]

Both Poe and Jünger know that there are powerful and irrational forces that urge man to seek his own destruction. This knowledge terrified Poe and he communicates to his reader a sense of doom: "And my soul from out that shadow that lies floating on the floor /Shall be lifted—nevermore!" Jünger sees a challenge to rise above it, not merely through resolute action but through faith in God's saving grace. At the end of *Auf den Marmorklippen,* when after a night of terror the powers of darkness seem firmly established, the sound of an organ is heard and the words:

> Weil denn kein Mensch uns helfen kann
> Rufen wir Gott um Hilfe an.

It should be noted in conclusion that Jünger's religious position, as reflected by writings cited in this paper, has puzzled many readers of his earlier works. They are not convinced that the former champion of "total mobilization," the herald of the front soldier, the author of *Der Arbeiter,* has undergone a genuine conversion. They feel that his metaphysical speculations are forced and his dreams, visions, and belief in magic are at best a substitute for religion. Jünger himself has noted that an age of terror inevitably gives rise to "Ersatzreligionen von unabsehbarer Zahl."[18]

I would suggest that these critics ponder the significance of the maelström image which occupies such an important place in Jünger's later books. In its dual aspect of death and rebirth it symbolizes the

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 349.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Über die Linie,* p. 24.

human condition as all the great teachers of religion have taught us to see it. Like many writers of his generation in Germany and elsewhere —T. S. Eliot is a case in point—Jünger descended into the maelström, embraced nihilism or, as he put it, was for a time a fellow traveler of the "Mauretanians." But he did not stay there.

> Tatsächlich war, als ich diese Fabel ["Der Hippopotamus"] vor einem Besuch bie Kubin konzipierte, die Sehnsucht nach dem Aufstieg aus den dunklen Dämonenreichen des Malstroms in mir besonders stark. Man muß derartiges auch als Prognostikon betrachten, denn die erfundenen Figuren eröffnen den Schicksalsreigen, sie tanzen ihm bald lächelnd, bald schauerlich voran, und Dichtung ist unsichtbare, noch ungelebte Historie.[19]

Amidst the terrors of a world in chaos Jünger found "Das Rettende." That, it seems to me, is the heart of the matter.

Reed College

---

[19] *Strahlungen*, p. 82.

SCRIPTOR CLASSICUS

GEORG LUCK

IT IS tempting to think of the "classical" as a kind of lighthouse or a promontory, as some changeless phenomenon of art or nature or both, or as an ancient priesthood whose membership has remained constant throughout the ages.[1] The concept of "classicality" has found its way into art, literature, music, fashion, and trade. But it has come to mean so many things that it means none of them.[2] The centuries have thickened the mist about it.

The term seems to have established itself, with a relatively clear denotation, in reference to the writers of the ancient world, mainly because classical scholarship, like comparative literature, forms a link between the nations and because its foundations, aims, and methods are the same or very nearly the same in all countries. Yet English "classical," German *klassisch,* French *classique* are not equivalent. For each nation, "classical" stands for something different. And, as soon as the standards which the word implies in one of these countries and civilizations are transferred into the field of classical scholarship, they lose a good deal of their validity.

There is one—and, perhaps, only one—aspect of the "classical" that is sanctioned by English, French, and German usage alike. That is the complex, elusive, and yet authentic ensemble of virtues and faults which goes by the name of greatness. What is "of the first class," what is "excellent," is classical, *klassisch, classique.*

There have always been writers who wrote correctly, clearly, even elegantly, who had one eye firmly fixed on posterity, without really opening up a realm of the imagination which was theirs and theirs alone.

[1] This paper was presented at the 1956 meeting of the American Philological Association in Philadelphia, as a contribution to a general topic, "The Nature of the Classical." On the same day, Harry Levin read his essay "Contexts of the Classical," which has now appeared as a chapter of his *Contexts of Criticism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957). Without Mr. Levin's kind encouragement, I should have hesitated to submit the following remarks for publication, because I felt that they could hardly add anything to his admirably perceptive and elegant essay. Still, as Mr. Levin has pointed out to me, our papers do not overlap, and I offer these thoughts as a complement from a classicist's point of view, and as a small token of my admiration for Harry Levin's "Contexts of the Classical."

Since the completion of this article, an excellent study of the concepts of "die Antike" and "das klassische Altertum" has been published by Walter Müri, *Die Antike* (Bern, 1957), which traces the history of these important terms through a series of little-known texts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

[2] It is sufficient to recall the protests of Emerson (who termed the distinction between the classic and romantic schools "superficial and pedantic"), Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch (who recommended that we "dismiss the terms 'classical' and 'romantic' out of our vocabularies for a while"), and Benedetto Croce (who declared that the word "classical" was meaningless); see Levin, *op. cit.*, p. 38.



Boileau, Pope, Wieland, and others are "classics" in one sense of the word; they are recommended authors, they are read in schools. But their classicism is what might be called "normative" rather than absolute; it can be taught, to a certain degree, and it can be imitated.[3]

This is precisely the kind of writers who are honored with the title *classici,* when the term occurs for the first time, in Aulus Gellius.[4] He has in mind the "standard authors" whose language and style are correct, accepted, normal. He finds them mostly in the "older cohort of orators and poets," "cohors antiquior vel oratorum vel poetarum." Such a limitation may seem arbitrary to us; but it is actually consistent with a belief which many ancient critics share—that the greatest poetry cannot be imitated. Its beauty can be explained, its appeal justified; but there will never be another Homer.

Gellius' preference for the writers of the past is not a mere reflection of his own archaistic tastes. Like those "partisans of the ancients" whom Horace ridicules (in Pope's adaptation),

> Who lasts a century, can have no flaw,
> I hold that Wit a Classic good in law,[5]

Gellius relies on the judgments passed by time. The poets of Horace's generation resented being always compared to the "classics." Ovid, in a letter from the Black Sea,[6] reminds his fellow writers in Rome that he had never hurt any of their books by a critical verdict, and that, "in suitable reverence for the writings of men of old, I yet consider not inferior those most recent,"

> veterum digne veneror cum scripta virorum,
> proxima non illis esse minora reor.

This "Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes" had broken out in Rome, when Catullus and his friends, who wanted to be known as "the modern poets," "poetae novi," demanded for themselves the recognition which the "classics" had enjoyed for centuries.

---

[3] I have borrowed this useful distinction from E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern, 1948), pp. 275 f. His concept of "Idealklassik" vs. "Normalklassik" was, in a sense, anticipated by Jacob Burchardt, who declared (in the preface to his lecture *Die Kunst des Altertums,* 1890), that Greek art came "closest to that phenomenon which might be called 'Art Absolute'" ("die Kunst an sich").

[4] Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae,* XIX, viii, 15. The term is derived from the first of the six census classes established in Rome under Servius Tullius.

[5] This seems to be the first occurrence of the word "classic" in English. "Classical," paired with "canonical," appears as early as 1599 (Levin, p. 52), whereas the word "classicism" was introduced by Carlyle in 1837 (Levin, p. 40). The passage quoted in the text (from Pope's *Imitations of Horace, Epist.,* II, i, 55-56) is a free translation of Horace's "est vetus atque probus centum qui perficit annos" (*Epist.,* II, i, 39).

[6] Ovid, *Tristia,* V, iii, 55 f.; cf. Horace, *Epist.,* II, i, 28 ff.; Velleius Paterculus, ii, 92; Martial, v, 10.

Less than three centuries before Catullus' time, the Greek poets and scholars attached to the Alexandrian Library had felt that a great period of Greek literature was coming to an end. The very concept of such a library, planned and organized as a vast repository of literary texts from Homer to the present, indicates a strong break in the tradition. In their capacity as critics and librarians, Callimachus and his colleagues paid homage to the "classics." They edited, interpreted, and catalogued the works of Homer, the lyric poets, and the dramatists with all the resources of scholarship and technical skill at their disposal. But, as creative poets in their own right, they avoided consciously the time-honored patterns of feeling and phrasing and searched for the "pure way."[7]

This tension between a selfless and dedicated study of classical literature, on one hand, and an urge for independence and originality, on the other, was the force that shaped the concept of "classicality." The Alexandrians were not satisfied with a mere inventory of the authors and works preserved. Their "lists" or "bibliographies" served a practical purpose and were indispensable for the ambitious project of the Library. But there was such a mass of material that one man alone could not even list, much less read it all in a lifetime. Trimming and pruning their "lists," the Alexandrians drew up "norms," including for each genre of literature the authors and works that were "worthy of being known and read," "cognitu et lectu digni."[8] Needless to say, not all the authors listed in those "norms" were "classics" in the highest sense of the word; but they had passed the critical tests of the Alexandrians and were "chosen" or "approved" authors—Gellius' *classici*.[9]

[7] Callimachus, *Epigr.*, 7. This is one of the Alexandrian poet's programmatic statements. After the decline of the Greek city state, writers and artists felt that they had no longer the authority, in an increasingly fractionated society, to answer the great human questions. They began to detach small pieces of existence and deal with them formalistically. They wanted to be "unclassical," and even their mannerisms represent a reaction against "classicism." The literary papyri that have been discovered in Egypt during the last fifty years or so reveal an almost feverish intellectual activity. Poets now dealt with private experiences; they cultivated the obscure, the difficult. Literature became the concern of small cliques and clans; the fashionable writers of this period were content to have few readers, provided they were men of learning and good taste. This Alexandrian art, which seems so "modern" in every respect, wants to surprise, to puzzle, to shock the reader. It is highly experimental, always "on the way" towards some new goal, seeking to establish an intimate relationship between the text and the reader, a relationship which owes nothing to political or social traditions, but promises the discovery of an exciting world, beautiful within narrow limits.

[8] On these "lists" (pinakes) see O. Regenbogen, in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Real-Encyclopaedie der klass. Altertumswiss.* (1950), col. 1408 ff.; on the "norms" (kanones) see L. Radermacher, *ibid.*, X (1919), col. 1873 ff. The "approved authors" are sometimes called the "sanctioned ones," sometimes simply the "great ones," e.g., by Antiphanes, *Anth. Pal.*, xi, 321.

[9] See Levin, p. 42: "The status of classic must be conferred by others; it is not attained by deliberate striving; this is perhaps the difference between being classical and being a classicist." Levin suggests (p. 45) that the legislative process of

This is precisely the meaning of French *classique* when it appears, for the first time, in Thomas Sébillet's *Art poëtique* (1548). The author of this handbook of poetics recommends "la lecture des bons et classiques poëtes François." Like Gellius, he has in mind those authors who may serve as models. As soon as poets began to write in the vernacular, such models for the correct and elegant use of their own language became necessary.

Today the sense of *classique* is largely determined by the standards of seventeenth-century literature, insofar as this literature was not baroque and distinguished itself by a uniform style, not merely a manner. French *classicisme* denotes not greatness as such, but greatness that will and must compete with the best in ancient literature. An outstanding author in this outstanding period is "un auteur classique." The same process of selection which took place in postclassical Greek literature repeated itself in France. A canon of the dozen or so most representative writers was established for every literary genre—Corneille and Racine for tragedy, Molière for comedy, La Fontaine for the fable. Liberal education in France is still largely based on the knowledge of these authors, just as liberal education, *paideia*, in later antiquity, centered around Homer and a certain number of plays by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides.

French *classicisme* is one form of European classicism, perhaps its most impressive form, but not the only one or the highest. It is a historical phenomenon, limited in time and space, with classical ideals of limited validity.[10] The authors and artists who entered into an endless contest with the "classical" works of Greece and Rome had a rather narrow view of antiquity. Even the classical scholars of the seventeenth century were strangely deluded—or so it seems—in their search for the classical values of the past. Pierre Daniel Huet, a leading and influential critic, published a collection of classical texts *in usum Delphini* and included a number of authors who are today read only by specialists—Florus, Aurelius Victor, Eutropius—because, to his taste, they were representative of "pure Latinity."

The romantic movement in France began as a protest against classical taste. The feeling that the "modern" was *eo ipso* unclassical and therefore "romantic" is characteristic of nineteenth-century French criticism, as it had been characteristic of Alexandrian criticism more than two thousand years before. Baudelaire wrote in *Curiosités esthétiques*: "Qui dit romantisme dit art moderne." And Sainte-Beuve, in 1850, replaced the rigid canon of the "classics" as it was understood

criticism is based on a number of masterpieces, but questions (p. 52) the absolute value of any canon.

[10] French critics hestitate to speak of an English or German classicism; see H. Peyre, *Le Classicisme français* (New York, 1942), pp. 152 ff., and, on the equation of "classical" and "French," Levin, pp. 44 f.

in academic criticism by his vision of a "temple du goût" where there was room for the great names of all nations and centuries, for Homer *and* Shakespeare, Molière *and* Dante, Goethe *and* Rousseau. In his essay, *Qu'est-ce qu'un classique?,* he confronted the French public with a change in outlook that had been inaugurated in England a hundred years before.

In England the French concept of the classical had helped to shape critical theories for most of the eighteenth century—when an exuberant and experimental age that produced classical works without thinking of itself as "classical" was followed by a neoclassical period, Goldsmith's "Augustan Age," whose standards were those of Boileau. In England, the rule of classical orthodoxy was not at first overthrown by a literary movement; it began to decline as the new historical and archaeological interest in Greece and Rome began to grow. The members of the London Society of Dilettanti (founded in 1732) were attracted by the concrete remains of antiquity, by the landscapes and sights of the Mediterranean world, by those "beautiful objects" that spoke a more eloquent language than the texts which had been read and misread for so many centuries.

In Germany, at about the same time, Winckelmann abstracted from such works of ancient art as he knew and admired an ideal of beauty which transcended time and space. In a "noble simplicity," a "quiet grandeur," he saw the essence of the classical. His definition was often repeated and more often misunderstood by his contemporaries. Winckelmann was a pioneer, but he overstressed one side of the classical, its Apollinian aspect, to use Nietzsche's term. The antithesis of the classical and the romantic in art, as he conceived it, modified drastically the Renaissance perspective of Western civilization. From the Renaissance point of view, the ancient world lies shining in the distance, like a sunlit mountain peak, separated from the present by a zone of clouds, the Middle Ages. It was the ambition of Renaissance man to recreate this ancient world, to restore it to its former splendor, and to bring it back into the present. For the seventeenth century in France, this revival had become a reality; Voltaire confidently counted the "Siècle de Louis Quatorze" as the fourth classical period of history, following the ages of Alexander the Great, Augustus, and the Italian Renaissance.

Winckelmann and Goethe questioned the legitimacy of this succession. They refused to believe that the Middle Ages had been all darkness and clouds; they were eager to admire Romanesque cathedrals, Gothic spires, the intimate art of the Flemish and Tuscan schools of painting. A new world of forms and colors revealed itself before their their eyes. The art which they had rediscovered required a new name—it was "romantic" art.

If the cathedral of Cologne represented the same legitimate triumph of feeling and form as the Parthenon, if Shakespeare was as great as Homer, the traditional view of antiquity was obviously false. Reacting against Winckelmann's visions of marmoreal perfection, the poets of the period of Sturm und Drang interpreted antiquity after their own image. They proclaimed that the roots of Hellenic civilization were embedded in the irrational, that Apollo *and* Dionysus were the most Greek of all gods, and that they symbolized two aspects of the Greek soul which were inseparable. Now, and only now, a broad view of antiquity was possible. *Altertumswissenschaft,* as it was conceived by F. A. Wolf, a friend of Goethe's, opened up, at the threshold of the romantic age, a perspective to which nothing that illuminated the life, languages, literatures, and art of antiquity was alien or irrelevant.[11]

It was the "Dionysian" element of antiquity that appealed to the romantic poets in England and Germany. They may have exaggerated its range, but at least they perceived it. Their visions have been abundantly justified by modern research. The studies of E. Rohde and, more recently, E. R. Dodds [12] have dispelled the myth that the best in ancient religion, art, and literature is "classical," that is to say, ordered, rational, and harmonious. A dramatist like Sophocles, with his passionate awareness of the dark sides of human nature, is a "Dionysian" poet. A Greek temple, richly painted in black and red and gold, certainly did not look "classical" in the conventional sense of the word.[13]

---

[11] Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824) is often called the founder of "classical scholarship." This designation is not quite accurate. Wolf matriculated at the University of Göttingen on April 8, 1777 as *studiosus philologiae*—a term previously unheard of. Later, when he delivered a series of lectures, *Über die Encyclopädie der Alterthumswissenschaft* (edited posthumously by J. D. Gürtler, Leipzig, 1839), he endeavored to find a more comprehensive term for the scholarly investigation of antiquity. He considered, for a moment, the term "philology," but then rejected it as misleading, in favor of *Altertumswissenschaft.* He was aware of the English term "classical scholarship," but rejected it, too, because it implied that all ancient authors were "classics." He notes approvingly that, in the English usage of his time, a "classical education" is identical with a "liberal education," but reserves the title of "classics" to a few select ancient authors; but the "classicist," he adds, should pay just as much attention to all the others.

[12] E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951); see my review in *Gnomon,* XXV (1953), 361 ff.

[13] Goethe's vision of the Greek temple, in the second part of *Faust,* does justice to the exuberance of Greek art:

> "Der Säulenschaft, auch die Triglyphe klingt,
> Ich glaube gar, der ganze Tempel singt."

Along Burckhardt's line of thought, Bernard Berenson has suggested that the classicism of Greek art is a humanism, and that Hellenic art is classical because the Greeks succeeded, for the first time, in discovering what channels of expression corresponded best with our physiological and psychological make-up (in the conclusion to his *Aesthetics and History,* New York, 1948). For Heinrich Wölfflin, classical art is the art of the Italian Renaissance, "the grand gesture of the Cinquecento, its restraint, its spacious and vigorous beauty" (*Die klassische Kunst,* first published in 1899 and dedicated to the memory of Burckhardt).

No matter how we define the "romantic"—whether we associate it with the spirit of adventure, with pathos and passion, with a sense of predestinate gloom fulfilled—the Homeric epic will always remain a "romantic" work of art, if the term is to have any meaning at all, and if it is indeed the opposite of the "classical."[14]

Since we face this difficulty of terminology, we must make a choice. On the one hand, we could restore to "classical" the meaning it had in Gellius. But is it not precisely this connotation of academic correctness that we want to avoid? We can, on the other hand (unless we strike it from our vocabulary altogether), redefine "classical" in terms which are acceptable today and which apply to art, literature, and music alike. Above all, we must free it from its fatal contradistinction from "romantic." This antimony served its purpose a hundred years ago; it is no longer relevant in our time. Various attempts to redefine the classical have been made during the last fifty years or so; all these definitions refrain from using nonromantic as one of the defining elements.

Still, one often hears that classicism and romanticism stand for two conflicting tendencies in man—the need for order and the desire for freedom. This would explain the fact that sometimes both tendencies coexist in the same poet or artist. But to argue that the greatest poets of all times have achieved a perfect balance between the two impulses —the need for discipline and the urge for self-expression—merely substitutes one concept of the classical for another. For "balance," according to these same critics, is characteristic of the classical in any form, and the true "classic" whom they postulate emerges as the artist who has disciplined his "romantic" impulses. Such a conclusion is surely acceptable, but does it not derive from circular reasoning? And does it not resolve itself into the portentous truism that every great artist is a great artist?

The second solution seems preferable. If a work of art exists in its own right, if the standards by which it may be judged are immanent, not transcendent, it is a classic insofar as it provides a satisfying experience. Wilhelm Dilthey, in a little-known passage, has expressed this admirably: "Klassisch ist nicht, was gewissen Regeln entspricht, sondern klassisch ist ein Werk in dem Maß, als es dem Menschen der

[14] In his sober and careful study, "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms" (*PMLA,* XXXIV, 1924), A. O. Lovejoy has shown that the word "romantic" has been used and misused in so many contexts that its value as a critical term is by now very limited. To give only one example—both Byron and F. Schlegel are "romantic" poets; but Byron's judgment of Schlegel, although it is a shrewd summary of much of German "romantic" writing, shows that he observes it from a distance, as if it were some strange phenomenon: "Lo! he goes down like a sunset, or melts like a rainbow, leaving a rather rich confusion." (Byron, *Works,* 1832-33, V, 191). I owe these two references to a paper by H. Oppel, "Englische und deutsche Romantik," *Die neuern Sprachen,* V (1956), 457.

Gegenwart eine vollständige Befriedigung gewährt." The work of art does not have to conform to any set of rules; it is our spontaneous acceptance that makes it a classic. Dilthey continues: "Die Entscheidung, was klassisch ist, liegt allein in der Wirkung, nicht in einem abstrakten Begriff von Schönheit, welchen das Werk zu verwirklichen hätte." Simple as it may sound, this statement dispenses with tomes of metaphysical speculations.[15]

Or is it too simple? When Thomas Mann, in his lecture on Lessing (1929), defined the nature of the classical, he also rejected its ordinary connotation of "academic correctness" and "exemplary value" (Mustergültigkeit), but then holding it against its historical background, he wrote:

> Das Klassische ... ist die anfängliche Gründung einer geistigen Lebensform durch das Lebendig-Individuelle; es ist ein erzväterlich geprägter Urtypus, in dem späteres Leben sich wiedererkennen, in dessen Fußstapfen es wandeln wird—ein Mythus also, denn der Typus ist mythisch, und das Wesen des Mythus ist Wiederkehr, Zeitlosigkeit, Immer-Gegenwart.[16]

If we regard literature as life frozen into immobility at its points of highest consciousness, we gain, indeed, a mythical concept of the classical. Mann's definition attributes, perhaps, too much importance to the classical and makes it appear as an impersonal force manifesting itself throughout the ages, but it frees the concept from the incrustations which it has accumulated since Gellius.

The classical is not simply the ancient, nor is it an academic imitation of the ancient.[17] The classical is not limited to a canon[18]—that is to say, it is not bound to purely educational ideals. The classical is not identical with the elements of order, harmony, and reason in literature and art, and it is not simply the opposite of the romantic. But if it is none of these—what *is* the classical? It is, in any language, a proof of the

---

[15] It is surprising to see how close Gertrude Stein comes to Dilthey's definition when she decides (in *Composition as Explanation*) that "the characteristic quality of a classic is that it is beautiful."

[16] On Thomas Mann's concept of classicality, see Levin, p. 48.

[17] This "act of communication across the centuries" is a creative one, not one of mere passive reception. See Levin, p. 53.

[18] A selection of "the best" is, perhaps, inevitable in the course of time. It may even be beneficial. The world is not much poorer for the loss of the homely wisdom of the representative farmer of Sappho's time, but it is a good deal poorer for the loss of Sappho's poems. Many authors are half-forgotten today because their best works are hidden in the bulk of discouragingly complete editions. Everything depends on the conditions under which the selection is made. As a consequence of the political crisis of the third century A.D., the level of literary studies in the Roman Empire dropped sharply. Unfortunately, this decline of genuine interest in literature coincided with an important technical innovation, the use of vellum codices on a large scale instead of papyrus scrolls. The works that were not read any more were not transcribed onto the more durable material and are consequently lost to us, unless they have been preserved by the sands of Egypt.

permanent existence in men of that which *responds*, of elements in the human mind that survive and transcend great stretches of time and bridge every distance of environment and race.

Cambridge, Mass.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE VICTORIAN POETS: A GUIDE TO RESEARCH. Edited by Frederic E. Faverty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. 292 p.

The Victorian Poets: A Guide to Research differs from its distinguished predecessor, *The Romantic Poets: A Review of Research* (1950), in three important respects. First, as the slight change in title emphasizes, the contributors have taken as part of their intention, not only a *review* of existing and particularly recent work ("loosely that of the last two or three decades"), but also a *guide* to outstanding problems which still demand investigation. Second, there is a substantial, if not quite complete, index to the volume, including researchers as well as research (the lack of such an index is thought by many to be the outstanding deficiency of *The Romantic Poets*). Third, this volume does not restrict itself to the Victorian greats or near greats: there are brief sections on even such third-order poets as Alice Meynell, John Davidson, and Lionel Johnson. (One wonders if this last is a substantial improvement. A great deal is now being said about the new perspective with which the Victorian period is being viewed; but the timidity of exclusion which makes us hang onto some thirty Victorian poets in a book of this kind surely calls the clarity of this new perspective into question.)

The contributors to the volume are unquestionably distinguished: Jerome H. Buckley ("General Materials"); Paull Franklin Baum ("Alfred, Lord Tennyson"); William Clyde DeVane ("Robert Browning"); A. McKinley Terhune ("Elizabeth Barrett Browning," "Edward FitzGerald," "Arthur Hugh Clough"); Frederic E. Faverty ("Matthew Arnold"); Clyde K. Hyder ("Algernon Charles Swinburne"); Howard Mumford Jones ("The Pre-Raphaelites"); John Pick ("Gerard Manley Hopkins"); Lionel Stevenson ("The Later Victorian Poets": Coventry Patmore, George Meredith, James Thomson ["B. V."], Thomas Hardy, Robert Bridges, Alice Meynell, William Ernest Henley, Robert Louis Stevenson, Oscar Wilde, John Davidson, Francis Thompson, Alfred Edward Housman, Rudyard Kipling, Lionel Johnson, Ernest Dowson).

Although a rigid pattern of presentation was not imposed upon the contributors, as the editor admits, all the essays attain reasonably well to the standards of objectivity and readability. Professor Buckley, whose chapter is brilliantly alive and suggestive, is perhaps a bit too given to tags; Professor Baum, who occasionally seems impatient of his task but whose judgment of scholarship and criticism is almost always reliable, was not able to free himself wholly of epigrammatic censure; and Professor Jones, whose treatment of the problems facing the student of Pre-Raphaelitism represents the most original analysis and synthesis in the whole volume, seems occasionally too intent upon lecturing the reader. But these are most minor criticisms. If one accepts the wisdom of including so large a number of figures, he can hardly quibble with the overall plan and execution of the book. And, except for a few errors in proofreading and omissions from the index, it is excellently edited.

There is only one "surprise" in the book—Hopkins is given more space than any other single figure, including Arnold, Browning, and Tennyson. For this there are three apparent reasons: first, according to Professor Pick, "the generations of critics since 1918 have probably directed more attention to him than to any other Victorian poet"; second, more traditional Victorian scholars have regularly neglected him and therefore need to be apprized of the present state of Hopkins study; and, third, although both "the Victorians and the Moderns... are now almost equally eager to claim him," during the past dozen years the

Victorians seem to be winning the battle to locate Hopkins aesthetically and ideologically within their time span.

In one important respect, unfortunately, the contributors to this volume have not performed equally valuable services. They have not all clearly and conscientiously provided "fresh leads and new ideas for further research." It is this overall unevenness which makes Professor Faverty's discussion of Matthew Arnold so notable; with perfect ease and with perfect rhetorical taste he clarifies, one by one, specific outstanding needs for future Arnold study. To judge from Professor Terhune's chapter, however, very little of a concrete nature need now be done on Mrs. Browning, FitzGerald, and Clough. Even Professor Stevenson's discussion of the later Victorian poets, learned and urbane as is his treatment of them, is disappointing in this respect; more often than not one has to infer a specific need instead of having it pointed up for him. Still, the guide to future study, explicit or implicit, is the most thoughtful and valuable ingredient of this book; and this review cannot do better service to its readers than give some specific notion of the research topics recommended in *The Victorian Poets.*

GENERAL. (1) Comparative studies "which will relate the poetry and the prose to a cosmopolitan context of philosophic ideas and aesthetic forms." (2) A close scrutiny of "the basic affinities between Victorian and Greek culture..." (3) Studies which will "isolate certain recurrent patterns, motifs, or ways with words that lend [Victorian] poetry a kind of multiple unity in diversity." (4) Studies in style. (5) Monographs on the relation of Coleridge and Shelley to the Victorian period. (6) A detailed definition of the "elements that lend Victorian poetry, whatever its debt to the past, a distinct character of its own." (7) Appraisals of the spiritual content of Victorian verse which are at once scholarly, nonpartisan, and up-to-date, and which do not confuse "message" with art; "... closer studies of the religious and ethical assumptions of the verse itself, of the images and symbols of faith which enrich its substance." (8) Analyses of "the extent to which political beliefs and current social values affected the actual quality of Victorian verse as a whole." (9) Definitions of "the sanctions of... obligation" for the "peculiar responsibility" which the Victorian poets felt. (10) A full acknowledgment of "the variety of forms and styles within Victorian poetry" and "an objective means of assessing the multiple evidence the poets have left behind." (11) A "full-scale modern study of the monologue..." (12) "Fresh scholarly estimates of the Victorian verse novel, the narrative poem, the elegy, the ballad." (13) A reasonable estimate of the success and failure of Victorian poets based on their "intentions," on "their aesthetic principles and purposes in writing..."; the "precise relation between the Victorian aesthetic and the practice of the Victorian poets..." (14) Fresh biographies of most of the Victorian poets, whose "essential" character still eludes us.

TENNYSON. (1) "A full variorum edition of all the poems, with the various readings of the manuscripts and the successive editions..." (2) An "impartial critical biography..." (3) "A formal analysis of Tennyson's prosody" made by someone "whose theories are generally acceptable." (4) A "systematic assaying, fair and objective, of the precise ways and degrees in which Tennyson echoed, followed, anticipated, or helped to form, the principal ideas... in England during his long life." (5) Further study of Tennyson's mysticism. (6) Monographs on Tennyson in Germany and Italy. (7) A thoroughgoing appraisal of "the aesthetic principles upon which [Tennyson] relied to convey his criticism of life."

BROWNING. (1) A "balanced and full appraisal of Browning's virtues and deficiencies and his effect on modern poetry..." (2) "Good annotation of the

full works..." (3) A definitive biography. (4) Location and publication of hundreds of unpublished letters. (4) Fresh study of "Browning's relationship to the romantic poets, and to Shelley particularly..." (6) Further study of the reasons for the "failure of Browning as a dramatist..."

ARNOLD. (1) A complete edition of the letters. (2) A critical edition of the prose works. (3) An adequate biography. (4) "More studies that give thorough consideration to particular aspects of his work." (5) A book on Arnold and France "in which sound and thorough scholarship is combined with critical insight and good judgment." (6) A monograph on Arnold and Germany. (7) Comprehensive treatment of Arnold's relationships with America. (8) Assignment to Arnold of his "true place in the role of English political thinkers." (9) "A full-length, scholarly treatment of Arnold and religion..." (10) A study of Arnold and science. (11) "A full-scale study of Arnold as a stylist in prose..." (12) A study of "Arnold's reputation and influence..." as "a fascinating and instructive account of the changes in culture and literary taste of the last one hundred years."

SWINBURNE. (1) Analysis of Swinburne's vigorous response to Darwin. (2) Textual study of Swinburne. (3) Further identification of Swinburne's contributions to the *Spectator*. (4) Further investigation on the "supposed central episode of Swinburne's emotional history..." (5) Systematic study of the influence of painting on Swinburne. (6) Clarification of "Swinburne's relations to his contemporaries and his use of contemporary ideas..." (7) New appraisal of the technique of Swinburne's poetic art. (8) An "adequate account of Swinburne's critical fortunes in Europe."

THE PRE-RAPHAELITES. (1) Study of the relations between the literary work and the fine art of the Pre-Raphaelites. (2) A determination of "the development of a climate in English opinion favorable to 'Christian' art before the appearance of Mrs. Jameson's *Memoirs of the Early Italian Painters* (2 vols., 1845) and her *Sacred and Legendary Art* (2 vols., 1848)." (3) A clear definition of what, exactly, the Pre-Raphaelites wanted. (4) A study of the effect of contemporary science on the Pre-Raphaelites. (5) The publication of many unpublished Pre-Raphaelite documents. (6) New and distinguished editions of D. G. Rossetti, Christina Rossetti, and William Morris. (7) Analysis of Rossetti's poetry "in terms that the work of I. A. Richards and others has made familiar." (8) A study of Dante Gabriel's and Christina's imagery. (9) A study of the Pre-Raphaelite contribution to the new cosmopolitanism of English literature after 1850.

HOPKINS. (1) A definitive (but as yet impossible) history of the Hopkins manuscripts. (2) A definitive biography. (3) Study of Hopkins' influence on Robert Bridges' experiments in sprung rhythm. (4) Further study of influences on Hopkins. (5) Further study of the multiplicity of Hopkins' interests, of his struggles, and of his character. (6) A definitive study of Hopkins' philosophical themes. (7) Definition of the relation of Hopkins to literary tradition. (8) A "balanced and comprehensively definitive book about Hopkins' poetry..." (9) Further ramification of the important influence of Scotus on Hopkins' metaphysic and aesthetic.

THE LESSER VICTORIAN POETS. *Mrs. Browning*: Genuine critiques of the poems. *FitzGerald*: Fresh analysis and criticism. *Clough*: A "satisfactory synthesis" of the independence of Clough's opinions and actions and the humor of his poems and letters..." *Meredith*: A supplement to bring up to date Bertha Coolidge's *Catalogue of the Altschul Collection of George Meredith in the Yale University Library*; further study of Meredith's "highly idiosyncratic use of sym-

bolism and other figurative devices..." *Thomson*: Further exploration and rounding out of some areas in Thomson's biography; further critical consideration. *Hardy*: A complete collection of the correspondence. *Bridges*: Further study of Bridges' dramatic work; more comprehensive exploration of his philosophic themes; rediscovery of Bridges as a lyric poet. *Meynell*: Elucidation of further details in the poems. *Henley*: "Identification of the great quantity of reviews and essays that Henley published anonymously in many papers" and thereafter further study of his prose and journalism. *Stevenson*: A thorough study of the texts of his poems with recourse to the manuscripts. *Wilde*: A thorough and objective biography; more detailed investigation of his poetry in English ("virtually all... has been made in German"). *Davidson*: A biography. *Thompson*: An investigation of his literary opinions; more critical study of his religious thought, poetic theory, images, style, choice of words, meter. *Housman*: A formal biography; study of his classical sources; a single thorough study of Housman's sources and analogues. *Johnson*: An overall critical study. *Dowson*: A full study of his sources and influence.

WILLIAM E. BUCKLER

New York University

A DICTIONARY OF SPANISH LITERATURE. By Maxim Newmark. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 352 p.

The present volume belongs to a series of literary dictionaries being published by the Philosophical Library, and is the latest work by Mr. Newmark, who has already written two dictionaries and is the author of *Twentieth Century Language Teaching*. The *Dictionary of Spanish Literature* may appear attractive to students of comparative literature who do not read Spanish easily, and it is to them that this review is primarily directed.

In his Preface Mr. Newmark describes the work: "The primary aim of *A Dictionary of Spanish Literature* is to serve as a convenient reference work for American students of Spanish and Spanish American literature... The scope is limited to those names and topics usually represented in standard textbooks and outlines of Spanish and Spanish American literature... The treatment is concise, factual and objective, the endeavor being to present a maximum of data with a modicum of critical commentary... the coverage includes the great anonymous masterpieces, the major and minor novelists, poets, dramatists, essayists and literary critics, both of Spain and Spanish America... In addition to biographies, critical evaluations, chief works and critical references for the above, the dictionary contains articles on significant movements, schools, and literary genres ... There are also entries on scholarly journals, source works, text collections, bibliographies, and literary, cultural and educational institutions."

This ambitious project entails obvious risks, and one of them is the omission of bibliographical material, "minor" figures, literary critics, etc. There are such omissions in this book; but, in spite of them, the work could have real value for what it does contain, provided that its content is accurate. The value of this kind of book lies precisely in its accuracy of fact and intelligence of definition and comment. It must inspire confidence if we are to use it or recommend its use by others, and a few flaws can destroy that confidence.

In the case of this particular work there are enough of these flaws to raise serious doubts as to the reliability of the book as a whole. For example, the definition of *barroco* seems to me to be misleading: "The predominance of the ornamental over the substantial in architecture, art, literature, and culture in general.

In literature, the excessive preoccupation with form and stylistic details (language, figure of speech, allusions, etc.) to the detriment of content and readability" (p. 27). I should not want a student of mine to begin his study of the baroque under the handicap of this antiquated and prejudiced description. Another unhappy attempt is his description of *petrarquismo*: "Characteristic of *petrarquismo* are personalized feeling and a mannered or *culto* style. A predilection for autobiographical detail, the facets of human nature and the cult of classical antiquity are other features of the style" (p. 262).

One might expect to find a definition under the heading "Humanism," but instead there is a brief description of the introduction of humanism into Spain and the names of some humanists. After listing Santillana and Mena as "humanists who were creative writers," Mr. Newmark writes that "The movement reached Spain through the influx of humanists from Italy during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella (1474-1504)." One of these statements must be to some degree erroneous since Mena died in 1456 and Santillana in 1458. Mr. Newmark paraphrases el Brocense to the effect that "everything might be freely examined except the orthodox faith," and adds, with a logic that could prove difficult for the naive, "Thus, the humanists of Spain were mainly eminent in religious and classical scholarship (Nebrija, Cisneros)" (p. 163). This sort of confusion is all too common.

There are numerous minor errors, some of them probably typographical: *patriarco* for *patriarca* (p. 105); *Huelva* for *Huelma* (p. 306, s.v. "Santillana"); *Calila et Digna* for *Calila e Dimna* (p. 102, s.v. "ejemplo"). In the article on "ejemplo" Mr. Newmark gives 1330-35 as the dates of composition for the *Conde Lucanor*, which are probable, but in the article on Juan Manuel the dates are given as 1323-35.

The article on Lope de Vega (pp. 339-341) has, I hope, more than its share of errors and irresponsible judgments. "Lope was said... to have written his first play at the age of twelve." It would be more accurate to state that Lope says he wrote his first play at the age of twelve, and then to add that Lope frequently uses numbers with poetic license. A few lines further on Mr. Newmark writes, "His [Lope's] most productive period coincided with a time of domestic happiness at Alba de Tormes, which ended in 1595 with the death of his first wife, Isabel." A curious statement in view of the fact that most of Lope's writing (and his best) was done after 1595. And then, "The last years of his life were embittered by the insanity and death of his second wife...." The lady in question was not his second wife (who died in 1613), but Marta de Nevares, who could not possibly have been Lope's wife, since (as Mr. Newmark noted earlier) Lope became a priest in 1614. "His writings were said to total over a thousand, of which some 400 are preserved." (This ubiquitous passive construction "were said" shrugs off all scholarly responsibility. In a book of this sort it is inexcusable.) In the sentence quoted we can suppose that Mr. Newmark means *comedias* or "plays," not "writings." There is little value in the critical comment that "Of his non-dramatic writings, his pastoral novel *Arcadia* (1598) is outstanding." Nor is the general confusion clarified by a statement like the following: "Influenced by Italian Renaissance critics, Lope discards all unities except that of action." I think Mr. Newmark means something quite different from what the sentence says.

It would be possible to lengthen the list of complaints, but further accumulation would serve no purpose. These examples are quite enough to destroy my confidence in the *Dictionary*. The evil lies in the book's pseudo scholarship, in the attractive, inaccurate, thumbnail sketch, in the pat, hollow "critical" commentary; and the work, unfortunately, cannot be redeemed by those parts that are correct, fair, and honest. My final evaluation must be severe; as a handbook for students

of Spanish or comparative literature, I can imagine no influence more destructive of scholarly procedure or of intelligent response to literature than the protracted use of this *Dictionary*. The Philosophical Library is doing scholarship in America no favor by publishing shoddy compendiums.

P. J. Powers

University of Oregon

Indiana University Conference on Oriental-Western Literary Relations. Papers edited by Horst Frenz and G. L. Anderson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. 241 p. (University of North Carolina Studies in Comparative Literature, No. 13.)

Of the seventeen essays in this volume, six deal with Chinese, two with Japanese, two with Arabic, one with Sanskrit, and one with Bengali literature; five treat problems concerning several literatures. Most of the papers center around specific topics; there are four on the poetics of Oriental literatures, four on modern Oriental literatures, and three on problems of translation.

Two of the papers deserve particular notice as studies in comparative literature. In "From Imagism to Whitmanism in Recent Chinese Poetry: A Search for Poetics that Failed," Achilles Fang brings to light some important but hitherto unrecognized links between modern Western and Chinese poetry. He convincingly demonstrates that Chinese poetry from 1916 on was influenced first by imagism and then by Walt Whitman. However, when he censures the leaders of the Chinese literary revolution for not studying Dante's *De vulgari eloquentia* (p. 184), he should have excepted one of the foremost leaders, Hu Shih, who did study it.

A comparative study of an entirely different order is "Urban History and Urbanity in Literature," by Jeremy Ingalls. Comparatists will be intrigued by her stated aim to work toward "a world-size view of the process of the creative imagination" (p. 193). But unfortunately her observations on twenty masterpieces and authors of world literature, ranging from the *Gilgamesh* to *Moby Dick*, are stated in terms of a mystifying theory of "urbanism" which is not sufficiently explained. Hence readers will be at a loss when confronted with a comparison between Joyce's *Ulysses* and *The Tale of Genji* (pp. 198-199) or with statements such as: "Ecclesiastes, Tu Fu, Hitomaro, Dakiki, and William Butler Yeats, for example, despite diverse centuries and living areas, all show the characteristics of a late middle urban society" (p. 198). Nor does it help to be told that " a common factor shared by all surviving urban literature is the world-wide diffusion of the puberty initiation, in its three-part cycle" (p. 193).

The four essays on poetics (Sanskrit, Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese), taken together, constitute an enlightening and suggestive study in comparative literature. Though each of the four authors takes a different approach, they all acquit themselves of their task with competence, skill, and clarity. In "Prosodic Elements in T'ang Poetry," John L. Bishop has admirably succeeded in explaining the prosody of the most common genre of classical Chinese poetry in terms that are meaningful both to the layman and to the specialist. Commendable is his practice of giving two translations of each poem discussed, a word-for-word version of his own which he calls "Pidgin-English translation" and a literary English rendition from the published work of a well-known translator.

"Arabic Poetics," by G. E. von Grunebaum, also deals in part with prosody, but in a more technical manner than Bishop's essay, so that this part of the paper will be of less appeal to readers who do not know Arabic. On the other hand,

the discussion of the role of poetry in Arabic society and culture (pp. 36-41) should be of great interest to comparatists. There is also much potential comparative material in "Sanskrit Poetry and Sanskrit Poetics" by Daniel H. H. Ingalls. His remarks on the "artificiality" of Sanskrit poetry (pp. 7-9), for example, call to mind similar features in the consciously "artificial" or "difficult" poetry of other literatures, such as the *fu* in China, *trobar clus* in Old Provençal, *gongorismo* and *culteranismo* in Spain. His pregnant discussion of the power of suggestion in the light of Sanskrit theory and practice (pp. 16-22) also has an immediate bearing on the poetry of other countries. The same topic receives perceptive consideration in Richard N. McKinnon's "Tanka and Haiku: Some Aspects of Classical Japanese Poetry." Much of what McKinnon says about the conciseness and intensity which characterize these two genres is equally relevant to certain types of Chinese poetry, despite the many basic differences between Chinese and Japanese poetry. The same goes for McKinnon's observations on the Japanese poets' intimate relationships with nature (pp. 72-75).

Each of the four essays on poetics puts its subject into sharper focus through contrasts with other literatures. Thus Daniel H. H. Ingalls repeatedly brings out salient contrasts between Sanskrit and English poetry, and McKinnon demonstrates the difference in the use of similar motifs in an anonymous *tanka* and a sonnet by Wordsworth (pp. 71-72). Specific mutual influences are also noted, for instance by von Grunebaum between Arabic and Persian poetry (p. 36). McKinnon recalls that the Japanese *tanka* and *haiku* contributed to the imagist movement and the French *haikai* movement (p. 70).

The decisive influence which Western ideas and writings have exerted throughout Asia in recent times gives a significant measure of unity to the four papers devoted to modern Oriental literatures (Japanese, Chinese, Bengali, and Arabic). "Tradition and Experiment in Modern Chinese Literature," by Yi-Tsi Mei, seems to me to be the most penetrating of the four papers. It demonstrates a multiple transformation in modern Chinese literature: on the one hand, the Chinese literary revolution was profoundly influenced by the native tradition which it had set out to reject; on the other hand, Western ideas produced fundamental changes in Chinese ideology and literature but were themselves considerably modified in the process of being grafted on the Chinese tradition.

From a perusal of this stimulating volume, some larger issues emerge. As the modern world draws closer together, there is an increasing urge, both in the East and in the West, to know more about the literatures of other, hitherto remote and unfamiliar civilizations, and to assimilate ideas and writings imported from abroad. Hence the importance attached to translations in both areas; three of the essays in this volume deal with Western-language translations of Oriental masterpieces, and the papers on modern Oriental literatures stress the role played by translations of Western works in the development of modern Asian letters.

In the realm of literary criticism, the rapprochement of Oriental and Western literary studies is also likely to lead to significant advances. As pointed out by Horst Frenz and G. L. Anderson in their introduction to this volume, there is much to be done in applying the methods of modern Western criticism, properly modified, to Oriental literatures. Conversely, literary criticism will benefit by enlarging its field of vision beyond the confines of the European tradition. By separating the features which are found exclusively in one cultural area from those which occur independently even in unrelated literatures, it will be possible eventually to arrive at a deeper understanding of, say, the nature of lyric poetry. John L. Bishop points the way when he notes in Chinese T'ang poetry "the absence of that imagery we associate with poetry in the West... If the trope is not a typical element of Chinese verse, two other poetic devices, it seems to me, provide the den-

sity and suggestiveness of simile and metaphor: one is the use of evocative detail, the other the use of literary and historical allusion" (p. 63). The Oriental theorists, too, have much to contribute to a refinement of modern literary criticism. Daniel H. H. Ingalls states: "The care with which Sanskrit critics have analyzed figures of speech is extraordinary. Their work on the rhetoric of poetry far surpasses that of the Greeks and Romans, and in many respects, it seems to me, has never been equalled in the West" (p. 10).

These and other problems raised and implied in the book under review open up new approaches to the study of literature on a worldwide scale.

HANS H. FRANKEL

University of California, Berkeley

JOYCE ET MALLARMÉ. By David Hayman. Paris: Lettres Modernes, 1956. 2 vols. 201, 261 p.

Few studies of Joyce, even by those intent upon sources and influences, include Mallarmé. Indeed, few studies of Joyce, even by experts in comparative literature, so much as mention Mallarmé. Yet, as Mr. Hayman proves, the French poet is responsible for much of the matter of *Finnegans Wake* and for much of the method. Mr. Hayman contends not only that Joyce owes his "suggestive" or symbolist technique to Mallarmé but that *Finnegans Wake* is little more than an elaboration of *Un Coup de dés* and its parody. Although those enigmatic documents are "essentially the same," Joyce required more than 600 pages to say what Mallarmé said in eleven. It is no part of Mr Hayman's intention, however, to dismiss Joyce as diffuse and incompetent.

That Joyce's acquaintance with the works of Mallarmé, in prose as well as verse, was early and complete is proved by a variety of evidence. There is the testimony of friends, not only those who recorded their opinions in the B.B.C. broadcasts on Joyce but also those whom Mr. Hayman interviewed. There is the evidence of the Buffalo manuscripts in which Joyce copied out poems by Mallarmé and the evidence of the manuscript of *Finnegans Wake*, with its myriad revisions, in the British Museum. Even without the manuscripts at Yale, which Mr. Hayman seems not to have consulted, the evidence is conclusive. He makes it appear likely that Joyce, having discovered Mallarmé at the turn of the century in the works of Arthur Symons and Huysmans, went on to read "Crise de vers," other essays, and the poems.

Joyce's text provides additional support. Mr. Hayman's analysis of the famous quotation from Mallarmé on Hamlet in *Ulysses* enters previously undiscovered territory. He finds, for example, that Stephen's "Sumptuous and stagnant exaggeration of murder" (Random House edition, p. 185) is another quotation from Mallarmé (Pléiade edition, p. 1558). In *Finnegans Wake*, however, the evidence is often a little less convincing. Mr. Hayman finds hidden references to Mallarmé in phrases or names beginning with "M" and in the syllable "Mal." Joyce's "Tomatoes malmalaid," for example, means "tomates à la Mallarmé," whatever that means. Sometimes Mr. Hayman's interpretation of passages in *Finnegans Wake* is tendentious, narrow, and eccentric. Joyce's "freshprosts of Eastchept and the dangling garters of Marrowbone" becomes "les pots de chair proustiens d'Egypte et les jarretières trainantes de Mallarmé."

In spite of such doubtful evidence, there is enough of a better sort. But, if Joyce knew of Mallarmé in 1900, how, we may ask, does it happen that his effect on Joyce's method is confined almost entirely to *Finnegans Wake*? Mr. Hayman

solves this problem by holding that for some reason that remains unclear Joyce did not become a symbolist until he undertook the story of H. C. Earwicker. To Mr. Hayman, as to Harry Levin, *Ulysses* seems naturalistic with symbolist decoration, and he all but ignores the earlier works, which, as symbolist in method as *Finnegans Wake,* might have been used to advantage in pursuit of a thesis. Off in Paris, working on his doctorate, he seems to have remained unaware of recent American studies of *Chamber Music, Dubliners, A Portrait,* and *Ulysses* that show Joyce a symbolist from the start. Indeed, as early as the *Epiphanies* he used something of that "stylistique de la suggestion" that Mr. Hayman thinks peculiar to *Finnegans Wake.* The effect of Mallarmé on these early works, not only possible but likely, is still to be explored.

Whatever Mallarmé's influence upon Joyce's symbolist method, it is only one among many. A footnote allows that Dante and Blake may have been around, but in general Mr. Hayman ignores these and their like. He neglects the Hermetic tradition, although Mallarmé read Eliphas Lévi and wrote an essay on magic. Joyce's early interest in theosophy, which helped make Mallarmé's ideas congenial, is also neglected. He is disinclined to notice that Joyce's theory of epiphany owes as much to patristic tradition as to Mallarmé, if not more. Although Mallarmé's influence is plain, it works in concert with many others. Mr. Hayman's study would have been sounder if he had considered this cooperation. To regard a favorite in isolation may be natural; but in the study of Joyce, who was far from single-minded, the emphasis might have been distributed more evenly. Joyce's debt to Rimbaud, as yet unexamined, might prove as great as that to Mallarmé—or to Dante, Blake, Yeats, and Hermes himself.

What Mr. Hayman has done, however, is more interesting than what he did not do. A specialist on *Finnegans Wake,* he makes it plain that scenes of that great book owe more to *Un Coup de dés,* "Hérodiade," and the "Faune" than to other members of Joyce's choir. This is a contribution to knowledge. Despite limitations, Mr. Hayman's thesis is of first importance for students of Joyce and, beyond them, to students of comparative literature in our time. Few studies of greater originality, single-mindedness, and brilliance adorn the field of comparative studies.

WILLIAM Y. TINDALL

Columbia University

STRINDBERGS ERÖVRING AV PARIS / STRINDBERG OCH FRANKRIKE 1884-1895. By Stellan Ahlström. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1956. 371, xviii p., 6 ill. (Stockholm Studies in History of Literature, ed. Henry Olsson, Vol. II.)

Quite a number of remarkable investigations concerning various phases of Strindberg's development have been published during the past ten years by young Swedish scholars; and, since Strindberg's mind was ever ready to absorb and assimilate influences from almost any time and civilization, these recent studies have quite often contained discussions of subjects which are of particular interest to the readers of this journal. An outstanding example is Gunnar Brandell's *Strindbergs Infernokris* (Stockholm, 1950). Another is Stellan Ahlström's treatise, which stresses the comparatist aspect in its title, "Strindberg and France, 1884-1895."

Several previous contributions of Ahlström's to periodicals, communicating some preliminary information about a few of his truly astonishing "finds" (e.g., the medical report on Strindberg's stay in the Saint Louis Hospital in Paris during 1895), had caused Strindberg scholars to await with eagerness the publication of

this work, which must have been in preparation for over ten years. It certainly lives up to the highest expectations. The book is extremely well documented; its 290 pages of text are supplemented by more than 1,000 notes (on 60 pages) and by long lists of the source material consulted, both printed and unprinted. It is also well organized and written in a lively and captivating style. For those who do not read Swedish there is a substantial, 18-page summary of its contents in French.

Those portions of Ahlström's study which are primarily a contribution to the biography of Strindberg—revealing and important though they are—will be disregarded in this review. The comparatist will find more than the title or subtitle might lead him to suspect, and more also than the author states in his preface—when he says that his emphasis has not been on literary analysis and that Strindberg's relations with French writers would be treated only in brief outline. The main theme of the study he claims to be Strindberg's unceasing endeavor through the years 1884-95 to make his mark in Paris. To this he has linked an account of how the creative work of Strindberg was received in France by the general public and by the critics.

What Ahlström states as his objective is amply fulfilled by the book itself. Strindberg's contacts with a wide range of more or less prominent Frenchmen are well explored, most extensively those with Zola, André Antoine, and Lugné-Poë. However, interesting material can also be found here about Paul Bourget, Henri Becque, Edmond de Goncourt, Charles Maurras, Jules Lemaître, Ferdinand Brunetière, Juliette Adam, Edouard Rod, Camille Mauclair, Francisque Sarcey, François de Curel, Ginisty, Bigeon, Charles Quinet, Georges Loiseau, Charles de Bignault de Casanove, Paul Gauguin, and others.

The wider significance of Ahlström's investigation becomes clear when one considers that the years on which he focuses his attention saw the climax of the naturalistic tendencies in Strindberg's art, and then prepared his change to a new and, in most respects, entirely different style which has many affinities with symbolism. Thus, his development in those years was symptomatic and occasionally anticipatory of the general development of Western literature as a whole, a transition which has not yet been convincingly explained by literary historians. Ahlström sheds incidentally considerable light on this problem.

Ahlström does not study Strindberg as an isolated figure, but sees him constantly in relation to his contemporaries. So we find here a detailed exposition of the wave of French enthusiasm for Scandinavian literature, drama in particular, which set in and faded away in the early 1890s. We are told not only how the works of Strindberg were received in France, but also those of Ibsen, Bjørnson, and others. Moreover, Scandinavianism is in turn viewed as part of a wider problem—cosmopolitanism versus chauvinism in letters—and so the reception of Tolstoy and other Russians is noted, as well as the repeated campaigns of literary xenophobia directed by some French authors against their too successful foreign colleagues.

To accomplish all this, Ahlström has—among other things—gone through the files of apparently all French periodicals, dailies included, for the period under consideration, and has been rewarded with a wealth of data. He has, however, wisely refrained from overwhelming his readers with this pile of information; he uses his documentation with great moderation and quotes such sources only when it is necessary to prove some particular point. It is obvious to his readers that he is as much at home on the highways and byways of French as of Swedish letters.

Ahlström's book accomplishes fully what it sets out to do. In some respects, however, it may whet the readers' appetite without entirely satisfying it. Thus, one could wish for a complete treatment of the Strindberg-Zola relationship, without restriction to the years 1884-95 which Ahlström's scheme has imposed upon

him. He was, of course, right in not attempting this in his present book. Nevertheless, the subject is both important and interesting enough to deserve study, consecutively and cohesively. Other readers may now wish for a specialized study of Strindberg's relations with the French stage of his time, with his role as both recipient and giver systematically described. The excellent typographical presentation of this book deserves a final word of praise. It is remarkably free of misprints—even in the numerous French quotations (almost all of them are relegated to the appendix of notes; the text proper gives Swedish translations). This reviewer has actually noted but one misprint: "Le femme" on p. 263.

HARRY BERGHOLZ

University of North Carolina

LA MUSIQUE INSTRUMENTALE DE LA RENAISSANCE. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1955. 394 p.

The essays included in this volume are papers presented at a symposium held in Paris in 1954 under the auspices of the Institut de Musicologie de l'Université de Paris. This symposium, in turn, was a sequel to a Colloque International held in the summer of 1953, contributions to which were published as *Musique et poésie au XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1954). Like the earlier volume, this one comes to us under the general editorship of Jean Jacquot.

Several introductory papers stress the reason for a concentration of papers on sixteenth-century instrumental music: for the first time in music history there appeared in this century a definite break between vocal and instrumental music; and from this separation of poetry and music modern instrumental music emerged. There follow papers on various aspects of instrumental music in many countries of Western Europe—not only England, France, Italy, Germany, and Spain, but also Hungary and Poland. Comparatists, as well as music and art historians, may find much of interest in these essays (more numerous, though somewhat briefer, than in the earlier volume). As an example, the very first paper (by M. Gustave Thibault), treating instrumental concerts in the fifteenth century, refers continually to descriptions of instruments and performers found in late mediaeval poetry (*Roman de Renard, Roman d'Alexandre, Roman de Flamenca,* and others).

There is a preponderance of essays on English music (most of them inspired by recent editions of important collections of Renaissance music), including essays dealing with music for keyboard, lute, and strings by David Lumsden, John Ward, Thurston Dart, Denis Stevens, Jeremy Noble, and Elizabeth Cole. Best of all, perhaps, is Jean Jacquot's analysis of some of the works of John Bull.

The music of France, too, has a prominent place, with essays on topics ranging from organ builders in Paris ca. 1600 (Pierre Hardouin) to the beginnings of definite independence between music for organ and music for harpsichord (Norbert Dufourcq) and to the French fantaisie from 1550 (Denise Launay). Especially interesting is the presentation by Suzanne Clercx of the evolution of the toccata and its influence upon the early sinfonia.

Mme Clercx' research draws heavily upon the music of Italy as well as France. Several other papers deal exclusively with Italian music—with the lute music of Domenico Bianchini (de Morcourt), with editions of keyboard music (Flavio Benedetti-Michangeli), with collections of instrumental *chansons* in Lombardy (Claudio Sartori), and with the music of Francesco da Milano (the late Otto Gombosi). Poland is represented by one contribution on a subject of perennial importance to Polish *musici*—the formation of a national style, here of course in

instrumental music of the Renaissance (Zofia Lissa). Hungary has one essay, on musicians at the court of Mathias Corvin (Emile Haraszti).

Spanish music for lute and guitar finds an eager exponent in Emilio Pujol, and Spanish harpsichord music (especially that of Bartolomeo Jobernardi) is discussed by Santiago Kastner. Kastner has a second essay on relations between the Spanish organist Cabezon and the German organist Arnold Schlick, each of whom, he points out, influenced the other. A critical commentary of numerous editions of early organ music by Pierre Froidebise stresses German editions but includes those of other countries. Exclusively German are two papers: the examination of a set of instrumental pieces from Wittenberg in the mid-sixteenth century (W. Brennecke) and a discussion of the dance up to the Thirty Years War (Ernest Meyer).

The instrumental dance is also the subject of several essays not limited to any one country. Daniel Heartz, in discussing instrumental styles during the Renaissance, analyzes the same dances published for ensembles, keyboard, and lute, and gives a most useful concordance for such dances found in Attaingnant's collections. Safford Cape, before presenting his Pro Musica Antiqua performers, discussed the dance in general. Harald Heckman, in pointing out the influence of sixteenth-century music on that of the seventeenth century, emphasizes the relationship between aesthetics and the dance. And André Souris, in discussing essential points to be considered in analyzing Renaissance music, centers his paper around Byrd's pavane, "The Earle of Salisbury."

A final section of the book is the "Discussion générale." Several communications aimed at evaluating the conference are significant here—especially the discussion by M. Boris de Schloezer, which raises a number of aesthetic and sociological as well as musical questions not touched upon during the five days of meetings. The book includes, in addition to a fairly accurate index, a list of all musical examples cited and printed, with those that are complete (there are nine of these) so marked.

The reader of this volume, layman or scholar, will find his horizons enormously expanded, and will hope that this will not be the last symposium on Renaissance music by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.

NAN COOKE CARPENTER

Montana State University

LA PRIMERA VERSIÓN CASTELLANA DE ATALA. By Pedro Grases. Caracas, 1955. 44 p.

In this valuable little monograph, Pedro Grases, the secretary of the Venezuelan Comisión Editora de las Obras Completas de Andrés Bello, has undertaken to establish the identity of the translator of the first Spanish version of *Atala*. Grases has not, however, written a work so narrow as the title might suggest; it includes also considerable bibliographical information and a useful summary of the present state of comparative studies on *Atala* in the Hispanic world.

The first Spanish translation of *Atala* came out in Paris in 1801, only a few months after the original publication of Chateaubriand's famous novel. The translation was signed by S. Robinson, and many critics from that time to the present (among them E. Allison Peers) have dismissed the translation as defective and unimportant, because they thought it the work of a man whose native tongue was not Spanish. But Samuel Robinson was the pseudonym of Simón Rodríguez, well known as an American educator and teacher of Simón Bolívar; and the translation is, according to Grases, in many respects superior to that of Pascual Genaro Ródenas, which has been frequently reprinted.

Another troublesome aspect of this literary problem is the fact that a Mexican priest, Fray Servando Teresa de Mier, laid claim to this translation in his *Memorias*; and such a distinguished critic as Alfonso Reyes affirmed this claim as recently as 1945, although other Mexican scholars had already begun to question the reliability of that strange priest's writings. After a careful examination of the evidence, Grases reaches the conclusion that the Venezuelan educator was the translator of the first Spanish *Atala*.

In the course of his monograph, Pedro Grases manages to resolve a number of problems raised by the inaccurate and at times contradictory statements made by previous literary historians and bibliographers. This little work is a valuable contribution to the study of French sources of Spanish and Spanish-American romanticism.

HUGH H. CHAPMAN, JR.

Pennsylvania State University

RAINER MARIA RILKE: CREATIVE ANGUISH OF A MODERN POET. By W. L. Graff. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. x, 353 p.

This book is one of the very few balanced treatments of Rilke. It combines the biographical and the thematic approach, in a manner which might be confusing unless we remember that many modern poets cannot be fully grasped by means of the standard life-and-works technique, which is suitable only for those authors who are still safely ensconced in the broad, well-lighted landscape of Western tradition. The great biographies of such figures (works like Gundolf's *Goethe*, Zweig's *Balzac*, Maurois' *Ariel* and *Lélia*) were written under the assumption that all three parties—author, biographer, and reader—shared, and interpreted more or less alike, a vast communal body of traditional knowledge and poetic imagery—from the myths of classical antiquity through the Bible and Shakespeare down to Freud.

But many twentieth-century authors, and especially those of an experimental or pioneering bent, have developed a language and imagery of their own in which to express their no longer tradition-bound knowledge. They clothe their knowledge and their feelings, which are often personal and no longer generic to mankind, in entirely new words and word complexes, or in familiar ones invested, for the purpose, with a meaning peculiar to the author or work in question. To use an unpoetic but well-known example, in his *1984*, Orwell makes up "doublethink" and "newspeak" to express phenomena unknown to earlier generations. "Big Brother," on the other hand, is an orthodox word combination converted, for the occasion, into almost the opposite of its traditional meaning. In this conversion Orwell cut out the exocative function of these two words, and severs the umbilical cord that ties the term "big brother" to its many ancestors in literature and psychology, in mythology and in everyday family life. Driven, in their quest for expression, to and beyond the very limits of language, many modern authors have developed a vocabulary and imagery of their own. None more than Rilke—and it is Graff's great merit to have laid bare the connection between the more important Rilkean thoughts and idiosyncrasies, and the words in which they eventually came to be expressed. Too many of Graff's predecessors have left concepts like "inner cosmic space" unexplained, whether through ignorance or because they assumed that they need no explanation.

Take Graff's interpretation of the (Rilkean) term "death." The bulk of it is found in the chapter "Death in Paris" (pp. 245 ff.). The chapter deals, quite

properly, with the experiences and sensations which Rilke set down in the *Notebook of Malte Laurids Brigge*. To the reader unfamiliar with Rilkean terminology, this chapter heading may evoke Mann's *Death in Venice*. Nothing could be more natural; the two authors were born the same year, their stories were published within a short time of each other, and the subject matter in both cases is death. The educated reader might also be reminded of a variety of other artistic representatives of death—in the Campo Santo at Pisa, in mediaeval woodcuts and *danses macabres*, in the metaphysical poets of the seventeenth century, in Baudelaire. But Graff shows that Rilke's "death," while ostensibly the same word used for the same phenomenon, is an utterly personal concept; it is a common word used for a very uncommon (and, for all that, tremendously impressive) set of thoughts and sensations hinging on the cessation of life. And so it is with Rilke's "thing" and his "angel," his "doll" and his "saint."

The method followed in this book is altogether appropriate to its subject. Perhaps it is the only method possible with a writer such as Rilke, who lived and thought and wrote so much in a world of his own that he might easily become incomprehensible to us. It would surely be futile to attempt the *Duino Elegies* without a fairly concise idea of what "angel," "child," "animal," etc. specifically mean in this context. It would be equally futile to read, by way of exegesis, a merely descriptive biography of the poet. In this connection Graff quotes—approvingly, one is tempted to think—what Rilke has to say regarding his own curiosity about Trakl's life: "... not with a view to 'understand' in the literal sense of the word, but in order to be confirmed here and there in the secret instinct which guides us" (p. 34).

The book's biographical part, then, is a guide to the poetry. Almost imperceptibly we leave the poet's life and enter into his thoughts. Yet one cannot help feeling that Graff dismisses too quickly the outward circumstances of Rilke's life. The book begins, in the best positivistic fashion, with the statement that "Rilke was born in Prague at midnight on the fourth of December 1875." Like any traditional biographer, Graff then lays before us the particular social, economic, and psychological situation of Rilke's parents. So far, so good. But, after an opening like this, the reader is perhaps entitled, somewhere along the line and most suitably toward the end of the book, to the complementary sentence: "Rilke died of leukemia, on the twenty-ninth of December 1926, at Muzot, Switzerland," Without wishing to be pedantic, one comes away wondering just what happened to Rilke after 1914, especially since Graff considers him not only specifically, but *sub specie aeternitatis*, as "a lyrical poet, pure and simple, in a world dominated by economic and technical skills" (Preface, p. v.). Surely the world of 1875 was nowhere nearly so hostile to the lyric poet as that of 1926; it was precisely the period after 1914 which accelerated the ascendancy of the "economic and technical skills" in Western Europe!

Quite outstanding are Graff's translations from Rilke, both as mottoes for each chapter, and occasionally, at greater length, in the text. And, although one may regret the paucity of biographical detail for the last third of the poet's life, one cannot but respect the integrity of a biographer who faces, in the last chapter, a question which is entirely legitimate but too often glossed over: "What validity for himself and for us is there in Rilke's construed and strangely solitary world?" (p. 333). Graff's temperate, respectful, but not uncritical answer bids fair to remain valid for many years to come.

WOLFGANG LEPPMANN

University of Oregon

RACINE AND ENGLISH CLASSICISM. By Katherine E. Wheatley. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1956. xi, 345 p.

Racine and English Classicism is a study of adaptations and translations of Racine in England up to 1803, with emphasis on the period 1675-1725. The English authors considered are John Crowne, Thomas Otway, William Congreve, Abel Boyer, Edmund Smith, Ambrose Philips, Charles Johnson, J. Robe, John Ozell, and Brooke Boothby. After examining the treatment of Racine's plays by each of these writers, Professor Wheatley turns to the problem of French influence in English neoclassical dramatic theory in an attempt to track down the cause of the consistent misinterpretation of Racine by the English.

She observes that Rymer, strongly influenced by Rapin, was the disseminator of ideas which were not typical of French classicism in general; Rapin was exceptional among the French in praising the English language and English theater (p. 220), in condoning the use of imagery in poetry (p. 221), and in ignoring the distinction between epic and strictly dramatic style (p. 221). What is more relevant for Dr. Wheatley's inquiry, Rymer rejected, in Jules de la Mesnardière's theory of tragedy, the idea that a realistic psychological style bars set passages of poetry (p. 225), but retained the cruder principles of poetic justice (pp. 230, 236) and melodramatic plot (p. 231). Furthermore, Restoration translators and theorists had absorbed from the French the criteria of the Cornelian rather than of the later Racinian genre (pp. 287 ff.). Professor Wheatley's general conclusion is that English obedience to French critical theory—which was itself incompatible with Racinian theater—precluded any understanding of Racine's dramatic spirit (p. 260).

The most serious defect of Professor Wheatley's book lies not in its scholarship but in the manner of its writing. Professor Wheatley tends to be harsh to the point of offense towards other literary historians. The accuracy of observations such as the following scarcely justifies their inclusion in any serious study: one scholar's critique is, in part, "a confusing jumble of contradictory assertions" (p. 32); another's monograph is "a sophomoric little essay written in barbarous English..." (p. 42).

If such comments merely marked the occasional overflow of scholarly impatience with the shortcomings of earlier investigators, they could well be overlooked. Actually, they reveal a pervasive weakness in the book. Dr. Wheatley is almost as much concerned with the opinions of other scholars as she is with her subject proper. She has used the errors, omissions, or misinterpretations of previous critics as an organizational principle; perhaps—dare one say—as the occasion for her book. If she had examined and rejected in advance all the opinions which she proceeds to examine and reject in the text itself, she would have produced a more concentrated book, though a more difficult one to write. The thinness of the topic is veiled by the density of controversy. Many aspects of Dr. Wheatley's subject are simply not very rich. In the end, not much can be found in the exhaustive comparison of, for instance, Otway's *Titus and Berenice* with Racine's *Bérénice* (Chap. II) which would not be immediately apparent to a sensitive reader; and no principle of thoroughness can justify the remorseless analysis of each misinterpretation, oversight, and mistranslation discoverable in a long series of minor adapters of Racine (Chaps. I-X, XIV).

There remains for our consideration the final part of the book, the section on dramatic theory. Here we are concerned with a straightforward thesis—that the influence of French rules in England created an obstacle to the English appreciation of Racine (p. 286). A question immediately springs to mind: How did the French, who had been exposed to these same rules, succeed in understanding

Racine in spite of them? And why did the English choose to be influenced by those aspects of French dramatic theory which were alien to the spirit of Racine (p. 230), while ignoring the large body of opinion (see Dr. Wheatley's own survey, pp. 224-225) congenial to Racinian theater? Is it reasonable to attribute the formation of the Restoration and early Augustan playwrights' mentality exclusively to French theorists (p. 215), as though the indigenous traditions of the English stage could have had no part whatsoever (pp. 285-286) in the creation of English theatrical taste? Dr. Wheatley herself admits that Otway misinterpreted Racine just as successfully as his later adapters, without benefit of neoclassic criticism (pp. 325-326). It might be well to remember Allardyce Nicoll's warning that in this period of multifarious influences, both native and foreign, one must never assume "that the serious drama of the time was fashioned by any one among these models to the total or virtual exclusion of the others" (*A History of English Drama*, Cambridge, 1952, I, 91). A further problem: Why did the English remain unresponsive to Racine's qualities so long after Rapin and Rymer had ceased to dictate the standards of the stage? Instead of multiplying examples and reiterating her principles unceasingly, Dr. Wheatley might have done better to consider such problems in order to close the gaps in her argument.

A second, and more interesting, thesis is presented in the very last pages of the book and remains undeveloped: the English were unable to appreciate Racine because they lacked any vital psychological tradition comparable to that of the French *mondains* and of the *moralistes* who emerged from their salons. This provocative notion must be held conjectural pending proper substantiation, but opens an enticing avenue to further study.

Our criticisms have left insufficient room for praise of the book's many merits: a painstaking attention to detail, a quantity of interesting information on dramatic theory (much of it, unfortunately, dropped down into footnotes rather than welded into the frame of the book), a perspicacious analysis of the misunderstandings that arise in the interpretation of foreign texts (e. g., p. 298), and, above all, a sincere love for Racine.

IRVING MASSEY

Brandeis University

DE SANCTIS ON DANTE. Essays edited and translated by Joseph Rossi and Alfred Galpin. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957. xxvi, 164 p.

A translation of De Sanctis' critical essays has long been overdue. No view of romantic criticism or of modern criticism is complete without De Sanctis. He performed in Italy a function which parallels that of Coleridge in English criticism, but performed it at a later date and so was able to work upon the more mature results of later German aesthetics. What Coleridge did for A. W. Schlegel, De Sanctis (who was also well acquainted with Schlegel) did for Hegel. He assimilated him and adapted him. Coleridge used Schlegel for his interpretation of Shakespeare; De Sanctis used Hegel for his interpretation of Dante. The concepts of imagination and creation, of organic form and dialectical development, presented in Hegel's aesthetic, were incorporated and transcended in De Sanctis' own aesthetic of dynamic form. This aesthetic enabled him to effect a complete reinterpretation of Italian literature, embodied in his *History of Italian Literature* and in his critical essays.

The most celebrated essays are those on Dante, seven in number. By translating them, Professors Rossi and Galpin have rendered a service not only to Italian



studies but also to the comparative study of literary criticism in this country. (Incidentally, comparatists may note with interest that De Sanctis' chair in the University of Naples was that of comparative literature.) This volume forms an indispensable sequel to the translation of De Sanctis' *History* published in 1931. The editors have added a compact Introduction giving essential information on De Sanctis, notes to the text when necessary, and finally a "Biographical Glossary," mainly of nineteenth-century critics mentioned by De Sanctis.

De Sanctis' interpretation of Dante was first presented in his lectures of 1855 and the following years, then shaped into a book which was never completed but of which some significant chapters remain (1857-58), and finally worked out in his essays, the earliest of which goes back to 1855, the latest to 1869. These were followed up in the *History* (1871), which has an extensive chapter on Dante. De Sanctis had been brought up on the traditional Italian formalistic interpretation of Dante, which concentrated on diction, style, and meter; but acquired wider horizons through his acquaintance with contemporary foreign criticism. He was familiar with both German and French criticism, and in Switzerland became personally acquainted with J. Burckhardt and Th. Vischer. He was keenly aware of the differences between the several critical approaches, and often discusses them in lively and illuminating introductions to his own interpretations. Most American scholars who have written hitherto on De Sanctis have seen him mainly from the Italian point of view, as a contributor to the main stream of Italian literature. But his share in the development of European criticism is no less significant and possibly even more important.

De Sanctis like Coleridge took over (mainly from German aesthetics) the dichotomy of imagination and fancy, the higher and the lower aesthetic faculties, and made frequent practical use of these concepts in his criticism. The parallel with Coleridge may escape English readers because in De Sanctis, following continental usage, the terms are reversed: *immaginazione* is the lower faculty and *fantasia* the higher. This reversal is briefly noted by the translators in their Introduction (p. xviii), but some further references may be helpful to establish the point: O. K. Struckmeyer, *Croce and Literary Criticism* (Cambridge, 1921), p. 25 n.; M. M. Rader, *A Modern Book of Aesthetics* (New York, 1935), p. 169 n.; *idem*, 2nd ed. (1952), p. 104 n.; B. Croce, *Terze pagine sparse* (Bari, 1955), II, 164; and a paper of mine, "Fantasia e immaginazione nella terminologia estetica europea," *Lingua Nostra*, V (1943), 12-13.

Another idea in which Coleridge was close to De Sanctis is noted in the Introduction (p. xix): "No work of true genius dares want its appropriate form, neither is there any danger of this. As it must not, so genius cannot, be lawless..." It may be added that these words of Coleridge are a striking confirmation of German influence, since they are little more than a paraphrase from A. W. Schlegel, as reference to T. M. Raysor's *Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism* (1930) will show (I, 223, note 2). To Schlegel Coleridge also owed the concept of form as organic, which is also in De Sanctis, but which the Neapolitan critic derived mainly from Hegel.

One of the points of Hegelian criticism which has received attention by recent scholars such as Binni and Contini is that of poetic "situation." This was developed by De Sanctis in his early lectures (*Teoria e storia della letteratura*, ed. Croce, 1926, II, 86 ff.); he obtained it apparently from a French exposition of Hegel's aesthetics, and found it of special value in the criticism of Dante. A poetic situation is a particularized theme, and culminates in a character. That is why De Sanctis begins by defining the situation in the *Divine Comedy* in the essay on "The Argument" of the poem, and then proceeds to an essay on the "Character of Dante." The theme of the poem is "the other world," and many superficial inter-

preters never go beyond that. But the situation is "the other world *as seen from the earth*" (Rossi and Galpin, p. 14), and this profoundly modifies the theme. But the situation does not become poetic until it is embodied in the character of Dante, who is an "essentially poetic" character: "His dominant trait is power [*forza*] that breaks forth freely and impetuously" (p. 22). From the interaction of character and situation, as defined, the critic derives the poetic quality of the whole poem in all its episodes.

De Sanctis does not, however, restrict himself to such generalities, but proceeds to analyze the poem in all its details—a descent to particularities that some may be inclined to call an *explication de textes*. The translators are doubtless right when they say that the method of De Sanctis differs from an *explication* (p. xiv)—it certainly achieves much more than most *explications*—but it does seem to aim at the same goal, what is known as "close reading" in modern American criticism, the total interpretation of a poetic text. For example, in the essay on Francesca da Rimini, De Sanctis interprets the episode line by line, almost word by word, not disdaining observations on verbal, metrical, and sound effects.

At the close of their Introduction the translators confidently affirm that "little has affected the validity of De Sanctis' interpretation of the *Divine Comedy*, and nothing has essentially modified the new direction he gave to Dantean studies" (p. xxvi). Of course, much has been done since De Sanctis in Italy on the interpretation of single episodes and of the whole poem, but these achievements owe much to his stimulus. His aesthetic approach is still the most fruitful, even though most American criticism of Dante seems to be moving in very different directions—e.g., towards the historic, the structural, and the symbolic. A glance at A. La Piana's *Dante's American Pilgrimage* (1948) is sufficient to show this. Even such a fine scholar as the late E. Auerbach could take up again Hegel's interpretation of Dante (*Mimesis*, 1946, Chap. VIII), apparently unaware that this had already given rise to De Sanctis' revision and correction.

The present translation is fluent and even brisk, matching quite often the verve of the original. Some readers, I suspect, may have to look into an unabridged dictionary for words like "proscript" (p. 24) and "cenacle" (p. 28); but such words are rare, and the text on the whole reads very easily. Through inadvertence a sentence has been dropped from p. 23, in the essay on the character of Dante: "L'amore di Beatrice si purifica nella sua parte terrestre, e diviene l'amor del divino" (ed. Romagnoli, 1955, p. 553). Since there is, unfortunately, no bibliography, the reader cannot know to what edition of the *History* (there are many) he is referred on p. xix.

G. N. G. Orsini

University of Wisconsin

The Radical Novel in The United States, 1900-1950. By Walter B. Rideout. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. 339 p.

This book is a genre study of novels which "either explicitly or implicitly ... object to the human suffering imposed by some socioeconomic system and *advocate that the system be fundamentally changed*" (author's italics); in addition the book considers "some interrelations of literature and society." The literary materials examined include no less than 169 radical novels (a valuable check list is appended), along with such publications as *The Masses* (1911-17); in addition the book provides summaries of extant radical literary theory and literary criticism. Of equal importance are the passages on "interrelations" which suggest the socio-

political conditions which obtained when the novels were published. In this non-literary area there is an emphasis on economic conditions, on American domestic issues, on such organizations as the John Reed clubs, the I.W.W., the Communist Party, on significant strikes, on court cases, on personalities of the day, on publisher's statistics, etc. Thus exegetical remarks and literary history are related, imaginatively, to the times. If this method should seem unsatisfactory in theory, it needs to be said that always there is at work a process of imaginative selection of detail, and that the problem itself dictates a combination of techniques, approaches, and disciplines.

The fifty years covered by this study embrace four periods: (1) to World War I, which was the time of the Socialist writers, an era which died in the heat of war-bond rallies and the frenzy of deportations; (2) the period of the 1920s, which found only Upton Sinclair consistently at work in the radical vein at a time when Wilsonian idealism and gin apparently made no difference to anyone; (3) the crash and the Great Depression, which brought more than seventy proletarian novels by such writers as Algren, Cantwell, Conroy, Farrell, Henry Roth, and Richard Wright; (4) "the long retreat," beginning with the Nazi-Soviet Pact and ending with World War II, and the Age of Investigation with its work-a-day informants. Actually few literary radicals are now alive, no publishing house is anxious to hazard fiction which is not confirmatory by intent, and the limited audiences for radical fiction are now more interested in quizz-show drama, where answers are based on brute recall and the villain is the tax collector, off stage. Doubtless the mid-1950s saw the last of the native radical tradition in America. There is now no equivalent to the idol smashers of the 1920s who furnished the continuing tradition of critical activity which was so important to the ideologies and the writers of the 1930s.

Within these periods the book distinguishes five types of the socialist novel as essayed by Jack London and Sinclair, and four types of the proletarian novel. In addition, such a figure as John Dos Passos gets attention, though, strictly speaking, he was not a radical novelist. This book is ample in scope, and factually sound. No one, I should think, would disagree with the central literary judgments: e.g., that Isaac Friedman's *By Bread Alone* (1901) and Sinclair's *The Jungle* (1906) are the monuments of the first period; that Michael Gold's *Jews Without Money* (1930) is basically reminiscent and sentimental; that *Marching! Marching!*, the *New Masses* prize novel of 1935, is of dubious historical interest, after only twenty years. Further, it seems to me that the estimates of the institutions and the organizations of the half century are equally sound. The Preface, however, asserts that some readers will find the book "unsatisfactory" because of the unconventional methodology. I would guess otherwise.

It seems to me that the method is reasonably sound, but that the accomplishment does not rise to the level of excitement one might expect from material which is by definition revolutionary. The author proposes to be "as objective as possible" in order to "put the facts into the public domain." It is one thing, however, to be judicial; it is another thing to be merely neutral. I do not see that neutrality is a virtue when one is dealing with a body of material that must have extracted more anguish from the individual authors than any other kind of writing. The men and women who wrote radical novels seldom got rich (average sale 2,000 copies?). They were "displaced" persons; their chances of being unhappy were very great, for they cared a great deal about two terribly difficult things, literature and politics.

The commitment to "facts" and the concern with neutrality go very deep in this book. The author must have more than a casual interest in the area of politics, and yet there is little sense of his own personal involvement; he seems, to the end, a "literary-scientist" in a land where quaint, misguided specimens abound. Behind

this flat tone there is a deceptive inflexibility—the basic organization is committed to a strict, almost year-to-year sequence. Perhaps this inflexibility precludes a discussion of the kinds of interrelationships of literature and society that are the most compelling: the detailed relationship of the author to his own class, the effect of the radical novel on society, and the relationship of the radical novels to the author's other works. It is true that these questions are occasionally considered; it is equally true that the emphasis is away from what seems to me to be the central literary issues.

As a book based on a doctoral dissertation, *The Radical Novel* is significant, for one sees here only the vestiges of an outmoded "historical" methodology. The relationships of literature and society are recognized, without argument, as an area germane to literary studies. While this is by no means new, such a solid accomplishment will serve as a good example of ways to handle our newer, more vital, literary problems.

James B. Hall

University of Oregon

The Figure of the Musician in German Literature. By George C. Schoolfield. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956. xv, 204 p.

This study consists in the main of four chapters, entitled "Romanticism," "Biedermeier and Poetic Realism," "The Post-Wagnerian Age," and "The Age of Musicology." They are preceded by a Preface and a brief Introduction, followed by a still briefer Conclusion. A bibliography in the form of notes is appended, and an index (of names) which would serve the user better if the most important pages were printed in bold type.

The author has chosen to present a historical or chronological survey, beginning roughly with the early nineteenth century and taking up authors and works as they have come before the public eye. Rarely does a writer appear in more than one chapter; each of the 130-odd titles scrutinized has one locale, noted in the Table of Contents.

Such a method has definite advantages, of which good use has been made. In particular, it is possible to show how later writers tread paths which have been cleared for them by predecessors. This is particularly noteworthy in a man with an encyclopaedic mind and a genius for appropriation, such as Thomas Mann. It is also possible to relate fictional treatments of the musician (and of music) to the historic development of music itself (e.g., Wagner, the twelve-tone scale). In such a survey the outstanding significance of a composer-novelist like E. T. A. Hoffmann, who leads the field with eleven works (Mann follows with six), is plain even at a casual glance.

Nevertheless, in my judgment the author would have done better to employ a topical organization. This would have compelled him to do what has not been done here sufficiently, to winnow the wheat from the chaff. In too many instances, the work examined (often merely retold as a story) does not deal vitally with the musician as such—he could just as well have followed some other unprosaic or artistic calling. ("Brachvogel's Narziss is only allegedly a musician," p. 93.) Extended discussion of such titles clutters the book and defeats the author's purpose "to offer a picture of the *musician* [my italics] as a figure in German creative literature" (p. xiii).

A topical treatment would also have tended to deflect the author from a flaw in procedure which might be called the biographical fallacy. It follows from the practice of renarration that the musician (who is after all an invention) is often

discussed as if he were a real person. Thus we read (pp. 17 f.), "What we know of ... Kreisler we have in a fragmentary form ... Hoffmann composed other tales which cast light upon the character ... sketches on music which say too little about the man himself." Only as character traits are bound up with aspects of music do they have pertinence in such a study; only as musician, only in his actual relation to music, does Kreisler interest us in this context.

Again, the topical approach would have entailed a more organic introduction of Wagner and Nietzsche than they can be given in a study of "literature" which restricts itself mainly to the novel and novella (p. xiv). Neither Wagner nor Nietzsche wrote narrative fiction; but, in a discussion of the phases of musical life as reflected in fiction, each would necessarily have his part to play.

It seems to me significant, and in a measure corroborative of these strictures, that the Introduction is really a prehistory, and that the Conclusion, which is merely a coda of the fourth chapter, fills less than two pages. What the author has given us, then, is mostly a collection of materials. We should be grateful for it; he has ploughed through a much larger body of printed matter than he has actually treated, and it seems unlikely that anything has been overlooked which falls in his period and deserves serious attention. His book will be indispensable to any later worker in this field.

The Preface was signed at Lund, Sweden; the book was printed in this country. That may help to account for the regrettably large number of misprints. Fortunately, there are very few in the German quotations—which not every reader would be able to correct.

BAYARD QUINCY MORGAN

Stanford, Calif.

EL BARROCO O EL DESCUBRIMIENTO DEL DRAMA. By Alejandro Cioranescu. La Laguna: Universidad de La Laguna, Secretariato de Publicaciones, 1957. 455 p.

The title of this rich and mature study suggests that all the post-Renaissance antimonies between cerebral imagination and simple approach to nature, geometrical planning and spontaneous drive, split quality of the psyche and naive groping for unity—complicated concepts and clear ideas expressed by endless variations of antitheses and contrapositions reflecting interior conflicts—were bound to end in the creation of the modern drama. Drama is here understood as tragedy, something inconceivable during the Middle Ages and even the Renaissance, but "normal" between 1580 and 1680 (p. 27), the epoch of those "almas doloridas, partidas en dos y que se pierden en inútiles esfuerzos para reunir las dos mitades irreductiblemente enemistadas" (p. 333).

Drama then is the real *apport* of the seventeenth century, the essence of the baroque in Spain, England, and France—drama on the stage, drama within the new novel, drama in life. Baroque thus conceived is the artistic realization of the dramatic, affective, existential doubt due to a common European plight at a moment when traditional authority and metaphysical and moral principles were shaken, and man was left a prey to all kinds of *angoisse*. Gongorism, Marinism, and preciosity—more or less exaggerated forms of expression—are definitely peripheral, though symptomatic of a common psychological doubt which permeates all of the works of this period in differing degrees of intensity.

There is much truth in this oversimplification, and it will be worth while to discuss briefly the virtues and shortcomings of the thesis. Professor Cioranescu blazes a very useful trail through the jungle of theoretical and practical attempts already made to define the literary baroque.

Cioranescu starts with the etymology of the term, which, according to Corominas, is actually a fusion of the Portuguese *barroco*, an irregular pearl, and the artificial Latin *baroco* of the Schoolmen, meaning a striking and shaky type of syllogism (p. 13). Both words were known in France at the end of the sixteenth century and produced the French adjective *baroque*, which means odd.

The author pays the usual tribute to Wölfflin and the art historians for the rehabilitation of the term and the art involved. He does not note, however, that, without a constant analogy to the concept and method of the art historians, the literary historians would have been unable to use the term at all. Only recently the pioneer in this field, Fritz Strich, clarified the important concept of baroque "time" through Wölfflin's category of "depth." Cioranescu actually rejects Wölfflin's principles as formal and not at all relevant for literature, and introduces in their place his own, which are not formal only, but mixed with cultural and psychological terms. But still he cannot avoid characterizations taken from art, such as "foreshortened portrait", "a foreshortened concept" (!), "multiplicity of planes," etc.

Cioranescu then faces the necessity of deciding between the French terminology, hostile (p. 19) to baroque (Renaissance, pre-classicism, classicism), and the German-American terminology, according to which the term "baroque" would cover the whole European seventeenth century, France included. He does not, however, state the dilemma correctly. The problem is not "French" versus "Anglo-Saxon" but "French-national" versus "comparative." The real difficulty, not seen by Cioranescu, stems from yet another fact. At the same time that the French, who first wanted to reserve the term "baroque" for certain newly discovered third-class lyricists (Sponde, La Ceppède, etc.), were extending the label to include Corneille, the comparatists were making a new distinction between mannerism and baroque. Thus from a European viewpoint which minimizes "las contingencias nacionales" (p. 208)—and this is decidedly Cioranescu's viewpoint—the "baroque" authors of the broader French definition became "mannerists" and the French classicists became "baroque." Cioranescu entirely ignores this development, to the detriment of his presentation. Not using the term "mannerism," he makes his "baroque" by a compromise fall between Renaissance and French classicism (p. 18). The latter is a "son" of the baroque, with many traits of the father, "freno del Barroco, al mismo tiempo que herencia" (p. 239). Despite this distinction he finds similarities between Racine and Calderón (p. 318) and between Calderón's thinking and Jansenism (p. 351).

Such concessions to the French viewpoint (p. 417), impossible on a "European" level, cannot change the fact that great movements are not stopped by a neo-classic tendency to redirect them (see the exhaustive studies on the literary historiography of the baroque by Franco Simone); French classicism is simply the first and most ingenious *dirigisme*. Cioranescu maintains, on the other hand, that "el barroco empieza lo que el clasicismo termina," and even that the baroque movement as such has not yet reached its end (p. 406), that Heidegger's *angoisse* (an allegedly baroque phenomenon) is no different from Tasso's.

Tasso is considered the first baroque type in time, but on the same level as Montaigne (p. 416). Here again Cioranescu runs into a difficulty. Tasso, it is true, *is* an anguished split personality and a tragic doubter who cannot sacrifice his Renaissance enlightenment ("duda demoledora," p. 393) and hedonism ("soberbia tranquilidad del Renacimiento") to the spiritual and moral exigencies of Trent. Therefore he *is* baroque, his tension is sincere, and he tries desperately to find a way out of his doubt. Montaigne, however, seems rather "happy" with his "sonrisa escéptica" (p. 390) expressed by his "que sais-je," a word repeated since by all the cyclothymic "bourgeois." But Cioranescu (not knowing Croll's prose-style

studies) sets chronological boundaries for the baroque that are the same for all European, or at least Latin, countries, with the consequence that France cannot be manneristic when Italy is baroque. This thesis can be easily refuted (see *Lettere Italiane*, IX, 1957, 1-29).

The thesis lures our critic into other similar equations, e.g., Shakespeare and Calderón, *Hamlet* and *La vida es sueño*. But the tragedy of Hamlet, the pathological doubter and *cunctator*—declared a typically manneristic figure by Wylie Sypher, and already recognized as only quasi-baroque by Wilhelm Michels ("Der Barockstil bei Shakespeare und Calderón," 1929)—has little in common with the metaphysical cure of the experimental doubter, Prince Segismundo, shaken by a fundamental experience concerning man as such. Again, Shakespeare uses dream and reality only in a manneristic fashion in *The Taming of the Shrew*. I would disagree with Cioranescu's ascription to truly baroque heroes of a "completa artificialidad de los sentimientos" (p. 133).

In order to make the proper distinctions it is necessary, of course, to have a clear view of the origin of the baroque. According to Cioranescu the originator of the baroque is Martin Luther (p. 385), the destroyer of Occidental spiritual unity. But this seems to me an impossible and extremely indirect interpretation. Why does all baroque art occur in the countries not affected by Luther's reform? The real origin is in the clash of the new natural sciences and the discovery of the role of the passions with the conscious conservatism and mental and moral discipline of the post-Tridentine world. Where the tragedy of the conflict is not fully felt, mannerism flourishes; where it is vitally experienced, baroque has its reign.

When Cioranescu keeps to strictly formal and stylistic description he is excellent, for instance in his tracing of the novel from the Renaissance series of adventures, through the half-psychological (manneristic) pastoral novel, to the fully baroque psychological novel which progressively destroys an initial situation of tranquility (e.g., *La Princesse de Clèves*)—"esta lucha interior, verdadera invención del arte barroca" (p. 307). Cioranescu offers distinctions of baroque presentation: "sugerir en lugar de enseñar" (p. 63), "retrato en movimiento" (p. 91), "dualidad en la unidad" (p. 157). He furnishes his readers with a *summa* of figures of style preferred and variously combined by baroque art. He practically proves that the moderate baroque (he does not use this excellent term coined by Franco Croce), following the same *impulsos inconscientes* (p. 44) as the exaggerated baroque, uses with taste and restraint the same forms. Cioranescu got his many fine examples the hard way, not utilizing the rich material presented by the recent works of Calcaterra, Getto, Flora, and Elwert.

The Spanish examples are in large part very original and belie the author's modest claim that his book is mere synthesis and not scholarly research (p. 47). The French division is handled with fresh and convincing insights, e.g., the baroque character of Lafontaine (p. 278). Professor Cioranescu's contribution now calls for some revision of the studies of Jean Rousset and Wylie Sypher.

H. H.

THE DIVINE COMEDY OF DANTE ALIGHIERI. A TRANSLATION IN TERZA RIMA, WITH INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENTS. By Glen Levin Swiggert. Sewanee: University Press of the University of the South, 1956. xvi, 567 p.

This translation has some indisputable advantages—it is as literal and correct as possible, it does not cut or falsify or comment on the text, and it is done in terza rima, not in blank verse or arbitrary rhyme combinations.

The translator knew as well as any Dante scholar that a language with leveled and lost endings can never do justice to the possibilities of the resounding Italian rhymes and that extreme liberties must be taken with the English language and prosody to cope with the original scheme: a hovering accentuation unsuited to the interior structure of the single verse; exploitation of adverbs in *y*, either unstressed and rhyming with a substantive ending likewise in *y*, or badly stressed and forming an assonance with verbs like *see* or *flee*; patterns reminiscent of *similiter cadentia*; awkward enjambements; abnormal word order; archaic rhymes (*virtue:due*); individual Latinisms (*eterne* rhyming with *discern*); desperate combinations (*dance:commence, begin:Mantuan*). But in spite of all these inevitable shortcomings this translation echoes the original well, e.g., the beginning of *Purgatorio:*

> "To travel better waters presently
> My talent's little skiff will now unfold
> Its sails and leave behind so cruel a sea;
>
> And of that second realm it shall be told,
> Where, in ascent, man's spirit purifies
> Itself, becoming worthy to behold
>
> Thus Heaven."

The merits of the Swiggett translation can only be assessed, however, by comparison with other terza rima translations.[1] Elizabeth Barrett Browning rendered the "lupa e veltro" passage,

> "Molti son gli animali a cui s'ammoglia,
> E più saranno ancora, infin che'l Veltro
> Verrà, che la farà morir con doglia.
>
> Questi non ciberà terra ne peltro,
> Ma sapienza ed amore e virtute,
> E sua nazion sarà tra Feltro e Feltro."
> (*Inf.*, I, 100 ff.)

as follows:

> "*Full* many a beast is wedlocked to her side,—
> And more shall yet be—till the Hound arrive,
> Who shall her slay, with tortures *multiplied.*
>
> He shall not feed on earth or gold, *but live*
> By love, *heroic* virtue, *noble lore:*
> Feltro from feltro, shall his country *rive.*"

Swiggett translates:

> "With many beasts in wedlock she does lie
> And more there shall yet be, till the greyhound
> Arrives that painfully will have her die.
>
> His food will not in land or pelf be found,
> But in love and in wisdom and virtue,
> His nation by two Feltros shall be bound."

[1] Some comparative material from the most modern translations is offered by Theodore Holmes in *CL*, IX (1957), 275-283.

Swiggett follows Dante line by line, almost word by word; the meaning is correct, even if *nazione* according to the most recent investigations means "birth"; rhythm and rhyme are satisfactory. Mrs. Browning follows Dante much less closely, waters down the sense in general and falsifies the last line, is guilty of five additions and vaguenesses (in italics above) which make the meaning shaky, and uses rhymes for the eye only (*arrive:live*).

William E. Gladstone translated the speech of Piccarda Donati (*Par.*, III, 73-78) explaining that each blessed soul is fully satisfied with the place allocated to it in Heaven:

> "Se disiassimo esser più superne,
> Foran discordi gli nostri disiri
> Dal voler di colui che qui ne cerne
>
> Che vedrai non capere in questi giri,
> S'esser in caritate è qui necesse,
> E se la sua natura ben rimiri,"

by the following terzine:

> "Did we desire *a region* loftier still,
> Such *our desire* were dissonant from His
> Who *bade us* each *our several stations fill*:
>
> *A thing impossible* in these spheres *of bliss*
> If *choso dwelleth here*, in Love alone
> Must dwell, and if Love's nature well *thou wis*."

Swiggett renders these two terzine thus:

> "If we to be more lofty should aspire,
> *Our longing* would not with His will agree,
> Who here *assigns us* now *a lot no higher*;
> *That* never *enters* these spheres, you will see,
> If love *must needs be* here our *being's fate*
> And if love's nature *you see wittingly*."

Swiggett's literal translation can do without the too concrete "a region"; his "longing" renders the Italian plural "disiri" much better than the singular "desire"; his fine, ambivalent translation of "che qui ne cerne" by "who here assigns us now a lot no higher" is superior to Gladstone's "Who bade us each our several stations fill." In the second terzina, Swiggett has preserved the scholastic flavor, while Gladstone only paraphrases Dante's text and drags in the archaism "thou wis," which does not render "ben rimiri" at all, while Swiggett's "you see wittingly" does.

Swiggett handles passages with proper names more lightly than some other translators:

> "Below on earth I was called Hugh Capet;
> The Louis and the Philips came from me,
> To whose rule latterly France does submit.
>
> I was son of a butcher of Paris."
> (*Pur.*, XX, 49-52)

Compare John Dayman's version (1865):

"I there was named Hugh Capet; of my source
The Philips and the Lewises begun,
Whose modern-dated rule in France hath force.

In Paris was I born a butcher's son."

The German translator, Otto Gildemeister, does not fare too well either, compared to Swiggett:

"Vernimm, ich bin der Geist Hugo Capets;
Die Philipp' und Ludwige, die Berater
Frankreichs, sind Sprossen meines Ehebetts,

Und in Paris ein Fleischer war mein Vater."

Swiggett renders with ease difficult and solemn passages which in other rhyming translations appear clumsy. The beginning of Canto I of *Paradiso* appears e.g., in Dom Patrick Cummins' translation (1948):

"Shine through the world we see All-mover's glory,
all penetrating, but more bright reglowing
in world-frame's higher than in lower story.

In highest home where most that light shines glowing
was I: but he to think or tell lacks fire,
who from that height now back to earth is going."

After moving through such thick air, we are grateful for Swiggett's gentle breeze:

"His glory, all things moving, motionless,
Spreads through the universe, and more reglows
In one fair part and in another less,

In farthest heaven whereto His light most flows,
I was; and I've seen things which none can know
How to re-tell who from there ever goes."

The only objection one might make to this newest American version is this, that a blank-verse translation like that of Lawrence Grand White is perhaps preferable, in its unstrained English which, without the tyranny of rhyme, is never compelled to sacrifice its idiomatic purity. But I for one vote for the terza rima.

Mr. Swiggett's splendid volume contains a few other translations, of sonnets in the *Vita Nuova* and by Michelangelo, an introduction to Dante's philosophy, and a summary of the three Canticles.

H. H.

THE FIRST ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE DECAMERON (1620). By H. G. Wright. Upsala: Lundequist, 1953. 279 p., 4 p. of plates. (Essays and Studies on English Language and Literature, Vol. XIII.)

The well-known Bangor scholar here attacks a problem of prime importance: Who translated the Decameron into English for the first time? England was late compared with other countries in the translation of this masterpiece. The reason is evident. The English have always been reluctant to encourage anything that smacks of immorality; in our own day English copies of de Sade's novels bear a Brussels or Paris imprint. The first English translator of the *Decameron* chose

to remain anonymous and toned down many a frivolous phrase—a fact which offered some help to Dr. Wright in his efforts to find out who the translator was.

The plan of the investigation is excellently thought out. First, Dr. Wright seeks to determine the personality of the translator from what indications he can find in the English version. It seems clear that the translator was interested, e.g., in dogs and horses, in drama and music, and that his ethical outlook was serious, bordering on the puritanical. Furthermore, he seems to have had connections with the Court, his life experience appears to be that of a mature man, he may have had some Italian background, and he had pronounced leanings towards scholarship. There is evidence of emotional and dramatic inclinations. As to style, Dr. Wright points out the translator's copious use of alliteration, and analyzes his prose rhythm and linguistic characteristics.

Not exactly central for the main problem but of great interest is his consideration of the text used for the rendering of the *Decameron*—with special reference to Salviati's edition and Le Maçon's French version. As is well known, Koeppel and Hutton advocated respectively the Salviati and the Le Maçon texts.

Dr. Wright finally points out that Giovanni Florio, the Elizabethan figure of whom so little is known, corresponds very closely in personality and style to the picture of the unknown translator. In the light of the material and analysis presented, the unprejudiced reader must agree with Dr. Wright that we find a "remarkable community of outlook" between the anonymous translator and Florio. Dr. Wright has made out a very strong case. He refuses, however, to claim that he has established Florio beyond question as the anonymous translator.

Though the investigation ends on a note of only great probability, it is a very valuable study for the light it sheds on its central problem and for its contribution to our understanding of English culture in the late sixteenth century. The extreme care with which the research is conducted, the methodical acumen and caution, and the great learning displayed not only in English but also in Italian literature entitle the author to our admiration and gratitude.

S. B. Liljegren

University of Upsala

Platonism in French Renaissance Poetry. By Robert Valentine Merrill with Robert J. Clements. New York: New York University Press, 1957. xii, 215 p.

Twenty-five years ago Robert Valentine Merrill published the first exhaustive treatment of the influence of Platonic doctrine on a particular author in *The Platonism of Joachim du Bellay* (Chicago, 1923). In this book he traced the stream of Platonic doctrine more fully than had ever been done before, from Plato through the writings and teachings of such men as Cicero, Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, the Church Fathers, Boethius, the Italian poets of the *dolce stil nuovo*, Dante, Petrarch, Ficino, Benivieni, Pico della Mirandola, Leo the Jew, Castiglione, Bembo, Symphorien Champier, Loys le Roy, and Héroët—and then to the period of the Pléiade, where his primary interests lay. Until his untimely death in 1950 he continued to treat the same general subject in numerous articles in the learned journals.

Professor Merrill's posthumous work, *Platonism in French Renaissance Poetry*, edited and supplemented by his former student and colleague at the University of Chicago, Professor Robert J. Clements—himself a distinguished scholar of French Renaissance literature—ties all his earlier works together, examines the Platonism

of all the poets of the Pléiade, and adds considerable new background material.

In the Introduction the author writes: "The purpose of this study is to consider the impact upon French poetry of the metaphysical-social-aesthetic current whose source lies mainly in Plato and which is known by his name" (p. ix). The study is not carried beyond the initial poets of the Pléiade—Ronsard, Du Bellay, Daurat, Baïf, Belleau, Jodelle, and Pontus de Tyard—although Professor Clements calls attention to my own study, *Platonism in Desportes*, which was completed after Professor Merrill's death.

The social impact of Platonic doctrine upon the Renaissance, though great, receives little attention in this work, since Platonic social doctrine was of limited use to the poet. However, since the author included the social among the triad of impacts, he might have given more attention to the idea of the philosopher-king and to the various academies of this period, which were organized with the express purpose of promoting harmony in a chaotic society. The academy sponsored by Baïf, the Académie de Musique et de Poésie, is of particular interest; some socially significant poetry came out of it, and some rather famous *discours* in prose.

Merrill points out the Platonic concepts which were most attractive to the Renaissance poets, bent upon combining erudition with lyricism, and shows by numerous examples how those concepts were adapted to their needs. The concepts fall into two major categories: first, those best suited to amoristic verse—idealism, the ladder of love, amorous fury, Eros and Anteros, and the myth of the Androgyne (Merrill's study of the Androgyne first appeared in *CL*, I, 1949, 97-112); and, second, those concerned with the relationship of the individual and his soul to the cosmos—the world-soul, immortality, the striving of the soul to regain its former state of purity and of knowledge. These poets were also intrigued by the themes of reminiscence, metempsychosis, and spirit possession, which could be associated with their own poetic experiences.

Attention is called to the different status of the Renaissance lover, compared with Plato's lover. The beloved is no longer a young man but a woman; the relative equality of the lover and the beloved in Plato has become a relationship of subservience on the part of the lover, through a combination of intervening mediaeval developments—feudalism, Mary worship, and courtly love. However, the poets of this period found little or no trouble in reconciling their Platonizing to a new set of circumstances.

The author points out the fact that, while the contemplation of fleeting temporal beauty should lead to a preoccupation with divine and eternal beauty, such contemplation all too frequently led the Renaissance poet to a *carpe rosam* point of view vis-à-vis his lady. This is particularly true with Ronsard. But not everyone will agree with the statement (p. 32) that "writing in Platonic vein was a fashionable exercise more frequently than the mark of a vocation, and Platonizers were more prevalent than Platonists." In his *La Philosophie de l'amour de Marsile Ficin et son influence sur la littérature francaise du XVIe siécle* (Paris, 1922), pp. 1-2, Jean Festugière says of the Renaissance poets: "J'ai cru à leur sincérité. Et sans penser, certes, que tous les adeptes des théories du *Phèdre* et du *Banquet* ont pratiqué la vertu de chasteté, j'ai admis que lorsqu'ils célébraient dans leurs vers la Beauté souveraine, ce n'était point la simple rhétorique, mais qu'un sentiment vrai les animait. Il est très humain de rêver un idéal de pureté célèste tout en s'abandonnant aux voluptés de la chair. Depuis qu'il existe l'homme est double."

It is doubtful whether the literary history of the god Anteros, the counterpart of the god Eros (love-in-return or love-for-love), has ever been so completely treated as in the ninth chapter of Merrill's work. The name Anteros appears in Plato but in an indefinite context and has been interpreted in several ways by

writers since his day, as often as not meaning love's avenger. Here, as elsewhere, the author explores with equal ease original texts in Greek, Latin, Italian, and French.

There is nothing of importance that one can criticize in this work. The great Italian Platonist, Marsilio Ficino, is spoken of as the "Italian physician" (p. 121), though it was his father and not himself who was the physician to Cosimo de' Medici. "Le tout" occurs over and over again in Marguerite de Navarre's mystical poetry; she might have been considered in the general treatment of that term, which represents the object of total adoration, or in some cases the complete individual as represented in the Androgyne. One might be inclined to question the statement: ". . . but Plato's conception of human love as a path either to a virtuous life or to the intellectual apprehension of ideal Beauty is far from Petrarch's ken" (p. 63); if Petrarch's sentiments for Laura are more earthly and more immediate than those of Dante for Beatrice, they embody, nevertheless, the hunger for a more permanent love and beauty than he has known here on earth. Other aspects of his life and pursuits seem to bear this out. Finally, professor Merrill's work might have been made more useful as a reference book by the inclusion of an index.

Professor Clements is to be complimented for having brought complete order—in a fashion worthy of Platonic doctrine as expressed in the *Timaeus*—out of the disorder (or perhaps even chaos) of the manuscripts and notes which were entrusted to him. The task could not have been an easy one and no one could have done it more satisfactorily or more in the spirit of the original author. Professor Clements takes little credit for the content, although he doubtless deserves a great deal.

This synthesis of all of Merrill's research will be of great value to students of Renaissance literature and of literary Platonism, as well as to students of comparative literature. Only through a study of such works can one get a true picture of the enormous debt which literature owes the Athenian philosopher and scholar.

ROBERT M. BURGESS

Montana State University

VARIA

FERNAND BALDENSPERGER
(1871-1958)

It was with great sorrow that scholars all over the world learned of the death of Fernand Baldensperger, on February 24, 1958, at the age of 86. Although his life was long and full, he always gave such an impression of health and vigor that those who knew him could not imagine that there could be an end to his great energy and vitality. For him to live meant to work and fortunately he was able to work up to the last few months of his life.

Fernand Baldensperger was born in the Vosges, at Saint-Dié, the city where America was "baptized." Baldensperger always remained faithful to the place of his birth and returned every summer for many years to the estate which he owned in the vicinity of that city. (The writer of those brief notes happened to visit the Baldensperger family in that villa one day when they were returning from a ceremony to commemorate the "baptism of America.")

The eminent comparatist did his elementary studies at Saint-Dié and also attended the *collège* of that city. He then went to Paris and attended the Lycée Louis-le-Grand. At the age of twenty-one he was already an *agrégé*. He entered the field of higher education after having done his military service at Nancy.

His teaching career was interrupted by World War I, in which he was awarded the Croix de guerre. He was sent on a mission to Scandinavian countries in 1916 and to Columbia University, where he was a visiting professor from 1917 to 1919, following Gustave Lanson in that post. We remember how Baldensperger at the commencement exercises wore his horizon blue uniform, the French university academic gown over it, the *bonnet* of the university, and held his *képi* in his hand. Before going abroad he had taught at the Faculté des Lettres of the University of Nancy (1884-1900), at the University of Lyon (1900-1910), at the University of Paris (1910-1935), and was on leave from that university at the University of Strasbourg from 1919 to 1923.

Fernand Baldensperger was a great traveler. He visited nearly every country in the world, the Far East as well as Europe, and North and South America. He gave lectures in all these countries. He returned to the United States in 1935, where he was visiting professor at Harvard University until 1940. From there he went to the University of California at Los Angeles, where he taught until the end of the war. He also gave lectures at Berkeley. Wherever he taught he made converts to the study of comparative literature. A great number of professors both of French literature and of comparative literature were "formed," as the French say, by him.

On his return to France from the United States, Fernand Baldensperger, who had retired from the Sorbonne, remained in Paris so as to be near the Institut de Littérature Comparée and to continue his interest in the *Revue de Littérature comparée*, which he had founded in 1921 with Paul Hazard. We cannot resist injecting here a personal note. The writer entered the Librairie Champion on the Quai Malaquais one day to visit the Champion family. Paul Hazard, professor at the Collège de France, happened to be there, talking with Édouard Champion. Hazard was holding a blank sheet of paper on which he was going to write the names of subscribers to the *Revue de Littérature comparée*. He handed me the sheet. Thus I became the first subscriber to the review.

The books which Fernand Baldensperger wrote include *Goethe en France, Orientations étrangères chez Honoré de Balzac, Le Mouvement des idées dans l'émigration française, Études d'histoire littéraire, Alfred de Vigny*, and many others. His colleagues and admirers in many countries contributed to a volume of *Mélanges* in his honor.

What characterized Fernand Baldensperger pre-eminently as a scholar was his uncannily lucid mind, his appreciation of literary style—he wrote poetry and had a keen sense of beauty and rhythm—and his intellectual integrity, which was intransigent.

Baldensperger was honorary member of many learned societies both abroad and in this country, and held honorary degrees from many foreign universities. He was an Officier de la Légion d'honneur.

Three eminent professors of comparative literature have left us: first Paul Hazard, at a relatively early age, then Jean-Marie Carré who succeeded Baldensperger as director of the Institute of Comparative Literature at the Sorbonne—he died a few months ago—and now Fernand Baldensperger. Baldensperger left to posterity an example of solid scholarship combined with a great interest in his students and disciples.

HÉLÈNE HARVITT

Brooklyn College

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Studi Francesi, under the able editorship of Professor Franco Simone of the University of Turin, is now entering its second year of publication. It is the only Italian journal devoted wholly to French studies, and has already established itself as one of the most distinguished periodicals in the field and an indispensable instrument of research. Its critical "Rassegna bibliografica" is especially useful. (Direzione, Corso Stati Uniti 39, Turin.)

Delta is now edited both from Naples and from Washington, D.C., where Professor Rocco Montano is located (Catholic University). This will mean that the United States will be more constantly reflected in the journal, which thus bids fair to become still more important for comparatists.

The Second Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association will be held at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, September 8-12, 1958. The principal topics for discussion will be European-American literary relations and the methodology and scope of comparative literature. Many foreign scholars will attend. Full information and reservations may be had from Professor W. P. Friederich, P.O. Box 775, Chapel Hill, N.C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Bentley, Gerald Eades (editor). The Arte of Angling 1577. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. vi, 92 p., 80 plates.

Billington, James H. Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. xvi, 217 p.

Bloch, J. M. Miscegenation, Melaleukation, and Mr. Lincoln's Dog. New York: Schaum Publishing Co., 1958. vi, 69 p.

Bryant, Donald (editor). The Rhetorical Idiom: Essays in Rhetoric, Oratory, Language, and Drama. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. x, 334 p.

Bush, Lewis. Japan Dictionary: Japanalia. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. xii, 226 p.

Bushnell, Nelson S. William Hamilton of Bangour, Poet and Jacobite. Aberdeen: University Press, 1957. xii, 164 p.

Calderón. Life is a Dream. Translation and introduction by William E. Colford. Great Neck, N. Y.: Barron's Educational Series, 1958. xxiv, 101 p.

Centennial Celebration of Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mal. Foreword by Henri Peyre. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958. xx, 59 p.

Chauvet, Victor. Manzoni-Stendhal-Hugo e altri saggi su classici e romantici. A cura di Carlo Cordié. Catania: Università di Catania, 1958. viii, 222 p.

Chicoteau, Marcel. Studies in Symbolist Psychology (Mind-Spirit-Morals-Men). Sydney: Hoertel & Co., 1958. 51 p.

Comparative Studies of Culture. Nos. 2, 3, 4. Tokyo Women's Christian College. Tokyo, n.d.

Cook, Bradford. Jacques Rivière: A Life of the Spirit. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. xvi, 158 p.

Czoniczer, Elisabeth. Quelques antécédents de "A la recherche du temps perdu": Tendances qui peuvent avoir contribué à la cristallisation du roman proustien. New York: Gregory Lounz, 1957. 224 p.

Davis, Charles Till. Dante and the Idea of Rome. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. viii, 302 p.

Del Litto, V. Bibliographie stendhalienne 1953-1956. Lausanne: Éditions du Grand-Chêne, 1958. 110 p.

Edwards, John Hamilton, and William W. Vasse. Annotated Index to the Cantos of Ezra Pound: Cantos I-LXXXIV. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. xviii, 325 p.

Eisner, Sigmund. A Tale of Wonder: A Source Study of The Wife of Bath's Tale. Wexford, Ireland: John English & Co., 1957. 148 p.

English Language and Literature, No. 4, (Oct. 1957). The English Literary Society of Korea, Shinheung University, Seoul, Korea.

Escarpit, Robert. Sociologie de la littérature. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958. 128 p. ("Que sais-je?" No. 778).

Faber du Faur, Curt von. German Baroque Literature: A Catalogue of the Collection in the Yale University Library. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958. xliv, 496 p.

Faber du Faur, Curt von, Konstantin Reichardt, and Heinz Bluhm (editors). Wächter and Hüter: Festschrift für Hermann J. Weigand zum 17. November 1957. New Haven: Department of Germanic Languages, Yale University, 1957. 176 p.

Fergusson, Francis. The Human Image in Dramatic Literature: Essays. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1957. xxii, 217 p.

Flanagan, John T., and Arthur Palmer Hudson (editors). Folklore in American Literature. Evanston, Illinois, White Plains, New York: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958. xvi, 511 p.

Flores, Angel (editor). An Anthology of French Poetry from Nerval to Valéry in English Translation. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1958. xviii, 456 p.

Flores, Angel, and Homer Swander (editors). Franz Kafka Today. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958. viii, 290 p.

Flornoy, Bertrand. The World of the Inca. Translated by Winifred Bradford. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1958. viii, 321 p.

Frey, John Andrew. Motif Symbolism in the Disciples of Mallarmé. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1957. xx, 158 p.

Friedländer, Paul. Plato, I, An Introduction. Translated from the German by Hans Meyerhoff. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. xxiv, 422 p. (Bollingen Series, LIX.)

Goethe. Faust, Part I. Newly translated by Bertram Jessup. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 224 p.

Gómez de Avellaneda, Gertrudis. The Love Letters. Translated by Dorry Malcolm. Havana: Juan Fernández Burgos, 1956. 96 p.

Guérard, Albert. Fossils and Presences. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. x, 270 p.

Guthke, Karl S. Englische Vorromantik und deutscher Sturm und Drang: M. G. Lewis' Stellung in der Geschichte der deutsch-englischen Literaturbeziehungen. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958. 231 p. (Palaestra, Band 223.)

Hanna, Thomas. The Thought and Art of Albert Camus. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958. xx, 204 p.

Hanot, M. De Beginselen van Albert Verweys literaire critiek. Ghent: Koninklijke Vlaamse Academic voor Taal- en Letterkunde, 1957. 298 p.

Hassell, James Woodrow, Jr. Sources and Analogues of the Nouvelles Récréations et Joyeux Devis of Bonaventure des Périers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. 171 p.

Hipple, Walter John, Jr. The Beautiful, The Sublime, The Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1957. vi, 390 p.

Houtchens, Carolyn Washburn, and Lawrence Huston Houtchens (editors). The English Romantic Poets and Essayists. A Review of Research and Criticism. New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1957. xii, 363 p.

Icelandic-English Dictionary. Initiated by Richard Cleasby, revised, enlarged, and completed by Gudbrand Vigfusson. Second edition, with a supplement by Sir William A. Craigie. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. xlvi, 833 p.

Kridl, Manfred. The Lyric Poems of Julius Slowacki. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1958. 77 p.

Langbaum, Robert. The Poetry of Experience: The Dramatic Monologue in Modern Literary Tradition. New York: Random House, 1957. 246 p.

La Vie de Lazarillo de Tormès (La vida de Lazarillo de Tormes). Traduction de A. Morel-Fatio. Introduction de M. Bataillon. Paris: Aubier Éditions Montaigne, 1958. 221 p. (Collection des Classiques Étrangers.)

Leal, Luis. Antología del cuento mexicano. Mexico City: Ediciones de Andrea, 1957. 165 p. (Coll. Antologías Studium, No. 3.)

Lemaire, Jean, de Belges. Le Temple d'honneur et de vertus. Édition critique publiée par Henri Hornik. Geneva: Librairie Droz; Paris: Librairie Minard, 1957. 140 p.

Leo, Ulrich. Zur dichterischen Originalität des Arcipreste de Hita. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1958. 131 p. (Analecta Romantica, Beiheft zu den romanischen Forschungen, 6.)

Lermontov, Mihail. A Hero of Our Time. Translated by Vladimir Nabokov in collaboration with Dmitri Nabokov. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1958. xxiv, 210 p.

Lesins, Knuts. The Wine of Eternity: Short Stories from the Latvian. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. xxiii, 179 p.

Letters of Gorky and Andreev, 1899-1912. Edited with an introduction by Peter Yershov. Letters, introduction, and notes translated by Lydia Weston. New York: Columbia University Press; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958. viii, 200 p.

Loomis, Roger Sherman (editor). Medieval Romances. New York: Modern Library, 1957. xiv, 426 p.

Lüthi, Max. Shakespeares Dramen. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1957. 474 p.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. Mandragola. Translated by Anne and Henry Paolucci. With an introduction by Henry Paolucci. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. xvi, 61 p.

Mazzeo, Joseph Anthony. Structure and Thought in the Paradiso. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. xii, 220 p.

McLean, Hugh, Martin E. Malia, George Fischer (editors). Russian Thought and Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. xii, 513 p. (Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. IV.)

Millard, Galia (editor). Les Empereors de Rome par Calendre. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957. viii, 179 p.

Milosz, O. V. de L. Miguel Mañara. Mystère en six tableaux. Paris: Librairie Les Lettres, 1957. 139 p

Miner, Earl. The Japanese Tradition in British and American Literature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. xxii, 312 p.

Molière. The Learned Ladies. Translation and introduction by Renée Waldinger. Great Neck, N. Y.: Barron's Educational Series, 1957. ii, 87 p.

Molière. The Middle-Class Gentleman. Translation and introduction by Herma Briffault. Great Neck, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, 1957. ii, 111 p.

Mulhauser, Frederick L. (editor). The Correspondence of Arthur Hugh Clough. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. 2 vols. xxiv, 320, vi, 321-656 p.

Müller-Bochat, Eberhard. Lope de Vega und die italianische Dichtung. Wiesbaden: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz in Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag, 1957. 158 p. (Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 1956, No. 12.)

Myers, Robert Mason. Handel, Dryden, & Milton. Being a Series of Observations on the Poems of Dryden and Milton, As alter'd and adapted by Various Hands, and set to Musick by Mr. Handel. To Which are added, Authentick Tests of Several of Mr. Handel's Oratorio's. London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956. 158 p.

Narokov, N. The Chains of Fear. Translated from the Russian by Christopher Bird. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958. 282 p.

Ojala, Aatos. Aestheticism and Oscar Wilde: Part II, Literary Style. Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 1955. 270 p.

Olivera, Otto. Breve historia de la literatura antillana. Mexico City: Ediciones de Andrea, 1957. 217 p. (Manuales Studium 7.)

Oppel, Horst. Stand und Aufgaben der deutschen Shakespeare-Forschung. Reprinted from DVLG, XXXII (1958), 113-171.

Oxford Slavonic Papers. Vols. VI (1955) and VII (1957). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956-57. 143, 134 p.

Parker, Jack Horace. Breve historia del teatro español. Mexico City: Ediciones de Andrea, 1957. 213 p. (Manuales Studium 6.)

Pearson, Lu Emily. Elizabethans at Home. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. vi, 630 p.

Praz, Mario. The Flaming Heart: Essays on Crashaw, Machiavelli, and Other Studies in the Relations between Italian and English Literature from Chaucer to T. S. Eliot. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1958. viii, 390 p.

Preitz, Max (editor). Friedrich Schlegel und Novalis: Biographie einer Romantikerfreundschaft in ihren Briefen. Darmstadt: Hermann Gentner Verlag, 1957. 271 p.

Pyritz, Hans. Goethe-Bibliographie. Lieferung 3. Unter radaktioneller Mitarbeit von Paul Raabe. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1957. 240 p.

Raddock, Maxwell C. Portrait of an American Labor Leader: William L. Hutcheson. Saga of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America 1881-1954. New York: American Institute of Social Science, 1955. xviii, 430 p.